ミッチェル先生ブログのもとになった国会質問書＆答弁書の日本語原文 2019/10
Q & A Japanese government style – denial has no boundaries – Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=43448 | chietherabbit (@chietherabbit) |
以下、ミッチェル先生ブログ★[☆]のもとになった国会MMT質問書＆答弁書の日本語原文です。 shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_… shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_… | |
ビル・ミッチェル 日本政府の答弁スタイル ｰ どこまでも拒絶（2019年10月24日） — 経済学101
https://econ101.jp/%E3%83%93%E3%83%AB%E3%83%BB%E3%83%9F%E3%83%83%E3%ビル・ミッチェル 日本政府の答弁スタイル ｰ どこまでも拒絶（2019年10月24日）
Bill Mitchell, “Q & A Japanese government style – denial has no boundaries“, –Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory, October 24, 2019.
（訳者注：日本語から英訳された質問主意書と政府答弁書は元の日本語に戻してあります。Chie Kobayashi（twitter）による政府答弁書の素晴らしい英訳は原エントリをご参照）
今日のエントリはいつもと少し違うスタイルだ。先日のこちらの記事– Apparently core MMT idea is now supported by the mainstream (October 16, 2019) –でも触れたように、日本の臨時国会の初日に立憲民主党の中谷一馬が提出した質問主意書に対し日本政府が答弁している。その記事を書いた時点では、日本政府の答弁が完全な形で入手できていなかったのだが、日本のメディアによれば要するにこういうものだったとのことだ。「政府として我々は日本がMMTの成功事例であるという考えに基づいた政策は実行せず、財政健全化に努めていく。」なるほど、否定しようもないものを否定しようとするための面白い方法だとは思う。しかしそもそもMMTは「事例」ではなく、それは現代の通貨システムの運用方法や、通貨システムにおける通貨の発行者たる政府の能力、および特定の政策を選択したときの結果を理解するための新しいレンズを提供するものだということが見落とされている。このレンズを通して見えてくるのは、日本政府が過去30数年間にわたり、政策を新たな領域へと押し進めてきたことだ。つまり、中央銀行による大規模な国債買い入れが継続的に行われ、大きな財政赤字を抱えながらも、金利はゼロ以下にまで低下し、インフレ率はゼロ近傍からマイナスに、長期国債利回りはマイナスに低下した。この「選択された」政策の結果は、主流のマクロ経済学者が予測していたものとはかけ離れている。本質的には日本は主流経済学を裏切っており、むしろその虚構性を示してきたのだ。日本の状況を説明できる唯一のマクロ経済学的思考体系がMMTである。だからこそ、われわれの仕事が日本の最高機関で議論されることになっている。さて今回のエントリはその質問と政府の回答の完全な翻訳を注釈付きで紹介しよう。自分の翻訳は Chie Kobayashi さんにより大きく改良されたものになっている。彼女の助力に感謝。
質問
ことの始まりは、2019年10月4日に日本の国会に提出された質問第一四号「ＭＭＴ（現代貨幣理論）に関する質問主意書」だ。中谷一馬氏によるこの主意書の中には政府の答弁を求める九つの質問が挙げられている。
ＭＭＴ（現代貨幣理論）に関する質問主意書
いわゆるＭＭＴ（現代貨幣理論）とは、自国通貨を発行できる政府・中央銀行は、自国通貨建てで国債を 発行している限り、財政赤字を拡大してもデフォルト（債務不履行）することはないという理論とされる。 国家は、国民に対して納税義務を課し、「通貨」を租税の支払い手段として法令で決める。ＭＭＴでは、 これにより、「通貨」には、納税義務の履行手段としての需要が生じることで、国民は、価値を認めること になると考える。結果として通貨は、民間取引の支払いや貯蓄手段として利用されるようになり、流通する ようになる。
また、ＭＭＴでは、誰かの債務は別の誰かの債権であり、誰かの赤字は別の誰かの黒字であると考える。 単純化すると、政府部門の赤字は民間部門の黒字（海外部門も含めれば、国内民間部門の収支＋国内政府部 門の収支＋海外部門の収支＝０）だと言える。世界的に見ると、アメリカ合衆国の民主党のオカシオコルテ ス下院議員が支持を表明したことで話題になり、経済学者や著名投資家などがＭＭＴに対してコメントする など、ＭＭＴへの注目が集まっている。
こうした状況を踏まえ、我が国においても様々な研究・検討を行う必要があると考え、政府の見解を確認したく、以下質問する。
一 日本の債務残高は対ＧＤＰ比で二〇一七年度末に二百三十六％を超え、金額で千二百九十四兆円となっ ている。日本の債務残高は、対ＧＤＰ比で見ても、二〇一〇年に破綻寸前と言われたギリシャを上回って いるが、金利については十年物国債金利が世界最低水準で推移しており、金利はマイナスまで下がり続け ている。こうした状況を踏まえて伺うが、債務残高が変化すると金利が変化するという因果関係はあると 考えているのか、ないと考えているのか。また、あると考えているのであれば債務残高がいくらになった ら金利がどうなるかなどの予測をされているのか、具体的な数値の見通しを含めて、政府の見解を伺いた い。
二 日本の政府債務がまだ四百兆円の頃（二十年ほど前）から、「ＧＤＰと変わらないほどの政府債務があ ったら金利は騰がり、通貨は暴落してハイパーインフレになって大変なことになる」と言われてきた。こ れは、財務省が商品貨幣説に立っているからであるが、いくら時間が経っても物価は騰がっていない。そ れにもかかわらず、今でもいつか起きるはずだと言う声があるが、日本はＭＭＴに基づいた政策を実行し ているとの考えから財政破綻はしないという声もある。ニューヨーク州立大学のステファニー・ケルトン教授も、「巨額の財政赤字でもインフレも金利上昇も起こっていない日本はＭＭＴの成功例」などと主張 しているが、こうした意見を政府はどのように捉えているのか所見を伺いたい。
三 二〇一九年四月四日に、日本銀行の黒田総裁は、「いわゆるＭＭＴの評価については、これが必ずしも 整合的に体系化された理論ではなくて、全体の把握が容易でないということで、その本質をつかむことは なかなか難しいのではないかと感じておりますが、ＭＭＴの基本的な主張について、自国通貨建て政府債 務はデフォルトすることがないので、財政政策は財政赤字や債務残高などを考慮せずに景気安定化に専念 すべきであるというふうに理解いたします。このように財政赤字や債務残高を考慮しないという考え方は 極端な主張であり、なかなか受け入れられないのではないかというふうに考えております。」という発言 をされているが、政府も同様の見解であるか。同様の見解であれば、何がどのように体系化されておら ず、理論としてどの部分が欠落していると政府は考えているのか、詳細についてご見解を伺いたい。
四 平成十四年に、海外の格付け会社が日本国債の格付けを引き下げた。その際、当時財務省の財務官であ った日本銀行の黒田総裁が、ムーディーズ・Ｓ＆Ｐ・フィッチ宛に出した質問状には「日・米など先進国 の自国通貨建て国債のデフォルトは考えられない。デフォルトとして如何なる事態を想定しているの ４ か。」という記載がある。この内容については、今でも政府公式見解として変わりはないか、所見を伺い たい。
五 二〇一九年四月四日の参議院決算委員会にて、日本銀行の黒田総裁は、「銀行は信用創造で十億でも百 億でもお金を創り出せる。借入が増えれば貸付としての預金が増える。これが現実。どうですか、日銀総 裁」と問われ、「銀行が与信行動をすることで預金が生まれることはご指摘の通りです。」と認めた。い わゆるＭＭＴでは、この信用創造を政府に当てはめ、政府が財政赤字支出をするに当たり国債を発行し、 事業を行えば、財政支出額と同額の民間預金が生まれ、貨幣供給量が増える。したがって、資金供給の逼 迫により金利が上昇することなく、財政破綻はしないと考える。政府部門を赤字にすれば民間は黒字にな る、つまりは、政府が国債を発行すればするほど民間の預金が増えるという意味であり、経済は活性化す ると言えるが、如何か。政府はどのように捉えているのか、見解を伺いたい。
六 経済学者のステファニー・ケルトン氏や経済産業省の中野剛志氏は「政府は、自国通貨発行権を有する ので、自国通貨建て国債が返済不能になることは、理論上あり得ないし、歴史上も例がない。」という趣 旨の発言を述べているが、この認識は正しいと思うか、否か、政府の見解を伺いたい。
七 財務省のウェブサイトでは、日本の国家財政において、歳出全体の約三分の一を公債金収入に依存して いることについて、「将来世代へ負担をつけ回して」と述べている。また財務大臣の諮問機関である財政 制度等審議会財政制度分科会の二〇一九年六月十九日の資料によると、「現代の世代の受益と負担の乖離 やその結果としての公債残高累増が意味することは、こうした将来世代へのツケ回しに他ならない」と述 べている。しかしながら、財務省が作成した個人向け国債の広告動画や資料においては、「未来への贈り 物。個人向け国債」と言うメッセージを配信している。国債について異なる意味合いのことが述べられて いるが、将来へのツケなのか、未来への贈り物なのか、政府の見解を伺いたい。
八 将来、国債を償還する時にその原資になるのは、将来世代が納める税金であると考えられるが、仮に国債が償還されなくなった場合、それにより直接的な不利益を被る者は国債の保有者という認識で正しい か、政府の見解を伺いたい。
九 財務省は二〇一九年四月十七日に開催された財政制度等審議会財政制度分科会において「説明資料（わ が国財政の現状等について）」という資料を公開している。
この資料の中には、「ＭＭＴに対する批判、コメント」という欄が設けられ、ＭＭＴに対する批判的なコメントのみが抜粋されている。そして批判的なコメントを述べた者としてクリスティーヌ・ラガルドＩ ＭＦ（国際通貨基金）専務理事の「ＭＭＴが本物の万能薬だとわれわれは思っていない。ＭＭＴが機能す るようなケースは極めて限定的である。現時点でＭＭＴが持続的にプラスの価値をもたらす状況の国があ るとは想定されない。（理論の）数式は魅惑的だが、重大な注意事項がある。金利が上がり始めれば（借 金が膨張して）罠にはまる。」という発言が記載されている。しかしながら、ラガルド専務理事は「デフ レに見舞われたりするなどの状況下では、短期的には効果的かもしれない」とも述べているが、その発言 は記載されていない。
このように財務省がＭＭＴに関して、肯定的な発言を排除し、わざわざ否定的なコメントだけを抜粋し てまとめた資料で、説明を行っている理由について政府の見解を伺いたい。右質問する。
日本政府の答弁 – ミッチェルの注釈付き
この政府の答弁は、10月15日に安倍晋三総理大臣から大島理森衆院議長に宛てられたものだ。
質問一について。国債金利は経済・財政の状況等の様々な要因を背景に市場において決まるものであり、「債務残高がい くらになったら金利がどうなるか」といった予測を行うことは困難であるが、国の債務残高の変化につい ては、政府の財政運営に対する市場の信認に影響を与える可能性があることから、金利に影響を与え得る 要因の一つであると考えられる。
ミッチェル：つまり、因果関係の問題に答えることを避けている。主流のマクロ経済学は、債務の量から利回りへの因果を明確に主張する。
それによれば国債は、限られた貯蓄のプールをめぐる民間企業との競争を激化させるから、希少性によって国債の利回が上昇するという因果になっている。さらに、インフレやデフォルトのリスクが高まるので、金利は上昇するとのことだ。
しかし、では日本の大規模で継続的な赤字が、低金利からマイナスの金利および債券利回りを伴っているという事実をどう説明するのか。
質問二について。現代貨幣理論（以下「ＭＭＴ」という。）については、論者によって様々な主張があり、御指摘の「Ｍ ＭＴに基づいた政策」が具体的にどのような政策を指すのかは必ずしも明らかではないが、「巨額の財政 字でもインフレも金利上昇も起こっていない日本はＭＭＴの成功例」という主張については、政府とし てそのような考え方に基づく政策はとっておらず、令和七年度の国・地方を合わせたプライマリーバラン ス黒字化を目指すと同時に債務残高対ＧＤＰ比の安定的な引下げを目指すなど、財政健全化に向けた取組 を進めている。
ミッチェル：MMTについてのよくある誤解の一つが登場。「MMTに基づく政策」と言うと、日本がMMTの中核となる一連の政策に従っているかのような意味になってしまう。
正しくは、過去三十年に渡り日本政府が選択した政策の結果は、主流のマクロ経済学を否定する結果をもたらし、MMTの中核的研究の予測精度を実証したというものだ。
MMTの経済学者たちは、日本政府（財務省と日本銀行の総体）は、日銀のバランスシートの動向とは無関係に、いつまでも低金利と国債の低利回りを維持することができるだろうと予想してきた。
我々はまた、日本政府が債務不履行に陥ることはなく、日本国債は低金利であっても非常に魅力的であり続けるだろうと予測してきた。主流のマクロ経済学者たちの予測はこれと正反対だった。
質問三について。御指摘の黒田日本銀行総裁の発言についてその背景や根拠等を必ずしも承知しているわけではなく、ま た、個別の理論が体系化されているか、理論としてどの部分が欠落しているかといったことについては、 学術的評価に関することであり、政府としてお尋ねにお答えすることは差し控えたい。
ミッチェル：拒絶だ。政府は二番目の質問への回答で明確に 「健全財政」志向を表明している。政府は一体となってプライマリーバランスの黒字が価値のあることだと言っている。
政府は現実としては常に健全財政を回避し「財政再建」 という名の経済停滞に取り組んできたのだが、政策選択の指針はいつも主流のマクロ経済理論だったのだ。
質問四について。御指摘の格付会社宛ての財務省の意見書については、平成十四年に、日本国債の格下げが行われたこと に対して、より客観的な説明を求めるため、同省より外国格付会社に送付されたものである。
ミッチェル：「政府は債務のデフォルト・リスクはゼロと考えているか」という質問に答えることをひたすら避けている。
質問五について。お尋ねの「政府が財政赤字支出をするに当たり国債を発行し、事業を行えば、財政支出額と同額の民間預金が生まれ、貨幣供給量が増える。したがって、資金供給の逼迫により金利が上昇することなく、財政破綻はしないと考える」及び「政府が国債を発行すればするほど民間の預金が増えるという意味であり、 経済は活性化すると言える」の意味するところが必ずしも明らかではないが、政府としては、「巨額の財 政赤字でもインフレも金利上昇も起こっていない日本はＭＭＴの成功例」との考え方に基づく政策はとっておらず、引き続き財政運営に対する市場の信認を確保するため、財政健全化の取組を進めていく必要が あると考えている。また、経済活性化に向け、成長戦略実行計画を強力に推進するなど、引き続き成長力 の強化に向けた取組を進めていく考えである。
ミッチェル：日本政府が選択した政策の結果は、MMTが示す分析と合致しているが、主流のマクロ経済学が30年近くにわたって日本について予測してきたことを明確に否定しているというのが現実だ。
ポイントはここなのだ。
日本の政策立案者が常にMMTの教科書を参照してきたと主張する論者はひとりもいない。
私も「日本がMMT分析の最良の実例だ」と言うことがある。それは、実施した政策の結果がMMTの予測とはよく一致している一方で、競合理論である主流のマクロ経済学から導き出される予測とは全然一致していないという意味だ。
日銀が金融システムの運営方法と自らの能力を理解してることは明白で、私の業界の主流連中や金融報道機関の腰巾着たちからの幾多の警告や予言にもかかわらず、日銀は長期にわたりその能力を行使し続けている。
質問六について。ＭＭＴについては論者によって様々な主張があり、また、御指摘の主張についてはその前提や根拠等が 明らかではないため、政府としてお尋ねにお答えすることは差し控えたい。
ミッチェル：拒絶だ。
通貨を発行する政府が自国通貨を使い果たすことは決してありえないし、自らの通貨で発行した未返済の債務を履行しない理由は存在しない。これらの前提も根拠も明々白々たるものだ。
質問七について。財務省においては、個人向け国債によりその購入者は一定期間資産運用が可能であることを踏まえ、御指摘の「未来への贈り物。個人向け国債」という表現を用いているところである。しかしながら、国債は国の借金であることに変わりはないことから、将来世代へ負担を先送りすることなく、財政健全化の取組を進めていく必要があると考えている。
ミッチェル：全く答えになっていない。政府が自らの債務について説明しようとする際に、場合によって矛盾したメッセージを発しているという指摘に答えていない。
もとの質問は政府の偽善を突いている。政府は、債務が将来世代の負担である（実際は彼らの富なのだが）と言いながら、同じ口でそれが将来世代の利益となると言っているのだから。
質問八について。 国債の元金償還及び利子支払については、政府が責任を持って行うこととしており、国債の償還が確実 に行われるよう、財政健全化の取組を着実に進めてまいりたい。
ミッチェル：政府自身による通貨発行能力を拒絶。
この質問は、国債が満期を迎えたときに、政府はいかにロールオーバーするかについてだ。
国債の満期時に日本政府が返済することには何の支障もなく、そのために増税する必要もないことは明らかだ。
また、国債の保有者はいつでも払い戻しを受けることができることも明らかだ。つまりデフォルトはない。したがって、政府がこれまで何十年にもわたって行ってきたことをただそのまま継続するために 「健全財政」原則を持ち出し緊縮政策をとらなければならないと主張することは、通貨発行者たる政府の能力について議会に誤解を与えようとする意味のない策略に過ぎないのだ。
質問九について。 御指摘の「ＭＭＴに対する批判、コメント」については、経済学者や外国政府の責任者など有識者の発 言等の中で、ＭＭＴに対する評価の要点を抜粋しまとめたものであり、「肯定的な発言を排除し、わざわ ざ否定的なコメントだけを抜粋してまとめた」との御指摘は当たらないものと考えている。
ミッチェル：もとの質問は明快だ。政府自身の委員会への説明資料におけるMMTに関する説明に偏りがあったということだ。政府は、否定的なコメントだけを提示しつつ肯定的なコメントを省略し、選択的な引用をしていたという。
その説明資料は見ていないので、この質問が正しいかどうか自分には判断できない。
しかし、これ以外の政府の答弁を考えると、この質問が妥当で、政府はMMTに関する肯定的な回答を省いたのだろうと思う。
調べれば簡単に確認できることだ。
結論
この両文書をこうして英語で記録したことは重要だった。
証拠は明白だ。
日本政府は、なぜか明白な事実を絶対に認めまいとする。
政府は、マクロ経済政策の考え方こそが正統な主流であり、この正統的な考え方が予測するところでは財政余地が制約されているという見解を維持したいのだ。
ところが現実には、主流派マクロ経済学が日本の金融システムのダイナミクスを理解することができていないのに対し、MMTは政策とその結果との関係についてエレガントで正確な理解を提供している。
来週後半からは講演のために日本に行く。このテーマについて関係者と話し合うのは面白そうだ。
Chieの助力にもう一度感謝。
今日はここまで！
Q & A Japanese government style – denial has no boundaries – Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=43448Q & A Japanese government style – denial has no boundaries
A little bit of a different blog post format today. I mentioned in this blog post – Apparently core MMT idea is now supported by the mainstream (October 16, 2019) – that the Japanese government had taken issued a statement, by way of a formal answer to a series of questions from Japanese CDR politician Kazuma Nakatani on the opening day of the new Parliament (October 4, 2019). The Japanese government reply was not available in full at the time I wrote that but it was reported in the Japanese Media that the Government response could be summarised as “As a government, we don’t implement policy based on the idea that Japan is a successful case of MMT because its inflation and interest rates are not rising despite massive debt … We are working to restore fiscal health”. Which I thought was an interesting way of trying to deny the undeniable but also missed the point somewhat – being that MMT is not a ‘case’ but rather just provides an alternative lens to understanding the way in which modern monetary systems operate, the capacities of the currency-issuing government within those monetary systems, and the consequences of particular policy choices. In that context, over the last 3 odd decades, the Japanese government has pushed policy into new domains – large-scale central bank government bond purchases with continuous, and, at times, relatively large fiscal deficits yet has seen interest rates fall to zero and below, inflation low to negative and negative long-term bond yields. The consequences of the policy choices have been anathema to those predicted by mainstream macroeconomists. Japan has essentially defied mainstream economics and demonstrated its falsities. The only body of macroeconomic thought that gets close to explaining the Japanese situation is Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). That is why our work is being discussed at the highest levels in Japan. Anyway, today, I can present full translations of the Questions and the Government response with my annotations of that response. My translation was considerably enhanced by Kobayashi Chie and I thank her heaps for her help.
The Questions
It started on October 4, 2019 in the Japanese Diet with – Question No. 14 – ‘MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) Questions’, which were submitted by Mr Kazuma Nakatani and contained nine queries in total for the Government to answer.
Here is the edited text in English.
MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) Questions
The so-called MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) asserts that as long as governments and central banks can issue their government bonds in their local currency, it will not default even if the budget deficit is expanded. The nation imposes tax payment obligations on its citizens, and the “currency” is determined by law as a means of tax payment. In MMT, therefore, people in the nation recognise the value of the “currency” when demanded as a means of fulfilling tax obligations. As a result, the currency will be used and circulated as a means for private transactions and savings.
Also, MMT considers that one entities’ debt is another entities’ credit, and one entities’ deficit is another entities’ surplus.
To simplify, the government sector deficit is the non-government sector surplus, such that the domestic private sector balance + the domestic government sector balance + the external balance sum to zero).
Globally, US Democratic Congress representative Ocasio-Cortez expressed her support and MMT has became a hot topic; economists and well-known investors commented on MMT and the theory attracted much attention. Based on this situation, we think that it is necessary to consider this issue in Japan.
I would like to ask the following questions to confirm the Government’s view.
- Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 236% at the end of fiscal year 2017, and amounts to 1,294 trillion yen. Japan’s debt balance surpasses Greece, which was said to be on the verge of bankruptcy in 2010, even as a percentage of GDP. However, the yield on 10-year government bonds has been at the lowest level in the world, and is has at times in the recent period been negative.
Based on this situation, does the government think there is a causal relationship between interest rates changes and the evolution of the public debt ratio?
Also, if the answer is that there is a causal relationship, I would like to ask the Government to quantify that relationship.
- Since the Japanese government debt was around 400 trillion yen around 20 years ago, it has been said that “when the amount of the government debt is accumulated as much as the nation’s GDP, then interest rates will rise and the currency will fall, which triggers hyperinflation.”
This is the Ministry of Finance’s expressed opinion based on commodity currency theory, but prices in Japan have not risen no matter how much time passes.
Nevertheless, there are still voices that these events will occur someday. However, there are other voices that Japan will never face bankruptcy and the fact that those events have not occurred demonstrates the core arguments made by MMT.
I would like to know What the government’s views about these differing opinions.
- On April 4, 2019, the Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda said, “As for the so-called MMT, in my opinion, it is not a coherently structured theory, and it is not easy to grasp as a whole, so it is quite difficult for me to grasp its essence. But, I understand that, according to the basic claims of MMT, since the government will never default on debt issued in its own currency, that fiscal policy should focus on stabilising the economy without considering the size of budget deficit or debt balance. The idea of not considering the budget deficit and debt balance is an extreme claim, and I think that is difficult to accept.”
Does the government have the same view? If you have a similar view, then I would like to know why you support this view of MMT and to elaborate in detail what parts of MMT the Government thinks are incorrect or missing?
- In 2002, a credit rating company downgraded Japanese government bonds. At that time, the then Vice Minister of Finance Kuroda (the current governor of the Bank of Japan) stated in the open letter addressed to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, that “the default of the domestic currency-issued government bonds is unthinkable. What kind of situation do you assume as default?”
I would like to ask you whether the official Government opinion remains the same as that expressed by the then Vice Minister of Finance in 2002.
- At the House Councilors Financial Committee on April 4, 2019, Governor Kuroda of the Bank of Japan, received the following question: “banks can create millions and even billions of money by credit creation. If borrowing increases, deposits as loans increase. That is the reality. What do you think?”.
In reply, he admitted that “as you have pointed out, deposits are created by banks’ credit behavior.”
MMT applies a similar logic to government credit creation.
For the government to deficit spend, it matches the deficit with bond issuance. The government spending creates income for the private sector and private deposits equivalent to the amount of fiscal expenditure will be created, and the supply of currency in the economy increases. Therefore, the interest rates will not rise as a result of money supply tightness, and there will be no default by government.
If the government sector is in the red, the private sector will be in the black. In other words, the more the government issues government bonds, the more private deposits will increase.
What does the Government think about this?
- MMT economists and Takeshi Nakano of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, assert that “it is technically impossible for the government to default on its liabilities that are denominated in its own currency, and, that there is no historical example of such a default”.
I would like to ask the government’s view whether this perception is correct or not.
- According to the Ministry of Finance’s website, about one third of all expenditures depends on bond income, and that situation is described as “putting a burden on future generations”.
According to the references on June 19, 2019 at the Sub-Committee of the Financial System Council, which is the Finance ministry’s advisory body, it states that “the resulting increase in public debt balance is nothing less than turning to future generations.”
However, in advertising videos and materials for personal bonds produced by the Ministry of Finance, the message “Gift for the Future. Government bonds for individuals” is articulated.
This appears to be a very different outlook of the implications of government debt issuance than the ‘burdening future generations’ narrative.
I would like to ask the Government’s view – it government debt a burden for the future generations or a gift for the future?
- It is claimed that the source for the funds for the redemption of outstanding government bonds will be the tax paid by future generations. If the bonds are not redeemed, then the bond holders themselves will incur the damage.
Is this correct? What is the Government’s view on this?
- The Ministry of Finance produced some “Explanatory Documents (regarding the current fiscal situations in our nation)” at the Sub-Committee of the Financial System Council held on April 17, 2019, which is now available for the public to view.
In those documents, there is a column “Criticisms and comments on MMT”, which only states some excerpt of criticism of MMT made by others.
IMF Executive Director Christine Lagarde, is as an example of one such critic and is quoted as saying: “We do not think that the Modern Monetary Theory is actually the panacea. Cases where MMT can function is extremely limited. We don’t think that any country is currently in a position where that theory could actually deliver positive value in a sustainable way. It is tempting, when you look at the (theoretical) mathematical modeling of it, but there are important caveats. If interest rates start to rise (due to expansion of borrowing), we may be caught in a trap.”
However, Lagarde also said “if there is deflation, then in those circumstances it could possibly work for a short period of time”. But this additional comment is not stated in the explanatory documents given to the Sub-Committee.
In this way, the Ministry of Finance has excluded positive comments regarding MMT, and only extracted negative comments.
I would like to know the government’s views on the reason why the only negative comments are provided in the explanatory documents.
Those were the questions.
The Government’s Answer – with annotations from me
The – Government’s answer – was posted on October 15 by the Chairman of House of Representatives Tadamori Oshima and sent to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
About One: The government bond interest rate is determined in the market against the backdrop of various factors such as economic and financial conditions. It is difficult to make a prediction such as “What will happen to the interest rate if the amount of the national debts changes?” but it is one of the factors that affects interest rates as it may affect market confidence in government financial management.
Bill: In other words avoiding the question of causality altogether. Mainstream macroeconomics makes it clear that the causality runs from the volume of debt to the yield.
The causality arises in this case from the government bonds increasing competition for a finite pool of savings with firms seeking investment funds. As a result, bond yields rise due to scarcity. Further, yields rise due to rising risks of inflation and default.
About Two: There are various assertions about the Modern Monetary Theory (hereinafter referred “MMT”) by its theorists, hence it is not always clear what is the “policy based on MMT” refers to. But regarding the claim that “Japan is a successful example of MMT, where there is a huge budget deficit, inflation and interest rates have not risen”, the government has not formulated its policy based on such an idea.
We aim to stabilise the fiscal soundness by achieving a primary balance surplus for the national and regional governments combined by 2025. We also aim to achieve a stable reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio.
Bill: Here we encounter one of these recurring misunderstandings about MMT – “policy based on MMT” implies that there is a set of policies that Japan is following that represent core MMT.
The actual correct statement, is that the consequences of the policies chosen by the Japanese government over the last three decades have delivered outcomes that defy mainstream macroeconomics and have demonstrated the predictive accuracy of the core body of MMT work.
MMT economists predicted that the Japanese government (Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan combined) would be able to maintain interest rates and bond yields at low levels indefinitely irrespective of what was happening on the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet.
We also predicted that the Japanese government would not have to default and its debt would be highly attractive even at low yields. The mainstream macroeconomists predicted exactly the opposite.
About Three: I am not necessarily aware of the background or basis of the remarks made by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Kuroda, nor as to whether individual theories are correct or whether there are elements that are missing. This requires academic evaluation, and the Government refrains from answering your question.
Bill: Denial. In the response to Question 2, the Government adopts a very explicit ‘sound finance’ theme – that there is virtue in running primary fiscal surpluses at all levels of government.
While it pragmatically avoids doing that and every time it attempts to engage in what it calls ‘fiscal consolidation’, the economy tanks, it is still holding out mainstream macroeconomic theory as the benchmark to guide its policy choices.
About Four: The open letter by the Ministry of Finance addressed to the foreign rating companies in order to seek more objective explanations for their decision to downgrade Japanese government bonds in 2004.
Bill: Completely avoids the question which was whether the Government still believes that its debt has zero default risk.
About Five: Your statements: “For the government to deficit spend, it matches the deficit with bond issuance. The government spending creates income for the private sector and private deposits equivalent to the amount of fiscal expenditure will be created, and the supply of currency in the economy increases. Therefore, the interest rates will not rise as a result of money supply tightness, and there will be no default by government” and “the more the government issues government bonds, the more private deposits will increase” are not necessarily clear.
But the Government has not developed its policy choices based on the idea that Japan is a successful case of MMT because its inflation and interest rates are not rising despite massive debt”. We think it is necessary to continue efforts to improve fiscal soundness to ensure that the market confidence retains confidence in our fiscal management.
In addition, with the aim of revitalising the economy, we will continue to promote growth potential programs such as by strongly promoting the growth strategy execution plan.
Bill: The reality remains that the consequences that have flowed from the policy choices the Japanese government has made fit the analysis of outcomes presented by MMT, and, categorically refute what mainstream macroeconomics has been predicting about Japan for nearly 3 decades.
That is the point.
No-one is asserting that the Japanese policy makers regularly consult an MMT textbook when they formulate policy.
When I say that Japan is the best real world example of MMT analysis, I am saying that its policy inputs and outcomes accord closely with MMT predictions and not at all with those derived from the alternative, competing mainstream macroeconomics.
It is clear that the Bank of Japan understands the way the monetary system operates and its capacities within it and exploits that understanding relentlessly over a long period despite all the warnings and predictions of doom from the mainstream of my profession and the hangers on to that mainstream in the financial press.
About Six: Since there are various assertions about MMT by its theorists, and the assumptions and grounds for the claims are not clear.
The government does not wish to answer the question.
Bill: Denial.
The assumptions and grounds for the claim that a currency-issuing government can never run out of its own currency and that their is never a financial reason for it to default on any outstanding liabilities it issues in that currency are straightforward and crystal clear.
About Seven: The Ministry of Finance considers that the purchasers can manage the assets for a certain period of time using personal government bonds, hence it uses the term “gift for the future. JGB for individuals”.
However, we regard government bonds to be the same as national debts, we think it is necessary to proceed our efforts to improve fiscal soundness without leaving the burden to the future generations.
Bill: No answer at all. Doesn’t address the contradictory messaging the Government uses when talking about its own debt in different domains of interest.
The question was exploring the hypocrisy of a Government, who, on the one hand, talks about debt burdening the future generations (despite it being their wealth), yet, on the other hand, being a benefit for the future generations.
About Eight: The government is responsible for the repayment of principal and interest on government bonds, and we would like to steadily move forward to achieve the nation’s fiscal soundness so as to ensure the repayment of government bonds ensured.
Bill: Denial of the Government’s own currency capacity.
The question was about how the governments roll over their debt when specific issues mature.
It is clear the Government in Japan has no problem paying back the debt on maturity and does not have to raise taxes in order to do it.
It is also clear that debt holders are always paid back – that is, there is no default.
So, to suggest that the Government has to impose austerity by adopting the principles of ‘sound finance’ in order to continue doing what it has done for decades is nonsensical and just a ruse to mislead the Parliament from the true capacity the Government possesses as the currency issuer.
About Nine: As to the criticism and comments on MMT you pointed out, that is an excerpt of the main points of evaluation for MMT made by the experts such as economists and foreign government officials. Your claim that “positive comments are excluded and only negative comments are intentionally extracted and summarised” is not correct.
Bill: The question was clear – why was the Government’s own briefing documentations for its own committee processes biased towards MMT – in that it selectively quoted people by only producing what might be construed as being negative comments and leaving out the positive.
I have not seen the briefing documents so I don’t know whether the propositions in the Question are accurate or not.
But given the rest of the answers that the Government provided, I would suspect that the Question has validity and the Government did attempt to suppress any positive responses concerning MMT.
At any rate, it is an empirical issue and easily checked.
Conclusion
I think it was important to document this interchange for the public record in English.
The evidence is clear.
For some reason, the Japanese government is highly resistant to admitting the obvious.
It wants to hold out a view that its macroeconomic policy thinking is mainstream orthodox and the major prognostications of that orthodoxy are binding constraints on its fiscal space.
The reality is that mainstream macroeconomics has never been able to grasp the dynamics of the Japanese monetary system and that MMT provides a sophisticated and accurate understanding for the links between policy inputs and their consequences.
My speaking visit to Japan begins late next week. It will be interesting to talk these issues over with the concerned parties.
Thanks again to Chie for her assistance.
That is enough for today!
(c) Copyright 2019 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.
プロフィール Profile
小林 千恵 (トランスランゲージ 代表)
大学卒業後、メーカー勤務、在京大使館勤務を経て翻訳/通訳業へ。
金沢市を拠点に、書籍翻訳から、ビジネス翻訳、官公庁用翻訳、時事・社会関連の翻訳、さらにアテンド等通訳まで、多岐にわたる分野において国内外のお客様より高い信頼を頂いています。
お見積り等、「お問い合わせ」よりお気軽にご連絡ください。
Chie Kobayashi ‐ representative, Translanguage
After graduating from university with B.A. in English, I worked for a major manufacturer and later joined a foreign government institution in Tokyo where I was engaged in press and information services, during which I was professionally trained for translation and interpretation. Since returning to Kanazawa ten years ago, I have been a fulltime translator/interpreter working with domestic and global clients in extensive fields.
Japan Finance Minister getting paranoid about MMT – Bill Mitchell – Modern Monetary Theory
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=42385Japan Finance Minister getting paranoid about MMT
The debates about MMT are expanding. There are weird offerings springing up each day. I read something yesterday about how MMT is really just Marxism in disguise and therefore a plot to overthrow entrepreneurship. Well in a socialist society there will still be a monetary system! Most of the critiques just get to their point quickly – MMT is about wild printing presses undermining the value of the currency! That should summarise 25 years of our work nicely. But there are also other developments on a global scale. A few weeks ago there was a lengthy debate in the Japanese parliament during a House of Representatives Committee hearing considering whether the October sales tax hikes should continue. The Finance Minister, Taro Aso was confronted by Committee members who indicated that it was useless denying that Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) was some abstract theory that was wrong because the Japanese are already “doing it”. The Minister told the hearing that MMT was dangerous and would undermine financial markets if anyone said otherwise. An interesting discussion took place. It highlighted some key features of MMT. It also indicates that progress is being made in the process of education aimed at giving people a better understanding of how the monetary system that we live within operates.
The true agenda
The Reuters Report (May 17, 2019) – Brainard: Modern monetary theory would pose risks in diminishing Fed’s authority – is only three paragraphs long but tells us a lot about the true agenda behind the myth of central bank independence.
The article was reporting on comments made by US Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard about Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).
It said that:
The set of ideas known as Modern Monetary Theory could poses risks in shifting authority over the economy from the Federal Reserve to Congress or other institutions more tied to political considerations.
She was quoted as saying:
Putting those responsibilities in an institution that has a lot of oversight but a little bit of independence – there are some virtues to that. And to the extent that moves to a different setting there may be risks.
The risk? That the voice of the people, exercised through their elected representatives might actually determine policy settings and those politicians will have to take responsibility for their actions and not be able to deflect such to unelected and largely unaccountable cabals like central bank committees.
The neoliberal way is to depoliticise economic policy.
That is shorthand for compromising democracy.
The Japanese MMT Laboratory
The Japanese Diet (Parliament) has been debating whether the planned sales tax rise on October 1, 2019 should go ahead or not.
I have written about the Japanese experience with sales tax rises before:
1. Japan is different, right? Wrong! Fiscal policy works (August 15, 2017).
2. Japan returns to 1997 – idiocy rules! (November 18, 2014).
3. Japan’s growth slows under tax hikes but the OECD want more (September 16, 2014).
4. Japan – signs of growth but grey clouds remain (May 21, 2015).
5. Japan thinks it is Greece but cannot remember 1997 (August 13, 2012).
Everytime they hike sales taxes, it ends in misery – spending falls and economic activity comes to a crashing halt.
They saw that in 1997. And again in 2014.
In April 2014, the Abe government raised the sales tax from 5 per cent to 8 per cent.
After the sales tax hike, there was a sharp drop in private consumption spending as a direct result of the policy shift. At the time, I predicted it would get worse unless they changed tack.
It certainly did get worse. Consumers stopped spending and the impact of static consumption expenditure was that business investment then lags.
Here is the history of real GDP growth (annualised) since the March-quarter 1994 to the March-quarter 2015. The red areas denote sales tax driven recessions.
In both episodes, these recessions were followed by a renewed bout of fiscal stimulus (monetary policy was ‘loose’ throughout).
In both episodes, there was a rapid return to sustained growth as a result of the fiscal boost.
Nothing could be clearer.
And the debate is back on the table in the Parliament.
However, this time, the debate has introduced MMT understandings which make it more interesting and bring out some really important aspects of our work.
The debates prompted the Wall Street Journal (May 15, 2019) article – ‘We’re Already Doing It’: Japan Tests Unorthodox Economic Doctrine (behind paywall) – to write:
But in Japan, MMT is at the center of a policy battle with imminent consequences: whether to proceed with an Oct. 1 sales-tax hike designed to trim the deficit.
The government plans to increase the sales tax from 8 to 10 per cent and has wheeled out an array of mainstream macroeconomic arguments about the evils of fiscal deficits to justify the decision.
In his annual – Speech on Fiscal Policy by Minister of Finance Aso at the 198th Session of the National Diet (January 28, 2019) – the Finance Minister said that the Government was making:
… steady efforts to achieve economic revitalization and fiscal consolidation … secure a stable source of funds by raising the consumption tax rate in October this year.
The context of these remarks was the “the declining birthrate and aging population” and the need “to establish a social security system oriented to all generations and secure its sustainability”.
So the usual suspects – government cannot afford to pay pensions as the society ages and thus needs to cut deficits to increase its capacity to fund said pensions.
The Finance Minister (Taro Aso) was quoted in the WSJ article as saying that:
It could loosen our fiscal discipline and be extremely dangerous.
He also claimed that “he didn’t want Japan to turn into a ‘test site’ for foreign economic theories.
Well I am sorry to say that Japan has been a great ‘laboratory’ for demonstrating the underlying principles of MMT for decades now, given that it has been the first nation to really explore what we might think of as the ‘extremes’ of fiscal and monetary policy.
Relatively high and sustained fiscal deficits.
Relatively high gross public debt to GDP ratios.
Zero interest rates.
Negative 10-year Japanese government bond yields.
Low inflation to deflation.
In Chapter 2 of our new MMT textbook – Macroeconomics – (published by Macmillan, March 2019), which is titled “How to Think and Do Macroeconomics”, we have a section “What Should a Macroeconomic Theory be Able to Explain?” and in that discussion we discuss “Japan’s persistent fiscal deficits: the glaring counterfactual case”.
We state:
Consult almost any other macroeconomics textbook and you will find the following propositions stated, in some form or another, as inalienable fact:
1. Persistent fiscal deficits push up short-term interest rates because the alleged need to finance higher deficits increases the demand for scarce savings relative to its supply.
2. These higher interest rates undermine private investment spending (the so-called ‘crowding out’ hypothesis).
3. Persistent fiscal deficits lead to bond markets demanding increasing yields on government debt.
4. The rising public debt-to-GDP ratio associated with the persistent fiscal deficits will eventually lead bond markets to withdraw their lending to the government and the government will run out of money.
5. Persistent fiscal deficits lead to accelerating inflation and potentially hyperinflation, which is highly detrimental to the macroeconomy.
To the ‘we knew it all along’ crew or the ‘MMT is crazy’ crew or derivations, they have to confront the fact that the 5 mainstream propositions are all disproven by the realities that Japan provides.
Japan has run a persistent deficit since 1992. A massive build-up of private indebtedness associated with a real estate boom, accompanied the five years of fiscal surpluses from 1987 to 1991. The boom crashed spectacularly in 1991 and was followed by a period of lower growth and the need for higher deficits. The convention in Japan is that the national government matches its fiscal deficit with the issuance of bonds to the non-government sector, principally the private domestic sector.
Unsurprisingly, given the institutional practice of issuing debt to the private bond markets to match the fiscal deficits, the debt ratio has risen over time as a reflection of the ongoing deficits that the Japanese government has been running to support growth in the economy and maintain relatively low unemployment rates
If the mainstream macroeconomic propositions summarised above correctly captured the way the real world operates, then we should have expected to see rising interest rates, increasing bond yields, and accelerating inflation in Japan, given the persistent fiscal deficits.
Did the persistent fiscal deficits in Japan drive up interest rates and government bond yields? The answer is clearly no!
The overnight interest rate in Japan, which is administered by the central bank, the Bank of Japan has stayed exceedingly low and has not responded adversely to the persistent fiscal deficits.
Long-term (10 year) bond yields (interest rates) on government debt have also stayed very low and not responded adversely to the persistent fiscal deficits. If investors considered the government debt had become increasingly risky to purchase, they would have demanded increasing yields to compensate for that risk. There is no such suggestion – that bond market investors have become wary of Japanese government bonds – to be found here.
The corollary is that the investors have also not signalled any unwillingness to purchase the debt; demand for the bonds remains high and yields remain low.
For example, the most recent 10-year bond auction was on May 3, 2019 (Issue No. 353) carried a nominal coupon rate (yield) of 0.1 per cent. There was 2,200 billion yen on offer and the Ministry of Finance recorded 7,609.5 billion competitive bids for the debt. The yield at the “lowest accepted price” was 0.00.
You can access all data – Auction Results for JGBs.
In terms of inflation, after the property boom crashed and the Japanese government began to run persistent and at times, large, fiscal deficits, the inflation rate has been low and often negative. There is clearly no inflationary bias in the modern Japanese economy, as persistently predicted by the mainstream economic theories.
The conclusion is obvious.
First, despite persistent deficits and a rising public debt-to-GDP ratio, along with a downgrade of Japan’s credit rating by international ratings agencies, including Fitch in April 2015, international bond markets have not ‘punished’ the Japanese government with high ten year interest rates on public debt nor has the central bank lost control of the overnight interest rate.
Second, the persistent deficits have not led to high rates of domestic inflation.
It is clear that the mainstream macroeconomic explanation of the relationships between fiscal deficits, interest rates, bond yields and inflation rates is unable to adequately capture the real world dynamics in Japan.
Such a categorical failure to provide an explanation suggests that the mainstream theory is seriously deficient.
In later chapters of the textbook we provide a detailed MMT explanation of these empirical outcomes.
The point is that the body of work we now call MMT has an impeccable record of capturing the dynamics of the Japanese monetary system and provided sound explanations for the data movements.
So Mr Aso – Japan is already ‘testing’ MMT. Thank you.
The Diet Records
If you go keep tabs on the discussions in the Japanese House of Representatives (the Diet) you will have come across some interesting discussions last month surrounding the sales tax debate.
The 198th National Assembly Finance and Finance Committee 12th met on Wednesday, April 17, 2019. Taro Aso was in attendance as were a host of Finance Ministry officials.
The Transcript of Proceedings – 第198回国会 財務金融委員会 第12号(平成31年4月17日(水曜日)) – makes interesting reading and is where the WSJ report comes from (even though the report was 2 weeks after the hearing.
The Finance Minister was asked by a Committee member:
There has been a lot of debate about MMT in the United States … Those who are proposing it say that Japan is ‘doing’ MMT currently – the Bank of Japan is carrying out a lot of fiscal actions and keeping interest rates low. They say that Japan is a good example of the principles of MMT. Do the Ministers agree with that?”
He replied:
Money, Monetary Theory … MMT for short … this is often spoken about now by politicians, various people …
I don’t think we need to explain the theory here … there are many people in the US – many officials including Larry Summers who are against it … But to do it in Japan … and think about that kind of reaction the market would have … I do not intend to make Japan an experimental site for it.
To which a Committee member responded:
By the way, MMT stands for Modern Monetary Theory, so please do not continue to make a mistake …
But it remains that MMT proponents are saying that the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan have been demonstrating the principles of MMT for many years. Does the Minister think that they are mistaken?
Aso replied:
As I said before … we are not experimenting with Modern Monetary Theory.
Committee question:
But do you think it is a sound theory … please tell us whether you have a positive or negative impression.
Aso wavered.
A Committee member then said:
I think MMT is just an excuse to delay fiscal consolidation and I think it is an outrageous argument. As Finance minister I think you should be more resolute in your rejection. It seems like you are vague about it. If so, I think that confidence in Japanese finances will fluctuate. Do you think that is okay?
Aso:
Japanese public finances are not shaky. Interest rates are not rising in the current situation and our finances are fine in the medium- to long-term. We are reducing bond issuance by more than 10 trillion trillion yen.
We have transmitted to the market our intent to consolidate and there has been no adverse market response – no sudden fall in government bond tenders and no rise in interest rates …
We must continue in this direction which is why we have to increase the consumption tax …
Committee Member:
The point is that the government has controlled the market and has kept interest rates low so that the government could make the debt environment easier and fiscal consolidation has been delayed … This is the essence of MMT and it says that Japan demonstrates best practice.
In other words, MMT proponents say that the Japanese government should postpone fiscal consolidation …
Aso wavered.
Committee Member:
We repeat the same point … as a finance minister, do you think that MMT is correct or do you think it is wrong? Please answer only that point.
Aso:
… I think I cannot follow such a dangerous story.
And so it went.
In the news brief – [PDF] 衆議院財務金融委員会ニュース (April 17, 2019) – which reported on the Committee proceedings it was stressed that it was necessary for the Minister to show a resolute attitude in rejecting MMT so that the market confidence in Japanese government finances was not undermined.
It was also stressed that if people started to follow MMT then the environment for fiscal consolidation would not be favourable.
I found this exchange really interesting. Think about it in relation to Lael Brainard’s fear that if politicians get hold of fiscal policy then they might pursue more “expansive social programs”.
The amazing thing about the Japanese discussion is that MMT provides a superior understanding of the dynamics of their monetary system.
It is not a matter of adopting MMT.
MMT should not been seen as a regime that you ‘apply’ or ‘switch to’ or ‘introduce’.
As I have noted regularly, MMT is rather a lens which allows us to see the true (intrinsic) workings of the fiat monetary system.
It helps us better understand the choices available to a currency-issuing government and the consequences of surrendering that currency-issuing capacity (as in the Eurozone).
It lifts the veil imposed by neoliberal ideology and forces the real questions and political choices out in the open.
An MMT understanding means that statements such as the ‘government cannot provide better services because it will run out of money’ are immediately known to be false.
Such an understanding will change the questions we ask of our politicians and the range of acceptable answers that they will be able to give. In this sense, an MMT understanding enhances the quality of our democracies.
By providing a detailed analysis of the link between fiscal policy and bank reserves, for example, MMT clearly helps us understand why the Japanese interest rates and bond yields have been maintained at very low levels indefinitely even though the fiscal deficits have been relative large for decades.
You do not get that understanding from reading a mainstream macroeconomics text book. Their predictions were completely wrong because their monetary framework, inasmuch as there is one, is deeply flawed – basically articulating a fictional world.
When mainstream economists say there is ‘nothing new’ about MMT or ‘we knew it all along’ they are simply lying and trying to cover their deep ignorance of the operations of the monetary system.
I challenge anyone to produce a mainstream textbook current or past that provides the deep insights about reserve operations, fiscal deficits and can explain the Japanese situation.
So poor Mr Aso – he thinks if he admits all that then the financial markets will go crazy. Yet, the financial markets already know all this stuff. While they may not call the reality they trade in MMT, the fact is that it is.
They haven’t been scared off in the last several decades and will not be if anyone dares to admit the obvious. MMT is all around us. Get used to it.
During the Japanese government discussions it was also highlighted that the Bank of Japan has been buying up an “increasing proportion” of government bonds which means that there is no real need for the bond market auctions anyway … another central MMT proposition.
This prompted a government member to tell Mr Aso that “You’re totally wrong. We’re already doing it”.
Finally, the other feature of the Committee discussions was in that the proponents of MMT in the House of Representatives spanned the ideological range.
There are two groups who are opposed to the sales tax rise and have invoked MMT as a defense:
1. “Ruling party conservatives”.
2. Communist Party members – one MP said that “MMT is gaining popularity in the US and Europe … it was a public backlash against austerity policies and the accumulated dissatisfaction has finally exploded. The same applies to Japan”.
The point is that MMT is agnostic about policy bar its preference for an employment buffer rather than an unemployment buffer to discipline inflation.
In general, it makes no sense to talk about an “MMT-type prescription” or an “MMT solution”.
To make that MMT understanding operational in a policy context, a value system or ideology must be introduced.
MMT is not intrinsically ‘Left-leaning’.
A Right-leaning person would advocate quite different policy prescriptions to a Left-leaning person even though they both shared the understanding of how the monetary system operates.
That is highlighted by these recent debates in the Japanese Parliament where conservative politicians and Communist party members have invoked MMT understandings to argue against sales tax hikes designed to reduce the fiscal deficit.
Conclusion
Progress is being made.
Now MMT is entering parliamentary debates and is the subject of condemnation motions and all the rest of it.
Things are moving along nicely.
And I hope Mr Aso can sleep well once he works out that MMT is all around him and the sky remains well above his head.
That is enough for today!
(c) Copyright 2019 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.
868 名無しさん＠お腹いっぱい。[sage] 2019/10/24(木) 19:11:08.30 ID:EZipiXiq
返信削除Q & A Japanese government style - denial has no boundaries – Bill Mitchell - Modern Monetary Theory
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=43448
billThursday, October 24, 2019
以下、ミッチェル先生ブログのもとになった国会MMT質問書＆答弁書の日本語原文です。
https://twitter.com/chietherabbit/status/1187300350757232640?s=21
2019/10/4
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon_pdf_s.nsf/html/shitsumon/pdfS/a200014.pdf/$File/a200014.pdf
ＭＭＴ（現代貨幣理論）に関する質問主意書 提 出 者 中谷一馬
…
九 財務省は二〇一九年四月十七日に開催された財政制度等審議会財政制度分科会において「説明資料（わが
国財政の現状等について）」という資料を公開している。
この資料の中には、「ＭＭＴに対する批判、コメント」という欄が設けられ、ＭＭＴに対する批判的なコメント
のみが抜粋されている。そして批判的なコメントを述べた者としてクリスティーヌ・ラガルドＩＭＦ（国際通
貨基金）専務理事の「ＭＭＴが本物の万能薬だとわれわれは思っていない。ＭＭＴが機能するようなケースは
極めて限定的である。現時点でＭＭＴが持続的にプラスの価値をもたらす状況の国があるとは想定されない。
（理論の）数式は魅惑的だが、重大な注意事項がある。金利が上がり始めれば（借金が膨張して）罠にはまる。」
という発言が記載されている。しかしながら、ラガルド専務理事は「デフレに見舞われたりするなどの状況下
では、短期的には効果的かもしれない」とも述べているが、その発言は記載されていない。
このように財務省がＭＭＴに関して、肯定的な発言を排除し、わざわざ否定的なコメントだけを抜粋して
まとめた資料で、説明を行っている理由について政府の見解を伺いたい。
右質問する。
2019/10/15
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon_pdf_t.nsf/html/shitsumon/pdfT/b200014.pdf/$File/b200014.pdf
内閣総理大臣 安倍晋三 衆議院議長 大島理森 殿
衆議院議員中谷一馬君提出ＭＭＴ（現代貨幣理論）に関する質問に対する答弁書
…
九について
御指摘の「ＭＭＴに対する批判、コメント」については、経済学者や外国政府の責任者など有識者の発言
等の中で、ＭＭＴに対する評価の要点を抜粋しまとめたものであり、「肯定的な発言を排除し、わざわざ否定
的なコメントだけを抜粋してまとめた」との御指摘は当たらないものと考えている。
https://twitter.com/5chan_nel (5ch newer account)