[120] Rogers, C., Money, Interst and Capital : A Study in the Foundations of Mone-
13.
[103] Mongiovi, G., “Keynes, Hayek and Sraffa", Economie Appliquee, 1990, pp. 131
-56.
tary Theory, Cambridge U. P., 1989.
[104] Myrdal, G., Monetary Equilibrium, 1939.
[105] 鍋島直樹「カレツキ有効需要理論と貨幣供給の内生性」『経済研究』第44 巻第1
号,1993年,
[106] Nell, E. J., "Keynes after Sraffa", 1983 (F#3 17KIREEA¥O J
第2章所収).
[106] 野下保利「2つの貨幣供給ルートと管理通貨制度の変容」、 深町郁彌編「ドル本
位制の研究』日本経済評論社,第 12 章所収,1993年,
[107] 翁邦雄「日本における金融調節」「金融研究』第10 卷第2号,1991 年,
[108] 小野善康『不況の経済学」日本経済新聞社,1994 年,
[109] Palley, T. I., “Bank Lending, Discount Window Borrowing, and th Endoge-
nous Money Supply : A Theoretical Framework", Journal of Post Keynesian Eco-
[121] Rousseas, S., Post Keynesian Monetary Economics, Macmillan, 1986.
[122] Samuelson, P. A., "The General Theory", 1947. (^ ) Z TLU
収).
[123] Schumpeter, J. A., History of Economic Analysis, 1954. (E A R TE 5}
析の歴史』岩波書店,第2巻).
[124] 鈴木淑夫.黒田晁生,自川浩道「日本の金融市場調節方式にっいて」『金融研究』
第7巻第4号,1988 年,
[125] Targetti, F., Nicholas Kaldor : The Economics and Politics of Capitalism as
A Dynamic System, Clarendon Press, 1992.
[126] Tobin, J., “Commercial Banks as Creators of Money", in Carson, D. ed., Bank-
ing and Monetary Studies, Irwin, New York, 1963, reprinted in his Essays in Eco-
nomics, Winter 1987–88, pp. 282–303.
nomics, Vol. I : Macroeconomics, North Holland, pp.272 82.
[110]
“Beyond Endogenos Money : Towards Endogenous Finance", in-
[127]
"A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory", Journal
Deleplace, G. and Nell, E. J. ed., Money in Mortion : The Post Keynesian and Circula-
tion Approaches, Macmillan, 1966.
[111] Pasinetti, L. L., Growth and Income Distribution, Cambridge U. P., 1974. (
崎耕一訳『経済成長と所得分配」岩波書店)
[112] Patinkin, D., Keynes' Monetary Thought, Duke University Press, 1978. (JI|L]
弘·吉川俊雄·福田川洋二訳『ケインズ貨幣経済論』マグロウヒル好学社)
[113]
of Money, Credit and Banking, Feb. 1969, pp. 1529.
[128]
"Money and Income : Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc", Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, May 1970, reprinted in his Essays in Economics, pp. 497-514.
[129]
"Comment", in Worswick, D. and Trevithick, J. ed., Keynes and the
Modern World, Cambridege University Press, 1983.
[130]
mler, W. ed., Nicholas Kaldor and Mainstream Economics : Confronta tion or Conve-
"On the Endogeneity of Money Supply", in Nell, E. J. and Sem-
"On Different Interpretations of the General Theory ", Journal of
Monetary Economics, 1990, pp. 205–43.
[114] Pierce, D.G.and Shaw, D. M., Monetary Economics : Theory, Evidence and
rgence?, Macmillan, 1991.
[131] Townshend, H., "Liquidity Premium and the Theory of Value", Economic Jou-
Policy, Butterworths, 1974.
[115] Pollin, R., “Two Theories of Money Supply Endogeneity : Some Empirical
rnal, 1937, pp. 157–69.
[132] 打込茂子「アメリカにおける資産,負債総合管理」『東京銀行月報」第33巻第
12号,1981 年.
[133] 渡辺良夫 「ポスト·ケインズ派理論における貨幣供給の位置」『明大商学論叢』
第68巻第3.4,5.6号,1986 年,pp. 227-49.
Evidence", Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Spring 1991, pp. 366–96.
[116]
do They Matter?", in Deleplace, G.and Nell, E. J. ed., Money in Mortion : The
Post Keynesian and Circulation Approaches, Macmillan, 1966.
[117] Radcliffe Committee, "Committee on the Workings of the Monetary
System : Report", Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Aug. 1959. (A dh4A
研究会訳「ラドクリフ委員会報告」大蔵省印刷局,1959 年),
[118] Robinson, J., The Rate of Interest and other Essays, Macmillan, 1952 (A-
司,梅村又次訳『利子率その他諸研究』東洋経済新報社,1955年).
"Money Supply Endogeneity :What are the Questions and Why
[134]
「ポスト,ケインズ派と内生的貨幣供給」『金融学会報告』第63 号,
1987 4, pp. 84-91.
[135]
「銀行の負債管理と内生的貨幣供給」『明大商学論叢」』第71 巻第1号,
1988 F, pp. 71-89.
「現代の金融政策とケインズ=ポストケインズ派モデル」、中央大学
経済研究所編『ケインズ経済学の再検討』中央大学出版部,第8章所収,1990年,
「ボストケインズ派と内生的貨幣供給」,ボスト.ケインズ派経 済学
[136]
[137]
2:6 参考文献
研究会編『経済動態と市場理論的基礎」日本経済評論社,第6章所収,1992 年,
[138]
217
「貨幣的均衡分析と内生的貨幣供給」『明大商学論叢』第75 巻第2.
3. 4 5, 1992 4, pp. 141-69.
[139]
1996 4E, pp. 133-56.
[140]
「ケインズの自己利子率理論」「明大商学論叢」第78 巻第1.2-3号,
索
引
「ポストケインズ派と貨幣」『経済と社会』第6号,1996年,pp.39-
52.
[141]
1997 E, pp. 25–49.
[142] Wicksel, K., Interest and Prices, 1989. (JEIFR R PUFE HAEA
評論社,1984年).
73, 99, 123
[ア]
貨幣の基本的性質 142-147
7197- (A. S. Eichner)
210
-4A E 142–143, 146–147,
アコード 87
202
AFX- 154, 158, 165, 209
-代替弾力性 143-144, 146-147,
暗黙の心理的,非金銭的費用92, 93,
[143] Wray, L. R., Money and Credit in Capitalist Economies : The Endogenos
Money Approach, Edward Elgar, 1990.
[143]
"Alternative Theory of The Rate of Interest", Cambridge Journal
「内生的貨幣供給と流動性選好」「明大商学論叢』第79 巻第3.4号,
長期的非中立性 3,4, 8, 49, 125,
177, 187
of Economics, 1992, pp. 69–89.
池尾和人 212
152-153, 159–160, 193, 198, 204
[144]
市川信幸 97, 212
- 5, 28, 46, 158
移動均衡理論 199, 205
岩佐代市 96, 212
"Alternative Approaches to Money and Interest Rates", Journal of
貨幣数量說 11, 63, 68-70
Economic Issues, Dec. 1992, pp. 1145-78.
貨幣供給
[145]
"Keynesian Monetary Theory :Liquidity Preference or Black
-のコントローラビリティー 12,
Box Horizontalism? ", Journal of Economic Issues, March 1995, pp. 273-82.
[146] 矢尾次郎「貨幣的経済理論の基本問題』千倉書房,1962年,
27
ANUA 4, 13, 22, 64, 70, 158
-の独立性,相互依存性 19, 51,
因果関係テスト13, 14
127-7 iti 88-89, 91, 178, 186–
56, 100
-OYÆTE 3, 39, 69, 79
187
-DHEMEEE 4, 11, 13, 14,
9 17 tv (K. Wicksell) 6, 69, 124,
15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 49, 55, 57,
125, 127, 128, 134, 151, 156, 158, 160–
58, 66
-DFUT 4, 15, 16, 17, 18
貨幣需要関数6,17-19, 52, 63-65, 169
161, 217
打込茂子 96, 216
エクイティファイナンス 119
貨幣乗数
オーパーファンディング 67
-770-f 5, 23, 36, 73, 81, 84,
*-7iti 88–90, 178, 186–187
翁邦雄 215
NF 154, 215
オフバランス 86
99, 110, 112
-DEE 15, 28, 48, 73
可変的一
固定的一一 5, 17
貨幣的(均衡)分析 3,7, 128-142, 149,
5, 28, 32-36
153, 156, 160, 194, 199, 205
[カ]
t-7 (R. F. Kahn) 189, 190, 212
回転資金 50, 51
S4E 811 ULKA 5, 12, 23, 39, 49, 65, 71,
貨幣的集計量 66, 114
F 23, 36
貸出需要関数 101, 107, 109, 119, 174
貨付資金供給関数 102, 105, 109, 174
Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money"
James Tobin
1963
I.
THE OLD VIEW
Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank credit and bank deposits Before the admiring eyes of freshmen he puts to rout the practical banker who is so sure that he "lends only the money depositors entrust to him.' The banker is shown to have a worm's eye's view, and his error stands as an introductory object lesson in the fallacy of composition. From the 0lympian vantage of the teacher and the textbook it appears that the banker's dictum must be reversed: depositors entrust to bankers what- ever amounts the bankers lend. To be sure, this is not true of a single bank one bank's loan may wind up as another bank's depoait. But it is, the arithmetic of successive rounds of deposit creation makes clear, true Whatever their other errors of the banking system as a whole. a long line of financial heretics have been right in speaking of "fountain pen money, money created by the stroke of the bank president's pen when he approves a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower's checking account. In this time-honored exposition two characteristics of commercial banksboth of which are alleged to differentiate them sharply from other financial intermediaries--are intertwined. One is that their liabilities, well at least their demand deposit liabilities--serve as widely acceptable means of payment. Thus they count, along with coin and currency in public "money. The other is that the preferences of the public circulation, normally play no role in determining the total volume of deposits or the total quantity of money. For it is the beginning of wisdom in monetary economics to observe that money is like the "hot potato" of a children's game one individual may pass it to another, but the group as a whole cannot If the economy and the supply of money are out of adjustment, get rid of it. This is as true, evidently of it is the economy that must do the adjusting. money created by bankers' fountain pens as of money created by public print- On the other hand, financial intermediaries other than banks ing presses. do not create money, and the scale of their assets is limited by their liabilities, i.e., by the savings the public entrusts to them. They cannot 11 count on receiving "deposits" to match every extension of their lending. The commercial banks and only the conmercial banks, in other words, And because they possess this key to unlimited possess the widow's cruse. Once this is expansion, they have to be restrained by reserve requirements. done, determination of the aggregate volume of bank deposits is just a matter of accounting and arithmetic: simply divide the available supply of bank reserves by the required reserve ratio. The foregoing is admittedly a caricature, but I believe it is not a great exaggeration of the impressions conveyed by economics teaching con- cerning the roles of commercial banks and other financial institutions in the monetary system. In conveying this melange of propositions, economics has replaced the naive fallacy of composition of the banker with other half- truths perhaps equally misleading. These have their root in the mystique of "money"--the tradition of distinguishing sharply between those assets which are and those which are not "money, " and accordingly between those institu- tions which emit "money" and those whose liabilities are not "money. The persistent strength of this tradition is remarkable given the uncertainty and controversy over where to draw the dividing line between money and other Time was when only currency was regarded assets as money, and the use of bank deposits was regarded as a way of economizing currency and increasing the velocity of money. Today scholars and statisticians wonder and argue whether to count commercial bank time and savings deposits in the money supplya And if so, why not similar accounts in other institutions? Never- theless, once the arbitrary line is drawn, assets on the money side of the line are assumed to possess to the full properties which assets on the other side completely lack For example, an eminent monetary economist, more candid than many of his colleagues, admits that we don't really know what money is, but proceeds to argue that, whatever it is, its supply should grow regularly at a rate of the order of 3 to 4 per cent per year. *E. S. Shaw, "Money Supply and Stable Economic Growth," in United States Monetary Policy, American Assembly, New York, 1958, pp. 49-71.
II THE "NEW VIEW"
A more recent development in monetary economics tends to blur the sharp traditional distinctions between money and other assets and between commercial banks and other financial intermediaries; to focus on demands for and supplies of the whole spectrum of assets rather than on the quantity and velocity of "money"; and to regard the structure of interest rates, asset yields, and credit availabilities rather than the quantity of money as the linkage between monetary and financial institutions and policies on the one hand and the real economy on the other.* In this essay I propose to look *For a review of this development and for references to its pro- see Harry Johnson's survey article, "Monetary Theory and Policy,' I will confine myself 20 tagonists, American Economic Review, LII, June 1962, pp. 335-384. to mentioning the importance, in originating and contributing to the "new view," of John Gurley and E. S. Shaw (yes, the very same Shaw cited in the previous footnote, but presumably in a different incarnation). Their view- point is summarized in Money in a Institution, 1960. Theory of Finance, Washington, Brookings briefly at 'new view" for the theory of deposit implications of this creation, of which I have above described or caricatured the traditional version One of the incidental advantages of this theoretical development is to effect something of a reconciliation between the economics teacher and the practical banker. According to the 'new view," the essential function of financial inter- mediaries, including commercial banks, is to satisfy simultaneously the port- folio preferences of two types of individuals or firms.** On one side are **This paragraph and the three following are adapted with minor changes from the author's paper with William Brainard, "Financial Intermedi- aries and the Effectiveneas of Monetary Controls," American Economic Review LII, May 1963, pp. 384-386. borrowers, who wish to expand their holdings of real assets--inventories, residential real estate, productive plant and equipment, etc.--beyond the limits of their own net worth. On the other side are lenders, who wish to hold part or all of their net worth in assets of stable money value with negligible risk of default. The assets of financial intermediaries are obligations of the borrowers--promissory notes, bonds, mortgages. The liabilities of financial intermediaries are the assets of the lenders--bank deposits, insurance policies, pension rights. Financial intermediaries typically assume liabilities of smaller de- fault risk and greater predictability of value than their assets. The principal kinds of institutions take on liabilities of greater liquidity too; thus bank depositors can require payment on demand, while bank loans become due only on specified dates. The reasons that the intermediation of financial institutions can accomplish these transformations between the nature of the obligation of the borrower and the ature of the asset of the ultimate lender are these: (1) administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, accounting, appraising, and collecting; (2) reduction of risk per dollar of lending by the pooling of independent risks, with respect both to loan default and to deposit withdrawal; (3) governmental guarantees of the liabilities of the institutions and other provisions (bank examination, investment regulations, supervision of insurance companies, last-resort lending) designed to assure the solvency and liquidity of the inst:itutions. For these reasons, intermediation permits borrowers who wish to ex- pand their investments in real assets to be accommodated at lower rates and easier terms than if they had to borrow directly from the lenders. If the creditors of financial intermediaries had to hold instead the kinds of obligations that private borrowers are capable of providing, they would cer- tainly insist on higher rates and stricter terms. Therefore, any autonomous increase--for example, improvements in the efficiency of financial institu- tions or the creation of new types of intermediaries--in the amount of financial intermediation in the economy can be expected to be, ceteris paribus This is true whether the growth occurs an expansionary influence. in intermediaries with monetary liabilities--i.e., commercial banks--or in other intermediaries. Financial institutions fall fairly easily into distinct categories, 'intermediary" offering each industry or a differentiated product to its customers, both lenders and borrowers. From the point of view of lenders, the obligations of the various intermediaries are more or less close, but not perfect, substitutes. For example, savings deposits share most of the attributes of demand deposits; but they are not means of payment, and the institution has the right, seldom exercised, to require notice of withdrawal. Similarly there is differentiation in the kinds of credit offered borrowers. Each intermediary has its specialty--e.g., the commercial loan for banks, the But the borrowers' real estage mortgage for the savings-and-loan association. market is not completely compartmentalized. The same credit instruments are handled by more than one intermediary, and many borrowers have flexibility Thus there is some substitutability, in the in the type of debt they incur. demand for credit by borrowers, between the assets of the various inter- mediaries.* *These features of the market structure of intermediaries, and their implications for the supposed uniqueness of banks, have been emphasized by on the deposit side is analyzed by David and Charlotte Alhadeff, "The Struggle for Commer- cial Bank Savings," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXII, February 1958, 1-22. An example of substitutability Gurley and Shaw, loc. cit. The special attention given commercial banks in economic analysis is usually justified by the observation that, alone among intermediaries, banks create" means of payment. This rationale is on its face far from convincing. The meansof-payment characteristic of demand deposits is indeed a feature differentiating bank liabilities from those of other intermediaries. Insurance against death is equally a feature differentiating 1ife insurance policies from the obligations of other intermediaries, including banks. It is not obvious that one kind of differentiation should be singled out for Like other different:ia, the means-of-payment special analytical treatment. attribute has its price. Savings deposits, for example, are perfect sub- stitutes for demand deposits in every respect except as a medium of exchange This advantage of checking accounts does not give banks absolute immunity from the competition of savings banks; it is a limited advantage that can be, at least in some part for many depositors, overcome by differences in yield It follows that the community's demand for bank deposits is not indefinite, even though demand deposits do serve as means of payment.
III THE WIDOW'S CRUSE
Neither individually nor collectively do commercial banks possess a "widows cruse. Quite apart from legal reserve requirements, commercial banks are limited in scale by the same kinds of economic processes that de- termine the aggregate size of other intermediaries. One often cited difference between commercial banks and other inter- mediaries must be quickly dismissed as superficial and irrelevant. This is the fact that a bank can make a loan by "writing up" its deposit liabilities, while a savings and loan association, for example, cannot satisfy a mortgage borrower by crediting him with a share account. The association must transfer means of payment to the borrower; its total liabilities do not rise along with its assets. True enough, but neither do the bank's for more than a fleeting moment Borrowers do not incur debt in order to hold idle deposits, any more than savings and loan shares. The borrower pays out the money, and there is of course no guarantee that any of it stays in the lending bank Whether or not it stays in the banking system as a whole is another question, about to be discussed. But the answer clearly does not depend on the way the loan was It depends initially made. on whether somewhere in the chain of transactions initiated by the borrower's outlays are found depositors who wish to hold new deposits equal in amount to the new loan. Similarly, the outcome for the savings and loan industry depends on whether in the chain of transactions initiated by the mortgage are found individuals who wish to acquire addition- al savings and loan shares. expand its assets either (a) by purchasing, The banking system can or (b by lending to finance new private lending against, existing assets; or investment in inventories or capital goods, buying government securities or (a) financing new public deficits. In case no increase in private wealth occurs in conjunction with the banks' expansion. There is no new private (b) In case saving and investment. private saving occurs, matching new dollar for dollar the private investments or government deficits financed by the banking system. In neither case will there automatically be an increase in savers demand for bank deposits equal to the expansion in bank assets. In the second case, it is true, there is an increase in private wealth. But even if we assume a closed economy in order to abstract from leakages of capital abroad, the community will not ordinarily wish to put 100 per cent of its new saving into bank deposits Bank deposits are, after all, only about 15 per cent of total private wealth in the United States; other things equal, savers cannot be expected greatly to exceed this proportion in allocating new saving So, if all new saving is to take the form of bank deposits, other things cannot stay equal Specifically, the yields and other advantages of the competing assets into which new saving would otherwise flow will have to fall enough so that savers prefer bank deposits. This is a fortiori true in case a) where there is no new saving and the generation of bank liabilities to match the assuned expansion of bank assets entails a reshuffling of existing portfolios in favor of bank deposits. In effect the banking system has to induce the public to swap loans and securities for bank deposits. This can happen only if the price is right. Clearly, then, there is at any moment a natural economic limit to the scale of the cormmercial banking industry. Given the wealth and the asset preferences of the community, the demand for bank deposits can increase only if the yields of other assets fall The fall in these yields is bound to restrict the profitable lending and investment opportunities available to the banks themselves. Eventually the marginal returns on lending and invest- ing, account taken of the risks and administrative costs involved, will not exceed the marginal cost to the banks of attracting and holding additional deposits. At this point the widow's cruse has run dry.
IV BANKS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES COMPARED
In this respect the cormercial banking industry is not qualitatively different from any other financial intermediary system. The same process limits the collective expansion of savings and loan associations, or savings banks, or life insurance companies. At some point the returns from addition- al loans or security holdings are not worth the cost of obtaining the funds from the public There are of course some differences. First, it may well be true that commercial banks benefit from a larger share of additions to private savings than other intermediaries. Second, according to modern American commercial banks are subject to ceilings on the rates pay- legal practice, able to their depositors--zero in the case of demand deposits. Unlike com- commercial banks cannot seek funds by raising peting financial industries, They can and do offer other inducements to depositors, but these rates substitutes for interest are imperfect and uneven in their incidence. In these circumstances the major readjustment of the interest rate structure necessary to increase the relative demand for bank deposits is a decline in other rates. Note that either of these differences has to do with the "money." quality of bank deposits as In a world without reserve requirements the preferences of depositors, as well as those of borrowers, would be very relevant in determining the The volume of assets and liabilities of every volume of bank deposits. competi intermediary, both nonbanks and banks, would be determined in a tive equilibrium, where the rate of interest charged borrowers by each kind of institution just balances at the margin the rate of interest paid its creditors. Suppose that such an equilibrium is disturbed by a shift in savers' preferences. At prevailing rates they decide to hold more savings accounts and other nonbank liabilities and less demand deposits They transfer demand deposits to the credit of nonbank financial institutions, providing these intermediaries with the means to seek additional earning assets These institutions, finding themselves able to attract more funds from the public even with some reduction in the rates they pay, offer better terms to borrowers and bid up the prices of existing earning assets. Consequently commercial banks release some earning assets--they no longer yield enough to pay the going rate on the banks' deposit liabilities. Bank deposits decline with bank assets. In effect, the nonbank inter- mediaries favored by the shift in public preferences simply swap the deposits transferred to them for a corresponding quantity of bank assets.
V. FOUNTAIN PENS AND PRINTING PRESSES
Evidently the fountain pens of comercial bankers are essentially different from the printing presses of governments. Confusion results from concluding that because bank deposits are like currency in one respect-- both serve as media of exchange--they are like currency in every respect. Unlike governments, bankers cannot create means of payment to finance Bank-created "money" is a their own purchases of goods and services. liability, which must be matched on the other side of the balance sheet. And banks, , as businesses, must earn money from their middlemen's role. Once created, printing press money cannot be extinguished, except by reversal of the budget policies which led to its birth.The community cannot get rid of its currency supply; the economy must adjust until it is The "hot potato" analogy truly applies. willingly absorbed. For bank- created money, however, there is an economic mechanism of extinction as If bank deрosits are well as creation, contraction as well as expansion. excessive relative to public preferences, they will tend to decline; other- wise banks will lose money. The burden of adaptation is not placed entirely on the rest of theе еconomy.
THE ROLE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS VI.
Without reserve requirements, expansion of credit and deposits by the commercial banking system would be limited by the availability of assets at yields sufficient to compensate banks for the costs of attracting and hold- ing the corresponding deposits. In a regime of reserve requirements, the limit which they impose normally cuts the expansion short of this competi- tive equilibrium. When reserve requirements and deposit interest rate ceilings are effective, the marginal yield of bank loans and investments exceeds the marginal cost of deposits to the banking system. In these cir- cumstances additional reserves make it possible and profitable for banks to acquire additional earning assets. The expansion process lowers interest rates generally--enough to induce the public to hold additional deposits but ordinarily not enough to wipe out the banks' margin between the value and cost of additional deposits. It is the existence of this margin--not the monetary nature of bank liabilities--which makes it possible for the economics teacher to say that additional loans permitted by new reserves will generate their own deposits. The same proposition would be true of any other system of financial institu- tions subject to similar reserve constraints and similar interest rate ceilings In this sense it is more accurate to attribute the special place of banks among intermediaries to the legal restrictions to which banks alone are subjected than to attribute these restrictions to the special character of bank liabilities. But the textbook description of multiple expansion of credit and given reserve base is misleading even for a regime of reserve deposits on a There is more to the determination of the volume of bank requirements. deposits than the arithmetic of reserve supplies and reserve ratios The redundant reserves of the thirties are a dramatic reminder that economic opportunities sometimes prevail over reserve calculations. But the sig- nificance of that experience is not correctly appreciated if it is regarded as an aberration from a normal state of affairs in which banks are simply fully "loaned up" and total deposits are tightly linked to the volume of phenomenon which is The thirties exemplify in extreme form a reserves. always in some degree present: The use to which commercial banks put the reserves made available to the system is an economic variable depending on lending opportunities and interest rates. An individual bank is not constrained by any fixed quantum of reserves. It can obtain additional reserves to meet requirements by borrowing from the Federal Reserve, by buying "Federal Funds" from other banks, by selling or 1# running off" short term securities In short, reserves are available at price This cost the bank the discount window and in the money market, at a must compare with available yields on loans and investments. If those yields are low relative to the cost of reserves, the bank will seek to avoid borrow- ing reserves and perhaps hold excess reserves instead. If those yields are high relative to the cost of borrowing reserves, the bank will shun excess reserves and borrOw reserves occasionally or even regularly. For the banking C system as a whole the Federal Reserve's quantitative controls determine the supply of unborrowed reserves. But the extent to which this supply is left unused, or supplemented by borrowing at the discount window, depends on the economic circumstances confronting the banks -on available lending opportuni- ties and on the whole structure of interest rates from the Fed's discount rate through the rates on mortgages and long term securities. The range of variation in net free reserves in recent years has been from -5 per cent to +5 per cent of required reserves. This indicates a much looser linkage between reserves and deposits than is suggested by the text- book exposition of multiple expansion for a system which is always precisely and fully "loaned up. (It does not mean, however, that actual monetary authorities have any less control than textbook monetary authorities. Indeed the net free reserve position is one of their more useful instruments and barometers Anyway they are after bigger game than the quantity of o "money" Two consequences of this analysis deserve special notice because of their relation to the issues raised earlier in this paper. First, an in- crease--of, say, a billion dollars--in the supply of unborrowed reserves will, in general, result in less than a billion dollar increase in required Net free reserves will rise (algebraically) by some fraction of reserves the billion dollars-a very large fraction in periods like the thirties, much smaller one in tight money periods like those of the fifties. Loans and deposits will expand by less than their textbook multiples. The reason is simple. The open market operations which bring about the increased supply of reserves tend to lower interest rates. So do the орerations of the commer- cial banks in trying to invest their new reserves. The result is to diminish the incentives of banks to keep fully loaned up or to borrow re- serves, and to make banks content to hold on the average higher excess reserves. Second, depositor preferences do matter, even in a regime of frac- tional reserve banking. Suppose, for example, that the public decides to switch new or old savings from other assets and institutions into commercial banks This switch makes earning assets available to banks at attractive yields--assets that otherwise would have been lodged either directly with the public or with the competing financial institutions previously favored with the public's savings. These improved opportunities for profitable lend- ing and investing will make the banks content to hold smaller net free re- Both their deposits and their assets will rise as a result of this serves. shift in public preferences, even though the base of unborrowed reserves re- mains unchanged. Something of this kind has occurred in recent years when commercial banks have been permitted to raise the interest rates they offer for time and savings deposits.
IIA CONCLUDING REMARKS
The implications of the "new view" may be summarized as follows The distinction between commercial banks and other financial inter- mediaries has been too sharply drawn. The differences are of degree, not of kind In particular, the differences which do exist have little intrinsically 2. to do with the monetary nature of bank liabilities. The differences are more importantly related to the special reserve re- quirements and interest rate ceilings to which banks are subject. Any other financial industry subject to the same kind of regulations would behave in much the same way» 4. Commercial banks do not possess, either individually or collectively, a widow's cruse which guarantees that any expansion of assets will generate a corresponding expansion off deposit liabilities. Certainly this happy state of affairs would not exist in an unregulated competitive financial world. Marshall's scissors of supply and demand apply to the "output" of the bank- ing industry, no less than to other financial and nonfinancial industries. Reserve requirements and interest ceilings give the widow's cruse myth 5. somewhat greater plausibility. But even in these circumstances, the scale of bank deposits and assets is affected by depositor preferences and by the lending and investing opportunities available to banks. I draw no policy morals from these observations. That is quite another story, to which analysis of the type presented here is only the preface The reader will misunderstand my purpose if he jumps to attribute to me the conclusion that existing differences in the regulatory trestment of banks and competing intermediaries should be diminished, either by relaxing constraints on the one or by tightening controls on the other.
「お金」の創造者としての商業銀行ジェームズ・トービン
「お金」の創造者としての商業銀行
ジェームズ・トビン
私。
古い見方
おそらく、初等経済学の教師にとっての最大の勝利の瞬間は、銀行信用と銀行預金の複数の作成についての彼の説明です。新入生の賞賛の目の前に、彼は「預金者だけに預けるお金を貸す」と確信している実用的な銀行家を敗走させます。彼に。' 銀行家はワームの視点を持っていることが示され、彼の誤りは合成の誤謬の入門的なオブジェクトの教訓として立っています。教師と教科書の0lympianの見地から、銀行家の口述を逆にする必要があるようです：預金者は銀行家に委託します確かに、これは単一の銀行には当てはまりません。ある銀行のローンが別の銀行の預金として終わる可能性があります。しかし、それは、預金作成の連続ラウンドの計算によって明らかになります。true銀行システム全体の他のエラーが何であれ。金融異端者の長い列は、「噴水ペンのお金、彼がローンを承認し、借り手の当座預金口座に収益を入金するときに銀行の社長のペンのストロークによって作成されたお金。この昔ながらの博覧会では2つの特徴どちらも他の金融仲介業者との差別化を図っていると言われている商業銀行の多くは絡み合っています。1つは、その負債、少なくともデマンドデポジットの負債が広く受け入れられる支払い手段として機能することです。したがって、これらはコインとともにカウントされます。と公共の「お金」の通貨。もう1つは、一般の流通の好みは、通常、預金の総量または金額の総量を決定する上で何の役割も果たさないということです。なぜなら、お金は子供のゲームの「ホットポテト」のようなものであるということを観察することは金融経済学の知恵の始まりです。ある個人がそれを別の人に渡すかもしれませんが、経済とお金の供給がなくなった場合、グループ全体はできません。調整の、それを取り除きます。これは真実であり、明らかに調整を行わなければならないのは経済です。公共の印刷物によって作成されたお金の時点で銀行家の万年筆によって作成されたお金-一方、銀行以外の金融仲介業者は印刷機を使用しています。お金を生み出さないでください、そして彼らの資産の規模は彼らの負債によって、すなわち国民が彼らに委託する貯蓄によって制限されます。彼らは、貸付のすべての延長に一致する「預金」を受け取ることを期待することはできません。言い換えれば、商業銀行と商業銀行のみです。そして、彼らはこの鍵を持っているので、未亡人の十字架を無制限に所有します。これが拡張になると、準備金の要件によって制限される必要があります。銀行預金の総量の決定は、会計と算術の問題です。銀行準備金の利用可能な供給を必要な準備金比率で割るだけです。以上は確かに似顔絵ですが、金融システムにおける商業銀行などの金融機関の役割についての経済学教育の印象を大きく誇張したものではないと思います。この命題のメランジを伝える際に、経済学は銀行家の構成の素朴な誤謬を、おそらく同様に誤解を招く他の半真実に置き換えました。これらは「お金」の神秘にルーツを持っています ラインのお金側の資産は、反対側の資産が完全に欠けている完全な資産を所有していると想定されます。たとえば、著名な金融経済学者は、同僚の多くよりも率直で、私たちが実際にどのようなお金を知っているかわからないことを認めていますですが、それが何であれ、その供給は年間3〜4パーセントのオーダーの割合で定期的に増加するはずであると主張し続けています。* ES Shaw、「マネーサプライと安定した経済成長」、米国金融政策、アメリカ議会、ニューヨーク、1958年、49〜71ページ。その供給は、年間3〜4パーセントのオーダーの割合で定期的に増加するはずです。* ES Shaw、「マネーサプライと安定した経済成長」、米国金融政策、アメリカ議会、ニューヨーク、1958年、49〜71ページ。その供給は、年間3〜4パーセントのオーダーの割合で定期的に増加するはずです。* ES Shaw、「マネーサプライと安定した経済成長」、米国金融政策、アメリカ議会、ニューヨーク、1958年、49〜71ページ。
II「新しい見方」
金融経済学の最近の発展は、お金と他の資産の間、および商業銀行と他の金融仲介業者の間の鋭い伝統的な区別を曖昧にする傾向があります。「お金」の量と速度ではなく、資産の全範囲の需要と供給に焦点を当てること。そして、お金の量ではなく、金利、資産利回り、および信用の利用可能性の構造を、一方では金融および金融機関と政策と、他方では実体経済との間のリンクと見なす。*このエッセイで私は提案する見てください*この開発のレビューとそのプロの参照については、ハリー・ジョンソンの調査記事「金融理論と政策」を参照してください。私は20人のタゴニスト、American Economic Review、LII、1962年6月、335-384ページを制限します。JohnGurleyとESShawの「新しい見方」を生み出し、貢献することの重要性に言及すること（そうです、前の脚注で引用したのとまったく同じShawですが、おそらく異なる化身です）。彼らの見解は、1960年のMoney in a Institutionに要約されています。この創造の預金含意の理論については、金融理論、ワシントン、ブルッキングスの「新しい見解」で簡単に説明しました。この理論的発展の付随的な利点は、経済学の教師と実際の銀行家の間で何らかの和解をもたらすことです。「新しい見解」によれば、商業銀行を含む金融仲介機関の本質的な機能は、2つのタイプの個人または企業のポートフォリオの好みを同時に満たすことです。**一方は**この段落と次の3つは、WilliamBrainardによる著者の論文「FinancialIntermediariesand金融統制の有効性」、American Economic Review LII、1963年5月、384〜386ページ。自分の純資産の限界を超えて、実物資産（在庫、住宅用不動産、生産性の高いプラントおよび設備など）の保有を拡大したい借り手。反対側には、債務不履行のリスクを無視できる安定した金銭的価値のある資産に純資産の一部または全部を保有したい貸し手がいます。金融仲介業者の資産は、借り手の義務であり、約束手形、債券、住宅ローンです。金融仲介業者の負債は、銀行預金、保険証券、年金の権利など、貸し手の資産です。金融仲介業者は通常、資産よりもデフォルトリスクが小さく、価値の予測可能性が高い負債を引き受けます。主要な種類の機関は、より流動性の高い負債も引き受けます。したがって、銀行の預金者は要求に応じて支払いを要求できますが、銀行のローンは指定された日付にのみ期限が切れます。金融機関の仲介が借り手の義務の性質と最終的な貸し手の資産の性質との間のこれらの変換を達成できる理由は次のとおりです：（1）行政経済と交渉、会計、評価、および収集の専門知識; （2）独立したリスクをプールすることによる、貸付1ドルあたりのリスクの削減。ローンのデフォルトと預金の引き出しの両方に関して。（3）金融機関の債務の政府保証、および金融機関の支払能力と流動性を保証するために設計されたその他の規定（銀行審査、投資規制、保険会社の監督、最終手段貸付）。これらの理由から、仲介により、実物資産への投資を拡大したい借り手は、貸し手から直接借りなければならない場合よりも、より低いレートとより簡単な条件で対応することができます。代わりに、金融仲介業者の債権者が民間の借り手が提供できる種類の義務を負わなければならない場合、彼らは確かにより高い金利とより厳しい条件を主張するでしょう。したがって、自律的な増加-たとえば、金融機関の効率の改善または新しいタイプの仲介業者の創設-経済における金融仲介の量において、ceteris paribusこれは、成長が拡大的な影響をもたらすかどうかに当てはまります。金銭的負債のある仲介業者、すなわち商業銀行、または他の仲介業者。金融機関は、貸し手と借り手の両方の顧客に各業界または差別化された商品を提供する「仲介業者」という明確なカテゴリにかなり簡単に分類されます。貸し手から見ると、さまざまな仲介業者の義務は多かれ少なかれ近いですが、そうではありません。完璧な代替品。たとえば、貯蓄預金は需要預金の属性のほとんどを共有しますが、それらは支払いの手段ではなく、金融機関には権利があり、ほとんど行使されません。撤回の通知を要求する。同様に、クレジット提供の借り手の種類にも違いがあります。各仲介業者には、銀行向けの商業ローンなどの専門分野がありますが、貯蓄貸付組合向けの借り手の実際のestage住宅ローンです。市場は完全に区分化されていません。同じ信用商品は複数の仲介業者によって取り扱われ、多くの借り手は柔軟性を持っています。したがって、彼らが負担する債務の種類には、ある程度の代替可能性があります。さまざまな仲介業者の資産間での借り手による信用の需要。**仲介業者の市場構造のこれらの特徴、および銀行の想定される独自性に対するそれらの影響は、預金側で強調されています。 Charlotte Alhadeff、「商業銀行の貯蓄のための闘争」。経済学の季刊誌、LXXII、1958年2月、1-22。代替可能性の例Gurleyand Shaw、loc。引用。経済分析において商業銀行に特別な注意が払われることは、通常、仲介業者の中で単独で銀行が支払い手段を作成するという観察によって正当化されます。この理論的根拠は説得力がありません。デマンドデポジットの支払い手段の特徴は確かに特徴です。銀行の負債を他の仲介業者の負債と区別する。死亡に対する保険も同様に、1ifeの保険契約を銀行を含む他の仲介業者の義務と区別する機能です。ある種類の区別を他の異なるものと同様に選択する必要があることは明らかではありません。支払い手段の特別な分析的処理。属性にはその価格があります。たとえば、貯蓄預金は、交換の媒体を除いて、あらゆる点で要求払預金の完全な代替品です。当座預金口座のこの利点は、銀行に貯蓄銀行の競争からの完全な免除を与えません。少なくとも一部の預金者にとっては、利回りの違いによって克服できるのは限られた利点です。したがって、要求払預金が支払い手段として機能する場合でも、銀行預金に対するコミュニティの需要は不確定ではありません。
@boes_ So, JFK asked Nobel laureate James Tobin, “Is there any economic limit to the size of the deficit?”, and Tobin responded, “the only limit really is inflation.
Tobin, James (1961). "Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value," American Economic Review, 51(2), pp. 26–37. Reprinted in Tobin, 1987, Essays in Economics, v. 1, pp. 217–27. MIT Press.
Tobin, James (1969). “A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory”. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking1.1 (1): 15-29.
Tobin, James (1970). "Money and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(2), pp. 301–317.
Tobin, James and William C. Brainard (1977a). "Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital". In Richard Nelson and Bela Balassa, eds., Economic Progress: Private Values and Public Policy (Essays in Honor of William Fellner), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 235-62.
Tobin, James (1977b). “How Dead is Keynes?”. Economic InquiryXV (4): 459-468.
Tobin, James, Essays in Economics, MIT Press: v. 1 (1987), Macroeconomics. Scroll to chapter-preview links. v. 2 Consumption and Economics. Description. v. 3 (1987). Theory and Policy (in 1989 paperback as Policies for Prosperity: Essays in a Keynesian Mode). Description and links. v. 4 (1996). National and International. Links.
Tobin, James, with Stephen S. Golub (1998). Money, Credit, and Capital. Irwin/McGraw-Hill. TOC.
Anyway, I also mentioned to the person that I had just that morning been reading a rarely cited 1963 paper Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” – by Nobel Prize winning economist (the late) James Tobin. I had read it a long-time ago while I was doing my PhD and was alerted to it again by one of the regular billy blog readers (thanks Jeff).
The article considers the money multiplier by juxtaposing the “Old View” and the “New View” of banking. I went back into my database to see the notes I took when I read the article originally (in 1983!). It is quite amazing that articles like this get lost in the mainstream literature. Despite obvious flaws they categorically demonstrate that the material that is presented in macroeconomics textbooks and which students subsequently take away from their studies as “truth” is typically misleading and often totally wrong.
Tobin begins:
Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank and credit deposits. Before the admiring eyes of freshmen he puts to rout the practical banker who is so sure he “lends only the money depositors entrust to him.” … [in fact] … depositors entrust to bankers whatever amounts the bankers lend … [for] … the banking system as a whole …. a long line of financial heretics have been right in speaking of “fountain pen money” – money created by the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower’s checking account.
James Tobin (March 5, 1918 – March 11, 2002) トービンのq(1963,1968)、トービン税(1974,1978)で知られる。
4 Comments:
552 金持ち名無しさん、貧乏名無しさん (ｱｳｱｳｳｰ Saa5-eSGr)[] 2020/01/02(木) 14:59:01.57 ID:gbp+lVeJa
望月慎（望月夜）
@motidukinoyoru
·
2017年12月5日
返信先:
@motidukinoyoru
さん,
@kenjikatsu
さん
遡ると、信用創造の"現代的理解"は、1963年のジェームズ・トービンの論文、"Commercial Banks as creators of "money" https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cwlcwldpp/159.htm
にまとまっているみたいです。お手空きなら、お読みになることをすすめます。
pitfall単行本所収1971
トービン資産均衡モデルの基本的構造 THE FUNDAMENTAL ...（Adobe PDF）
m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/.../daigakuinkiyoshou_14_45.pdf
-キャッシュ
トービンによれば、①政府要求払債務，②銀行預金，③長期国債，④実物資本，⑤ ... 以上のような意味において2つの市揚価 ... 2）J．Tobin and W． C． Brainard，“Pitfalls in Financial Model Building，”op． cit．
トービンのq：メモ - NAMs出版プロジェクト
nam-students.blogspot.com/2015/10/q.html
-キャッシュ
Brainard, W.C. and J. Tobin (1968), "Pitfalls in financial ... は金融機関でつくりだされるのだから，中央銀行は意味がない」って ... トービンのq理論 (Tobin's q theory) とは、アメリカの経済学者 ...
Tobin1963 - NAMs出版プロジェクト
nam-students.blogspot.com/2019/06/tobin1963.html
-キャッシュ
2019年6月10日-Pitfalls in Financial Model Building (pp. ... トービン「国際為替取引税」（『人間開発報告書1994』より） ... 上に，お金の大半は金融機関でつくりだされるのだから，中央銀行は意味がない」って考え方 ...
計 量 経 済 分 析 の 展 望 - J-Stage（Adobe PDF）
www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jjss1970/22/3/22_3.../_pdf
に見て言えることは,投 資関数の推定結果は トービンの σ理論が期待するようなパフォーマン ... バイアスを考慮して推定すれば4理 論により整合的な結果が得 られることを意味する. ... "Pitfalls in Financial. Model. Building",. American. Economic. Review,.
電力経済研究 日本の資産市場モデルと為替レートの ... - 電力中央研究所（Adobe PDF）
criepi.denken.or.jp/jp/serc/.../pdf/periodicals29_11.pdf
産市場全体における波及分析が行えないという (2) 式の意味するところは,各資産,負債. 弱点がある。 の合計額が正味資産として ...
訳者河合正修 徳 - 長野大学リポジトリ（Adobe PDF）
nagano.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action...uri...1...
-キャッシュ
し、貨幣的変数は内生変数と外生変数とを結びつを意味している。これは ... 15-29) のように、エール大学の J. トービン による指標の有効性は将来の利益についての産業 ... ' Pitfalls in financial model building' Amer.
DSGEモデルに基づく政府支出・税制に関する政策 ... - 財務省（Adobe PDF）
www.mof.go.jp/pri/publication/.../fr.../r134_05.pdf
-キャッシュ
いほど増加（減少）することを意味しており，効用関数が微分可能であれば，交差微分が正（負）となるこ. とで表現される。 ... pitfall with estimated DSGE-based government ... トービンの q：. 非リカード的家計の消費：.
ブイター
https://iitomo2010.blogspot.com/2020/07/1933-j.html
メリットについては、模索理論的な文献では、以下のような負の税が提案されている。お金は効率を高めることができる。インフレによって引き起こされるものに似た「ホットポテト（訳注：音楽に合わせてホットポテトを投げ合い、音楽が停止したときにポテトをもっている者が負け）」効果は、貨幣残高の価値の損失を避けようとする買い手の模索力を高めることで、速度を向上させる。この結果、全体の取引の合計が増加し、総体的な活動が増加する。また、マイナス金利のメリットの一つは、急激なデフレ・ショックの際に金利のフロアを回避できることであることは議論の余地がない。
MMTerのミッチェルもTobinの万年筆マネーに言及／「マクロ経済学の学生に事実を教える」Wミッチェル 2010年 http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=9574 #経論 #経論MMT
グチ師匠
グチ師匠
師匠口さん@masterguchi
一ヶ月前
とにかく、私はちょうどその日の朝、ノーベル賞を受賞した経済学者（故）ジェームズ・トビンの1963年の論文「お金」の創造者としての商業銀行」を読んでいたことをその人に話した。私が博士号を取得している間、私はずっと前にそれを読んでいたのだが、ビリーブログの読者の一人（ジェフに感謝）から再び注意を喚起された。
この記事では、銀行の "オールドビュー "と "ニュービュー "を並置して、マネー・マルチプライヤーを考察している。私は、この記事を読んだときのメモを見るために、私のデータベースに戻ってみました（1983年に！）。このような記事が深いLの文献の中で迷子になってしまうのは非常に驚くべきことである。明らかな欠陥があるにもかかわらず、マクロ経済学の教科書で紹介され、その後学生が「真実」として取り上げた内容は、典型的には誤解を招くものであり、完全に間違っていることが多いことを明確に示しています。
トビンは始まる。
おそらく、初等経済学の教師にとって最大の勝利の瞬間は、銀行と信用預金の多重生成についての説明である。新入生の感心する目の前に、彼は彼が "預金者が彼に委託したお金だけを貸す "ように確信している実用的な銀行家をルーチンに置きます。
ジェームズ-トビン（1918年3月5日 - 2002年3月11日
トービンのq(1963,1968)、トービン税(1974,1978)で知られる。
コメントを投稿
<< Home