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インタビュー:ポール・シェアード「日本はMMTを実践していない」
Paul James Sheard (born November 25, 1954) is an Australian-American economist. He is Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government,[1] after previously being Vice Chairman of S&P Global.[2] Sheard has held chief economist positions at Lehman Brothers, Nomura Securities, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, and S&P Global. Prior to entering financial markets in 1995, he was an academic economist based in Australia, Japan and the United States, specializing in the Japanese economy and the economics of firm organization. He is a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on the New Economic Agenda and was a member of the WEF's Global Agenda Council on the International Monetary System (2010-2012).[3] He is a member of the board of the Foreign Policy Association and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bretton Woods Committee[4] and the Economic Club of New York. He attends and speaks regularly at conferences around the world,[5][6][7][8] and his views on the global economy and economic policy are frequently cited in the international press.[9][10][11][12][13]
Sheard was Kiyoshi Kojima Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australia-Japan Research Centre,[14] ANU, Lecturer in Economics, and later Associate Professor of Economics at Osaka University. He held visiting scholar positions at Osaka University, the Bank of Japan, and Stanford University, where he was also visiting assistant professor of economics.
In January 1995, Sheard became Japan Strategist for Baring Asset Management and later Head of Japan Equity Investments. In September 2000, he was appointed Chief Economist for Asia of Lehman Brothers and became Global Chief Economist of Lehman in April 2006. When Lehman failed in September 2008, after a stint at Barclays Capital, in November 2008 Sheard was appointed Global Chief Economist and Head of Economic Research at Nomura Securities, based in New York.[15] In June 2012, he moved to Standard & Poor's Ratings Services as Global Chief Economist and Head of Global Economics and Research and a member of the firm's executive committee, later becoming Chief Economist and Executive Vice President of S&P Global, the parent firm.
Sheard served as a member of committees of the Japanese Government's Economic Deliberation Council, in 1997-98 as an appointee of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and in 1998-99 as an appointee of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. He served as a member of the oversight board of the Japanese Government's Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry,[16] 2001-2006. From 2003 to 2010, Sheard served as a non-executive director of ORIX Corporation, a large Japanese financial services firm.
Sheard's academic work analyzed the economic rationale of distinct features of Japanese corporate organization, including the role of multi-tier subcontracting networks in the auto sector ;[17] the role of main banks and interlocking shareholdings in creating an internalized market for corporate control that supported the "lifetime" employment system;[18][19][20] the informational and risk-sharing role of general trading companies (Sogo shosha) as financial intermediaries;[21] and assessing the arguments that Japanese firms avoided short-termism.[22] In the "structural impediments" debate of the early 1990s, Sheard argued that many of the features criticized as "non-tariff barriers" or as being anti-competitive were better understood in terms of how firms and markets in Japan were efficiently organized.[23] He pointed out that the common practice of characterizing keiretsu or affiliated enterprise groups in Japan as "horizontal groups" was confusing because to many foreign observers "horizontal" connoted within-same-market whereas most of the relationships in question were "vertical" (between stages of production) or between-market in nature.[24]
As a markets economist in Tokyo, Sheard was active in the policy debate, identifying two factors as contributing to Japan's falling into and remaining in deflation: the failure of the government to aggressively recapitalize the banks after it issued a blanket guarantee of deposits in June 1995 and the aggregate demand management policy mix, under macro deleveraging, of "timid" monetary policy and stop-start fiscal policy.[25]
After the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession, Sheard argued that sustained, aggressive monetary and fiscal policy expansion was needed to restore lost aggregate demand in the developed economies.[26]
He has argued that quantitative easing (QE), far from being inflationary "money printing," is best viewed as a "debt management operation of the consolidated government" whereby the central bank retires government debt securities and refinances them into central bank money,[27] and that, contrary to common parlance, banks cannot "lend out" their excess reserves.[28] Sheard argues that, QE being a mild form of monetary easing, the unwinding of QE, in principle, is an innocuous process.[29]
Invoking the metaphor of a "Monetary Garden of Eden",[30] Sheard has argued that monetary and fiscal policies should be viewed as "two sides of the same sovereign coin" and much more closely coordinated and aligned.[31][32]
Sheard has argued that monetary union without fiscal union in the euro area is unsustainable, describing the architecture of the euro area at the time of the sovereign debt crisis as akin to putting countries, when hit by a sudden loss of aggregate demand, in a "macroeconomic vice," and that a steady-state solution must involve "either less monetary union or more fiscal union."[33] Sheard identifies the fundamental problem with the economic and political architecture of the European Union as being the "selective sharing of sovereignty," viewing Brexit as being as much about the future of the EU as about the UK's relationship with the EU.[34]
Long a critic of the Bank of Japan's monetary policy communication and action,[35] Sheard has been a strong supporter of the Bank's April 2013 policy shift under Governor Haruhiko Kuroda,[36] describing it as the monetary policy equivalent of a Copernican Revolution.[37]
Sheard received a Bachelor of Arts (Honours in Japanese and Geography) from Monash University (1981) and a PhD in Japanese Economy (1986) and Master of Economics (1988) from the ANU.[38][39]
Sheard's 1981 undergraduate thesis was awarded the Institute of Australian Geographers’ Honours Thesis of the Year.[40] His 1997 book in Japanese, Mein Banku Shihon Shugi no Kiki (The Crisis of Main Bank Capitalism),[41] published by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, was awarded the 1998 Suntory Gakugei Prize in the Economics-Politics Section. In 2006, Sheard was recognized by Advance as one of 100 Leading Global Australians.[42][43]
In May 2019, Monash University conferred an honorary Doctor of Laws on Sheard.
1 Comments:
インタビュー:ポール・シェアード「日本はMMTを実践していない」
米国や日本で毎年巨額の財政赤字を垂れ流し、日銀が異次元の金融緩和で、
事実上の財政ファイナンスをしている状態から、日本は「現代貨幣理論(MMT)」
を実践していると指摘される。 しかし、私は違うと言いたい。
MMTの基本的洞察は貨幣の創出者たる統合政府には、資金調達の制約がない。
金財分離の制度的枠組みが、そういう制約を恣意的に作り上げているだけだ。本
来、政府には資金の枯渇があり得ない。真の制約は、実体経済の在り方にある。
確かに2013年に黒田東彦総裁率いる日銀が大掛かりな量的緩和に踏み切ったの
は、MMTをほうふつとさせた。なぜならば、量的緩和は統合政府が返済期限のあ
る国債を返済期限のない中央銀行の負債に変形させるからだ。金融政策と財政政
策の境目を溶かす策だ。
日本の長期停滞の教訓は、金融緩和と財政出動の一体政策を欠いたことだった
と私は考えている。ゼロ金利や量的緩和政策を実施し、財政出動を実施したかと
思えば、00年にゼロ金利を解除したり、小泉政権では公共投資の削減に踏み切る
など緊縮財政に取り組んだ。
また、量的・質的金融緩和のスタートからたった1年(14年4月)で、政府が消
費税率を5%から8%への引き上げに踏み切った。まさにアクセルを踏みながら、
ブレーキを同時にかけるようなちぐはぐな政策を続けてしまった。
対照的なのは米国だ。 08年のリーマン・ショック後、米国は日本の失敗の教訓を
生かし、金融緩和と銀行資本投入も含む財政出動で景気の底割れを回避し、いち
早く回復基調を取り戻した。
翻って日本は、また過去の失敗を繰り返そうとしている。2%の消費者物価指数
(CPI) 上昇率の実現が見通せないまま、10月には財政再建への配慮から消費増税
を実施しようとしてる。日銀の黒田総裁も予定通りの消費増税実施を支持してい
る。こういうことでは、金融と財政が一体となり、財政制限を取っ払うMMTとは
程遠い。
インフレ制約
MMTの考え方では、中央銀行が無制限に紙幣を刷り、政府が積極財政を続けれ
ば、いずれ供給制約に直面してCPI上昇率は高まる。つまり、インフレ圧力が強
まる。その制約が実現するまで、財政再建が無用。むしろ有害だ。 制約実現こそ
が、政策目標達成だ。
日本のような長期デフレ状況に陥った経済には、一種のカンフル剤としてMMT
的な政策、つまり金融と財政の促足進的一体運営で景気拡大をはかり、インフレ率
を高める政策が有効だ。
具体的には、消費税引き上げの実施時期を、日銀のマネタリーベース(「日本銀
行券発行高」+「貨幣流通高」+「日銀当座預金」)の拡大継続約束の条件、つまり
CPI上昇率が安定的に2%を超えた後、と同一にすべきだ。 日本は今MMTを実施し
ていないが、政策路線を修正すれば、MMTの先駆者になりうる。
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