MMT predicts well – Groupthink in action
This blog will be a bit different from my normal fare. It provides insights into how entrenched a destructive and mindless neo-liberal Groupthink pervades the economics profession. For the last several years I have been on the ‘expert’ panel for the Fairfax press Annual Economic Survey. Essentially, this assembles a group of well-known economists in Australia from the market, academic and institutional (for example, union) sectors and we wax lyrical about what we expect will happen in the year ahead. To be fair, there is a large element of chance in the exercise as there is in all forecasting. So I am never one to criticise when an organisation such as the IMF or the OECD or some bank economist gets a forecast wrong. The future is uncertain and we have no formal grounds for even forming probabilistic estimates, given we cannot even assemble a probability density function (an distributional ordering of all possible events ) to extract these probabilities. So guess work is guess work and you have to be guided by experience and an understanding of how the system operates and the elements within the relevant system interact. What I do rail against is the phenomenon of systematic bias in forecast errors. For example, the IMF always predicts stronger growth than occurs when it is advocating imposing austerity (thereby underestimating the costs of the policy). The systematic bias in their errors is traceable to the flawed models they use to generate the predictions, which, in turn, reflect their ideological slant against government deficits and in favour of fiscal surpluses (as a benchmark). As luck would have it, in the 2016 round of the Fairfax Scope survey, I was fortunate enough to achieve the status of Forecaster of the Year (shared with 2 other members of the panel) – see Scope 2017 economic survey: Stephen Anthony, Bill Mitchell; and Renee Fry-McKibbin tie for forecaster of the year – for detail. I tweeted over the weekend that as a result “MMT predicts well”. There was a lot underlying that three-word Tweet and it intersected with recent events that demonstrate how far gone mainstream macroeconomics is – it is in an advanced state of denial and has lost almost all traction on the real world.
The following graph provides a selection of forecasts (for the indicators I get could more or less comparable results) for the year-ending 2016.
The blue columns are my Fairfax forecasts (provided in early 2016), the red columns are the IMF’s forecasts (the last they made towards the end of 2015 – so not much different information to the set I was exposed to) and the jade is the actual outcome (note the actual real GDP estimate is at September-quarter 2016).
It is clear on several key macroeconomic aggregates, that the IMF approach, which reflects a sort of industry standard among mainstream macroeconomists – is way off the mark.
I could show you earlier years with similar results. The errors that result from the mainstream models that the IMF uses are typically systematic.
They are usually way too optimistic when they are recommending fiscal cutbacks and way to pessimistic when a government is expanding its fiscal position to stimulate economies.
It usually overestimates wage inflation (because its Phillips curve approach is crippled by the flawed NAIRU concept) and it rarely goes close in guessing government bond market outcomes (because it relies on a flawed understanding of how nations with their own currencies operate).
The IMF approach based on its New Keynesian general equilibrium bias. It uses a number of formal models to generate forecasts which embed the standard mainstream components – micro-founded optimisation; rational expectations, long-run steady-state neutrality.
In February 2014, the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF published an interesting analysis (BP/14/03) of “how the IMF produces forecasts for use in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and Article IV consultations” – The IMF/WEO Forecast Process.
The IMF relies on its so-called Global Projection Model (GPM) , as the basis of its World Economic Outlook forecasting updates.
It uses “insights from micro-founded DSGE models” (calibrated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models) based on attempts to aggregate rational, maximising micro behaviour into a representative agent macro but realise that they are “far from being able to integrate such models into a global model at this stage of the development of macro model building” and so they supplement it with the ad hoc use of time series or VAR models (VAR = Vector Autoregressive – no theory just data fitting).
They claim this means their approach:
… falls between fully micro-founded estimated models and purely time series or VAR models … On the one hand, it avoids one of the problems of many fully-estimated macro econo- metric models—unrealistic simulation properties because of difficulties in dealing with simul- taneity problems. On the other hand, by using economic theory as the basis for the model, the approach should be able to outperform global VAR models in forecasting and enable researchers to undertake policy simulations that cannot be addressed by VAR models.
Which you should read as saying that:
1. The so-called micro founded DGSE models are highly simplified mathematical expressions of optimal decision making in an environment of rational expectations (everyone knows everything to infinity with zero average forecasting errors) and free markets.
2. They create a macro universe by claiming that individuals are all alike (representative agent) and firms are all alike (representative firms) etc because they cannot solve the aggregation problem inherent in trying to move from individual to aggregate analysis – so they assume it away and assume the macro is just like the individual – so all errors inherent in the fallacy of compositions prevail and are ignored.
3. They cannot say anything about the real world with this approach so they then tack on ad hoc time series properties (lags in relationships, responses etc) which allow them to sort of fit data points.
4. But in adding these ‘real world’ elements, the properties (micro-foundations) they claim to be superior and which they laud over other approaches to assert authority, are completely lost. The actual behaviour of the model simulations etc are no longer driven by the pure optimising properties (which really just assert some theoretical long-run neutrality).
Some of that terminology will be difficult for many readers and I apologise. I just don’t want to write another blog detailing all these concepts.
The point is they think:
1. There is a long-run state where the path of aggregate spending is irrelevant. So fiscal policy cannot change where the economy reaches at some point in the future. They can derive mathematical expressions of that that they impose on the way the model adjusts to a shock (an introduced change).
2. The ad hoc elements (that have nothing to do with optimisation theory) allow the model to have ‘short-run’ dynamics that are different to this long-run, but the adjustment paths always head back to the long-run position.
There is no theoretical authority in this approach. It reflects an ideological position (the way the DSGE model is designed and calibrated) coupled with a crude, data-fitting approach in the short-run.
In general, to fit the real world data, they just make stuff up (residual adjustments – for example – where they just add things to errors to get a closer fit etc).
Please read my blog – When mainstream economists jump the shark and lose it completely – and the links to earlier blogs, for more discussion on this point.
It was in that sense, that I tweeted that ‘MMT predicts well’. In fact, MMT economists have an excellent track record in extrapolating the likely consequences of policy shifts and external shocks.
I invite readers who care to invest the time to go back through my blog where at key points in the last decade I have made statements that are in defiance of the sort of conclusions that the mainstream economists have made – and you will see who was wrong.
I should add that in previous years, Steve Keen has won the Forecaster of the Year title and I have been close. Both academic economists who deploy a non-standard approach heavily influenced by the development of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), although Steve and I focus on different things in our respective academic work.
Think about Japan! The New Keynesians such as Paul Krugman and the more free market mainstream economists (such as hang out at the University of Chicago) predicted terrible things for that nation in the 1990s.
We were led to believe it would inflate badly (because of the growth in the money supply), that the government would run out of money (because bond markets would stop buying debt as the debt level and ratio built up); and that interest rates would go through the roof (because the fiscal deficit was so large).
Result:
1. Low inflation bordering on deflation since the early 1990s.
2. Rising debt ratio – high bid-to-cover ratios in bond auctions – low long-term bond yields (now negative out to 10 years).
3. Rising deficits – but zero or low interest rates since the early 1990s.
4. Relatively low unemployment rates despite a massive property collapse and some natural disasters.
5. The sky above the Japanese islands remains firmly above!
The same goes for the GFC.
As government deficits rose and interest rates fell, notable mainstream economists came out and said that governments would run out of money as bond markets refused to buy debt; that inflation would accelerate and become hyperinflation, that central banks would have to hike interest rates to unprecendent levels to control the inflation as a result of the build up of assets on their balance sheets (expansion of reserves), etc etc.
The MMT economists all were calm.
Nothing along the lines that the mainstream approach predicted happened – they were not even close.
The neo-liberal Groupthink that has rendered mainstream macroeconomics moribund and irrelevant
Which brings me to the next part of the story – the devastating neo-liberal Groupthink that has infiltrated my profession and made it almost irrelevant to any person seeking knowledge.
We talk a lot about ‘fake news’ these days. Well mainstream macroeconomics as taught in universities and practices in international organisations such as the OECD and the IMF and within treasury and central bank departments – is fake knowledge.
Geographers and navigators moved on from their false ‘flat earth’ beliefs once they started to gain an understanding of the way planets form and the physics that govern their relationships and the empirical evidence that emerges from that understanding.
The Flat Earth theorists were beguiled by ships disappearing over the horizon onto to return intact.
Please read my blogs – Flat Earth theory returns – budget aftermath and Flat earth theorists – dumb but sneaky – for more discussion on this point.
The empirical reality of Japan, for example, should be the ships off the horizon wake up point for mainstream macroeconomics.
It should then prompt them to acquire a thorough understanding of the way modern monetary systems operate and the dynamics that govern the relationships between government and non-government.
They would then be able to reconcile the overwhelming empirical evidence that supports from that theoretical understanding.
In the Fairfax report on the Forecaster of the Year (cited above) the journalist noted that my forecast was:
… the closest on record-low wage growth, picking an ultra low 2 per cent, close to the 1.9 per cent recorded in the year to September.
So not only was my forecast an outlier but it was almost exact. I told the journalist that my forecast:
… would have been obvious to anyone who wasn’t seduced by the fairly steady unemployment rate. Underemployment had been climbing, tens of thousands of people had left the workforce who would have once been in it, and what jobs growth there was had been concentrated in part-time jobs that were typically non-unionised where workers had low bargaining power. This year he is predicting wage growth of 1.8 per cent, less than the rate of inflation, meaning earning power will shrink.
The mainstream macroeconomists barely have unemployment in their models – they think it is a voluntary, optimising choice that workers make not to work some times.
Their models do not consider underemployment or the casualisation of the labour market – those real world events are below their DSGE radar.
As a consequence they haven’t a chance of really forecasting these outcomes very accurately (on a regular basis).
The Fairfax article also said that my forecast:
… hit the bullseye on the 10-year bond rate, picking 2.7 per cent, which is where it ended up … [and] … He says the low bond rate was also obvious, given auction data showing queues of traders wanting to buy risk-free assets. For all the talk about the need to attract foreign capital, Australia’s government finds it pretty easy.
If you think that governments can run out of money, you will never really be able to understand the dynamics of bond rates.
Remember all the articles that poured out from mainstream economists in the early days of the GFC predicting sky-rocketing bond yields and governments being crippled by lack of ‘money’?
It was never going to be true but those underlying beliefs cause forecasts to be systematically wrong.
Which brings me to share another personal experience which builds on the recent critique by a UNSW economist of MMT. It was a ridiculous critique – which included libellous claims that MMT economists were cranks, charlatans, snake oil salespersons and the rest of it.
It set up some false straw person challenge to make us look like idiots:
So here’s my challenge to the modern monetary theory crowd. Please state a formal, precise, economic model in which a monetary authority can extract an infinite amount of real resources through seigniorage. Or be quiet.
Of course, no MMT academic has ever claimed that “a monetary authority can extract an infinite amount of real resources through seigniorage”. Read never.
That was a fake claim about us – an untruth, designed to degrade our academic reputation and justify the use of the libellous descriptors.
But it tells you about the state of mainstream macroeconomics.
Here is another interesting example.
Our new MMT textbook will be published later this year by the leading textbook publishers Macmillan Palgrave.
It will offer a two-semester sequence in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) from the introduction to the second-year (intermediate) level study. It is built on the introductory book we released earlier last year.
It is much improved on that book and covers a lot more material with some very sophisticated analysis (including the use of mathematics) and topical debates.
But it is faithful to MMT and is very graduated. We do not include anything formal (mathematical) for its own sake. A person with no background in economics will be able to make excellent progress as he/she traverses the 27 chapters in the book.
They will end up with an excellent understanding of the way the monetary system actually operates and appreciate the policy choices available to government and their likely consequences.
We have been through a rather exhaustive process before the publisher issued us with the publishing contract. It is not easy getting such a contract in this sort of market.
Part of that process involves the publisher inviting blind (to us) referees to review our proposal with sample draft chapters. This gives the publisher some idea of the market opportunities, who will take up the book for teaching purposes etc and provides us with feedback from the profession.
We received several reports from the publisher some which were obviously from heterodox economists who were all uniformly positive although the comments were not necessarily all favourable and some of the suggestions for clarification were excellent.
They were in the spirit of open debate – yes, the approach was sound (heterodox, MMT) but this or that could be improved etc.
Several other reports were from mainstream macroeconomists and they were all uniformly antagonistic.
It was clear from reading those reports that our approach offends the basic Groupthink ideology that the mainstream economists adhere to, which provides them with internal succour but renders their capacity to analyse the real world as being close to zero.
The textbook does not consider in any detail theories of unemployment that are built on the optimisation view that unemployment is a choice individuals make between labour and leisure and when the real wage they face is too low, they choose leisure because it delivers maximum utility.’
If that view was correct, then quit rates would be pro-cyclical. In the real world they are firmly counter-cyclical indicating people do not quit jobs at increasing rates when unemployment rises. Quite the opposite.
Why would we include an arcane neo-liberal notion which seeks to deny the involuntary nature of unemployment?
A standard mainstream response is that our general approach is old hat and out of touch with the way that modern macroeconomics is now taught. The mainstream textbooks all conform to the approach that macroeconomic reasoning begins with microeconomics (optimising markets and individuals with rational expectations, etc) and that DSGE modelling is at the core supplemented with time series calibration (as in the IMF approach outlined above).
Apparently, if a textbook does not take that approach they are killing the career prospects of their students in graduate programs, even though hardly anyone goes on to undertake PhDs in economics as a career move.
But reflect on the implications of a world of macroeconomics textbooks all teaching the same micro founded, DSGE approach, which my profession tells us is required.
This is the exact approach that delivers the ridiculous forecasts that the IMF makes continuously.
This is the exact approach that predicted austerity in Greece would lead to rapid growth in 2011 and when the economy collapsed further, the IMF had to admit they had calibrated their model wrongly. Oops.
This is the exact approach that allowed the GFC to build up over several decades and then explode without any of the practitioners of that approach seeing it coming or knowing what to do when it arrived.
Remember the comments made by Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas Jr (University of Chicago) in his 2003 presidential address to the American Economic Association:
My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades. There remain important gains in welfare from better fiscal policies, but I argue that these are gains from providing people with better incentives to work and to save, not from better fine tuning of spending flows. Taking U.S. performance over the past 50 years as a benchmark, the potential for welfare gains from better long-run, supply side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in short-run demand management.
So the ‘business cycle’ was dead and all that governments should do was to further privatise and deregulate.
At the time, the private debt buildup and the pursuit of fiscal surpluses was leading to a perfect storm. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) economists wrote about the impending crisis even during the 1990s – it was not a matter of if, but when and how bad it would be.
The mainstream with their were blithely unaware.
Those modern New Keynesian models typically didn’t even have a financial sector in them because they didn’t think ‘money mattered’.
It is clear that the mainstream of my profession spend their time propagating a macroeconomics literature that has zero predictive content. We know that because Robert Lucas was wrong – the business cycle was far from dead and just four years later the financial system collapsed and we are still picking up the pieces.
It is no surprise that the mainstream macroeconomic models didn’t predict the crisis – their macroeconomic models assumed stability, did not have financial sectors (banks etc) built into the models, and were underpinned by the biased view that free market would optimally self-regulate.
That is the approach that appears in all the mainstream textbook in macroeconomics.
Our textbook will take a completely different approach.
And it is not surprising that the first point of call for governments in late 2008 who were facing the meltdown of their entire financial and production systems was the so-called outdated approach that MMT economists advocate.
The policy makers didn’t turn to DSGE New Keynesian models – they used an approach that is outlined in our textbook.
One could never understand the last 25 years of Japanese economic history using the approach taken in mainstream macroeconomics textbooks.
One could never understand wage developments in the real world using a rational expectations NAIRU approach which is embedded in all mainstream macroeconomics textbooks.
It is not suprise that they didn’t see the GFC coming and couldn’t explain how to get out of it.
But the neo-liberal Groupthink is so strong and the denial is so pervasive that these characters go through their careers with blinkers on.
When a chink of the real world enters their stultified lives and they realise there is a problem, the denial resonates strongly and some ad hoc rationalisation occurs, followed by historical revision (it won’t be long before they deny the GFC actually occurred).
Times are changing within the economic profession – it will take time. But our book and others that will follow like it will be benchmarks as that change goes through.
Conclusion
A slightly different sort of blog.
That is enough for today!
(c) Copyright 2017 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.
#29:484関連
484
HISTORY OF MACROECONOMIC THOUGHT
The existence of true uncertainty makes it impossible to optimise or maximise because we simply do not
know the future. Inevitably we undertake decisions by exercising bounded rationality. This might lead us to con-
clude that the safest thing to do is to fall back on opinions and expectations of others. We use conventions and
weight of argument to decide what to do, without knowing if this is optimal.
Some post-Keynesians, in particular Paul Davidson, argue that the future is non-ergodic. What this means is that
even if we had all the probability distributions for past outcomes, these cannot be applied to the future because
the probabilities for the futu re could be, and probably will be, different from those calculated from the past.
The easiest way to think about this
to remember that the future is yet to be created, and no matter what
humans have done in the past, they could choose to do something different in the future. To some degree we
could say that we know quite a lot about the past and even about the present, but we simply cannot know the
future, at least, until it occurs.
Minsky had a slightly different view on uncertainty. The uncertainty we face is over the correctness of our
model of the way the world works. The uncertainty is not just about the data and probabilities, but rather about
the correct model of the world.
We know our model can be wrong. Hence, we build in margins of error and the best margin of safety is to hold
highly liquid assets like cash. It might turn out that our model of the world is wrong, but holding liquid assets
provides a cushion of safety.
jan Robinson used to joke that time exists to keep everything from happening at once. This does capture a
key difference between heterodoxy, which uses the concept of historical time where everything cannot happen
at once, and orthodoxy, which uses the notion of logical time in its rigorous models. In logical time, one can go
backward and forward in time to re-contract in order to get the best deals.
In the Walrasian auctioneer models, the auctioneer takes bids and offers but nothing happens until the equi-
librium price list for all tradeable goods and services is settled. Once equilibrium prices are established, then all
exchanges take place.
This ensures there is no false price trading at disequilibrium prices. In such models, there is no room for money
since there is no reason to postpone purchases to see whether a better opportunity might come along. And there
is no uncertainty because the equilibrium prices reveal all the information that is needed. Effectively, time col-
lapses to the instant during which the exchanges take place. All exchange reduces to barter
By contrast, in heterodoxy, money matters:
We need money to spend, as Clower explains. Money buys goods and goods buy money but goods do not buy
goods.
. We measure success in terms of money. Marx argues that capitalist production takes the form of M-C-P-C'-M':
money (M) is advanced now to buy inputs (C) and produce (P) commodities (C') with an expectation that
these can be sold for more money (M') later.
We can hold money against an uncertain future.
Money is needed to start the production process, to finance spending by both firms and consumers. However,
money also allows one to defer decisions; it is a safe repository that breaks the link between income and spending,
nullifying Say's Law. When uncertainty rises, the demand for liquidity simultaneously rises and there is a growing
gap between the supply and demand for goods and services. Money is never neutral, although in an important
sense it matters more in troubled times
In addition to these functions of money, MMT adds the link between money and sovereign power, which is
largely lacking in other heterodox approaches to money, as well as in orthodoxy. The state also needs to finance its
spending and plays an important role in organising the monetary system to move resources to the public sphere.
Money cannot be neutral for the state either, since currency sovereignty is critically important to ensure that the
not financially constrained.
The neoclassical notion of Ricardian Equivalence cannot hold in the case of a sovereign currency. If a govern
ment spends more or taxes less, it would be irrational for the private sector to cut its own spending in anticipation
state
of future tax hikes.
484
マクロ経済思想史
真の不確実性が存在するため、最適化または最大化を行うことは不可能です。
未来を知ります。必然的に私たちは限界のある合理性を行使して決定を下します。これは私たちに
最も安全な方法は、他の人の意見や期待に頼ることです。私たちは慣習を使います
これが最適かどうかを知らずに、何をすべきかを決めるための引数の重み。
いくつかのポストケインズ派、特にPaul Davidsonは、未来は非エルゴード的であると主張しています。これが意味することはそれです
過去の結果に対するすべての確率分布があったとしても、これらを将来に適用することはできません。
未来の確率は過去から計算されたものとは異なる可能性があり、おそらく異なるでしょう。
これについて考える最も簡単な方法
未来はまだ創造されていないことを忘れないでください。
人間は過去にやったことがありますが、彼らは将来違うことをすることを選ぶかもしれません。ある程度まで
過去についても現在についてもかなり知っていると言えるかもしれませんが、私たちは単に
少なくとも、それが起こるまでの未来。
Minskyは、不確実性について少し異なる見方をしました。私たちが直面している不確実性は、私たちの正しさにあります。
世界のしくみのモデル。不確実性はデータと確率だけではなく、むしろ
世界の正しいモデル。
私達は私達のモデルが間違っている可能性があることを知っています。したがって、我々はエラーのマージンを組み込んでおり、安全のための最良のマージンは以下のとおりです。
現金のような流動性の高い資産。私たちの世界のモデルは間違っているが、流動資産を持っていることが判明するかもしれません。
安全性のクッションを提供します。
jan Robinsonはかつてそのことを冗談で言っていましたが、一度にすべてが起きないようにするためです。これは
すべてが起こり得ない歴史的時間の概念を使用している異説間の主な違い
厳密なモデルでは論理時間の概念を使用します。論理的な時間では、人は行くことができます
最良の取引を得るために再契約するのに間に合うように前後に進みます。
Walrasian競売人モデルでは、競売人は入札と売り出しを行いますが、それが達成されるまで何も起こりません。
取引可能なすべての商品およびサービスの価格表が決まっています。均衡価格が確立されれば
交換が行われます。
これは、不均衡な価格で誤った価格取引がないことを保証します。そのようなモデルでは、お金の余地はありません
よりよい機会が来るかもしれないかどうか見るために購入を延期する理由がないので。そしてそこに
均衡価格から必要な情報がすべて明らかになるので、不確実性はありません。事実上、時間の経過とともに
交換が行われる瞬間に経過します。すべての交換は物々交換になります
それとは対照的に、異分野では、お金が重要です。
Clower★が説明しているように、私たちは使うためにお金が必要です。お金は商品を買い、商品はお金を買うが、商品は買わない
品。
。私たちはお金で成功を測ります。マルクスは、資本主義的生産はM-C-P-C'-M 'の形をとると主張している。
マネー（M）は、インプット（C）を購入し、（P）コモディティ（C '）を生産するために現在進められています。
これらは後でもっとお金で売ることができます（M '）。
不確実な将来に対してお金を握ることができます。
企業と消費者の両方による支出をまかなうために、生産プロセスを開始するためにお金が必要です。しかしながら、
また、お金によって決定を延期することもできます。それは収入と支出の間のつながりを壊す安全な貯蔵庫です、
セイの法則を無効にする不確実性が高まると、同時に流動性の需要が高まり、成長が見込まれます。
商品とサービスの需要と供給のギャップ。重要ではあるが、お金は決して中立ではない
困った時にはもっと重要
これらの貨幣の機能に加えて、MMTは貨幣とソブリン権力との間の結びつきを追加します。
正統派と同様に、お金への他のヘテロドックスアプローチで大部分が欠けています。州もその資金を調達する必要があります
支出し、資源を公の領域に移動させるために通貨システムを組織することにおいて重要な役割を果たします。
通貨の主権は、国家を確実にするためにきわめて重要であるため、国家にとっても中立にすることはできません。
財政的な制約はありません。
リカード当量の新古典派の概念は、ソブリン通貨の場合には成り立ちません。統治者の場合
しかし、民間部門が自国の支出を見込んで削減することは合理的ではないでしょう。
状態
将来の増税について
29
Modern Schools of Economic Thought
Sovereign governments do not need to raise taxes in the future to pay for spending (or tax cuts) today. And
indeed, they do not do so in the real world. We observe that the normal situation for most sovereign govern-
ments is to run nearly continuous deficits and rarely, if ever, pay down a significant portion of their debt. This is
485
for reasons discussed in Chapter 21.
What matters, in any case, is to run the economy near to continuous full employment of its resources. Any
labour resources not used this year cannot be stockpiled for future use, nor can those labour resources used this
year be somehow paid for by taxes later. Any resources mobilised this year for use in the public sector are paid for
mediately, by cutting cheques or by marking up bank accounts
Ir would be irrational for the private sector to react to greater receipts from government spending by cutting
hack household and business spending. Rather, it is far more rational to increase private spending alongside rising
public spending
These ideas underpin the concept of the Keynesian multiplier. All plausible empirical estimates demonstrate
that there is a multiplier effect, not a Ricardian effect, of government spending.
MMT also teaches that central banks always operate with an overnight interest rate target, which is consistent
with heterodox as well as NMC thinking.
This implies that central banks must coordinate operations with the fiscal authorities, offsetting the effects
of fiscal operations on reserves (either by accommodating bank demand or by paying interest on reserves).
However, all else being equal, budget deficits increase excess reserves that would place downward pressure on
overnight rates, which is precisely the opposite result to that implied by the neoclassical crowding-out theory
Crowding-out theory assumes that there is competition between government borrowing and private bor-
rowing for a limited supply of loanable funds. This completely misunderstands government finance
monetary policy operations. If interest rates do go up in the presence of budget deficits, it is because the central
bank has raised its target rate.
well as
Conclusion
In this chapter we continued our discussion of the history of economic thought by delving more deeply into the
main modern schools of thought. We began with the orthodox approaches, including New Classical, Real Business
Cycle, and New Keynesian. We explained how each developed as a response to perceived weaknesses in the older
Monetarist and IS-LM approaches, and then looked at the weaknesses in each of these approaches. In the next
chapter we will study the current 'synthesis' that attermpts to integrate parts of each of these three schools.
We next discussed in detail the shared fundamental building blocks of the modern heterodox schools of
thought, and briefly contrasted these with the foundations of mainstream, orthodoxy.
References
Domar, E.D. (1946) "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment", Econometrica, 14(2), April, 137-47.
Friedman, M. (1968) "The Role of Monetary Policy", The American Economic Review, 58(1), March, 1-17.
Friedman, M. (1970) "The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory", IEA Occasional Paper, No. 33, Institute of Economic
the Capitalist Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Affairs. London.
Kalecki, M. (1971) Selected Essays on the Dynamics
Lucas, R.E. (1972) "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money", Journal of Economic Theory, 4(2), 103-24.
Mankiw, N.G. (2016) Macroeconomics, 9th edn, New York: Worth.
Economic Studies, XXIX (4), October, 267-279.
Sraffa, P (1960) Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory,
pp.78-9.
profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth", Review of
Pasinetti, L. (1962) "Rate
Cambridge: Cambridne University Press.
29
現代経済学派
ソブリン政府は、今日の支出（または減税）を支払うために将来、増税する必要はありません。そして
実際、彼らは現実の世界ではそうはしていません。私たちは、ほとんどの主権政府にとって通常の状況は
それは、ほとんど継続的な赤字を実行することであり、たとえあったとしても、彼らの負債のかなりの部分を返済することはめったにありません。これは
485
第21章で説明した理由により。
いずれにせよ、重要なのは、経済をその資源の継続的な完全雇用に近づけることです。どれか
今年使用されていない労働資源は将来の使用のために備蓄することはできず、またこれらの労働資源はこれを使用することもできない。
どういうわけか後に税金で支払われる年です。公共部門での使用のために今年動員されたいかなる資源も対価を支払われる
暫定的に、小切手を切るか、銀行口座をマークアップすることによって
民間部門が政府支出からのより多くの領収書を削減することによって対応するのは不合理でしょう。
家計と事業支出をハックする。むしろ、個人消費を増加させるのと同時に、個人投資を増やすほうがはるかに合理的です。
公費
これらのアイデアは、ケインズ乗数の概念を支えています。もっともらしい経験的推定値はすべて実証している
政府支出には、リカルディアン効果ではなく、乗数効果があること。
MMTはまた、中央銀行は常に一晩の金利目標で運営していることを教えています。
ヘテロドックスとNMCの考え方で。
これは、中央銀行が財政当局と業務を調整し、その影響を相殺しなければならないことを意味します。
（銀行の需要に対応するか、または準備金に利子を支払うことによる）準備金に対する財政運営の影響。
しかし、他の条件がすべて同じであれば、財政赤字は過剰準備金を増加させ、それが
これは、新古典派の混雑理論によって暗示されているものと正反対の結果です。
クラウドアウト理論は、政府借入と民間借入の間に競争があると仮定している。
貸付可能資金の限られた供給のための漕ぎ。これは政府の財政を完全に誤解している
金融政策運営。財政赤字の存在下で金利が上がるのであれば、それは
銀行は目標金利を引き上げた。
だけでなく
結論
この章では、経済思想の歴史についてさらに深く掘り下げて議論しました。
現代の主な学派私たちはニュークラシック、リアルビジネスを含む正統的なアプローチから始めました
サイクルとニューケインジアン我々は、高齢者の弱点の認識に対する反応として、それぞれがどのように発達したかを説明しました。
MonetaristとIS-LMがアプローチし、次にこれらの各アプローチの弱点を調べました。次に、次で
この章では、これら3つの学校のそれぞれの部分を統合することを試みる現在の「統合」について検討します。
次に、現代のヘテロドックススクールの基本的な基本構成要素について詳しく説明します。
考え、そして主流の正統派の基礎とこれらを簡単に対比した。
参考文献
Domar、E.D. （1946）「資本拡大、成長率および雇用」、Econometrica、14（2）、4月、137-47。
フリードマン、M。（1968）「金融政策の役割」、アメリカの経済レビュー、58（1）、3月、1-17。
フリードマン、M。（1970年） "貨幣理論における反革命"、IEA臨時論文、第33号、経済研究所
資本主義経済、ケンブリッジ：ケンブリッジ大学出版局、
事務ロンドン
Kalecki、M。（1971） 『ダイナミクスについてのエッセイ』
ルーカス、Ｒ。 （1972）「期待とお金の中立性」、経済理論のジャーナル、4（2）、103-24。
マンキウ、Ｎ。 （2016）Macroeconomics、第9版、ニューヨーク：Worth。
Economic Studies、XXIX（4）、10月、267-279。
Sraffa、P（1960）商品による商品の生産：経済理論批判への序論、
７８−９頁。
経済成長率に関連した利益と所得分配」、
Pasinetti、L.（1962） "レート
ケンブリッジ：Cambridne University Press。
486
HISTORY OF MACROECONOMIC THOUGHT
Endnotes
1. Aggregate income does not depend on distribution unless capital is homogenous with what Marx called a constant organic composition of capital; this requires essentially the same ratio of hours of labour employed directly in production to the hours of labour embodied in the capital used. On the other hand, Keynes has no such problem in the
exposition of the General Theory since he measures everything in labour hours and a nominal wage unit
2. Minsky credited Lucas and the NC approach for recognising that agents in the model have a model of the model.
but he rejected the NC presumption that the model held by agents is the correct one. He argued that in the real
world, everybody knows the model held is wrong. This is why it is prudent to hedge one's bets by building in margins
of safety.
3. If interest is not paid on reserves, the central bank ensures excess reserves are kept near zero while offering treasury
bonds through open market operations as the interest earning alternative. If the central bank pays a rate of interest
on reserves equal to the target rate, there is no need to drain excess reserves by offering bonds.
Visit the companion website at www.macmillanihe.com/mitchell-macro for additional resources
including author videos, an instructor's manual, worked examples, tutorial questions, additional
references, the data sets used in constructing various graphs in the text, and more.486
マクロ経済思想史
文末脚注
1.マルクスが資本の一定の有機的構成と呼んだものと資本が同質でない限り、総所得は分配に依存しない。これには、生産に直接使われる労働時間と、使われる資本に含まれる労働時間との本質的に同じ比率が必要です。一方、ケインズはそのような問題はありません。
彼は労働時間と名目賃金単位ですべてを測定するので、一般理論の博覧会
2. Minskyは、モデル内のエージェントがモデルのモデルを持っていることを認識しているとLucas氏とNCのアプローチを信じました。
しかし彼は、エージェントによって保持されているモデルは正しいものであるというNCの推定を拒否した。彼は実際には
世界では、誰もが開催されたモデルが間違っていることを知っています。マージンを組み込んで自分の賭けをヘッジするのが賢明なのはこのためです。
安全性
3.準備金に利息が支払われない場合、中央銀行は、自己資金を提供しながら過剰準備金をゼロ近くに維持する
利益を得るための代替手段として、公開市場での運用を通じて債券を調達します。中央銀行が利子を支払う場合
目標金利に等しい準備金については、社債を発行して余剰準備金を排出する必要はありません。
その他の資料については、コンパニオンWebサイト（www.macmillanihe.com/mitchell-macro）を参照してください。
作者のビデオ、講師用マニュアル、うまくいった例、チュートリアルの質問、その他
参考文献、本文中のさまざまなグラフの作成に使用されるデータセットなど。
★
Clower, R. (1965) "The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal," in F.H. Hahn and F.P.R. Brechling (eds),
The Theory of Interest Rates, London: Macmillan.
#14:214~5
NATIONAL INCOME, OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION
214
As we have learned, Say's Law denies there can ever be overproduction and unemployment. If consumers
decide to save more, then the firms react to this and produce more investment goods to absorb the saving, There
is total fluidity of resources between sectors, and workers are simply shifted from making, say, iPads to making
investment goods.
Keynes showed that when people save, they do not spend. Further, they give no signal to firms about whon
they will spend in the future and what they will buy then. So, there is a market failure. Firms react to the rising
inventories and cut back output, unable to deal with the uncertainty
There was a theoretical push to reassert Say's Law using the real balance effect as the conduit by which aggre.
gate demand would always adjust to aggregate supply in the 1950s. But major theoretical work by Keynesians
such as Robert Clower (1965) and Axel Leijonhufvud (1968) provided new insights into how we can see the
contribution of Keynes and his demolition of Classical theory. These two authors demonstrated in different ways
how neoclassical models of optimising behaviour were flawed when applied to macroeconomic issues such as
mass unemployment.
Clower (1965) showed that an excess supply in the labour market (unemployment) was not usually accom-
panied by an excess demand elsewhere in the economy, especially in the product market. Excess demands are
expressed in money terms. How could an unemployed worker (who had notional or latent product demands)
signal to an employer (a seller in the product market) their demand intentions? Not via saving in financial terms,
such as holding money and other liquid financial assets.
Leijonhufvud (1968) also noted that involuntary unemployment arises because there is no way that the unem-
ployed workers can signal that they would buy more goods and services if they were to be employed. A particular
firm cannot assume their profit will rise if they hire another worker even though revenue in general will clearly
rise (because there will be higher incomes and higher demand). The market signalling process thus breaks down
and the economy stagnates. Only if the additional workers hired were guaranteed to buy the firm's extra output
could the firm go forward to hire them, because only in that case could the firm be sure that the costs of hiring
the workers would be covered by additional sales revenue."
Conclusion
One of the key elements of Keynes' attacks and his ultimate discrediting of the Classical employment theory was
his identification of what we call the fallacy of composition. We discussed this concept in Chapter 2
Prior to the 1930s, there was no separate study called macroeconomics. The dominant theory of the day,
characterised by the Treasury View, considered macroeconomics to be an exercise in the aggregation of individual
relationships. The economy was thus seen as being just like a household or single firm, only bigger. Accordingly
changes in behaviour or circumstances that might benefit the individual or the firm were automatically claimed
to be of benefit to the overall economy.
The insistence in the Treasury View that wage cuts would cure the mass unemployment that arose during the
1930s' Great Depression symbolised the fact that their reasoning was based on compositional fallacies.
Keynes led the attack on the mainstream by exposing several fallacies of composition. While these types of
logical errors pervade mainstream macroeconomic thinking, there are two famous fallacies of composition in
macroeconomics: (a) the paradox of thrift; and (b) the wage-cutting solution to unemployment.
Our discussion of the macroeconomic demand for labour curve in this chapter also highlights how Classical
employment theory was bedevilled by this problem.
We have considered the Keynes versus Classics debate in some detail in Chapters 12-14 because the
ideas are in dispute in the current era.
国民所得、出力および雇用の決定
214
私たちが学んだように、セイの法則は、過剰生産と失業がこれまでにないことを否定します。消費者なら
もっと節約することに決めたら、企業はこれに反応し、節約を吸収するためにもっと多くの投資財を生産する。
部門間の資源の総流動性であり、労働者は単にiPadの製造から製造へと移行している。
投資商品。
ケインズは、人々が救うとき、彼らは費やさないことを示しました。さらに、彼らは会社にwhonについての合図を与えません。
彼らは将来使うでしょうそして彼らがその時買うもの。だから、市場の失敗があります。企業は上昇に反応する
不確実性に対処することができない、在庫と生産量の削減
実際のバランス効果をどのようにしてアグリするかの根拠としてSayの法則を再主張するための理論的推進があった。
1950年代には、ゲート需要は常に総供給に調整されていました。しかしケインズ派による主要な理論的研究
Robert Clower（1965）やAxel Leijonhufvud（1968）のような論文は、私たちの
ケインズの貢献と古典理論の彼の破壊。これら2人の著者は異なる方法で実証しました
次のようなマクロ経済問題に適用した場合、最適化行動の新古典派モデルがどのように欠陥があったか
大量失業。
Clower（1965）は、労働市場における過剰供給（失業）は通常は順調ではないことを示した。
経済の他の部分、特に製品市場での過剰な需要によってパニックに陥った。過剰な要求は
お金で表した。どのようにして失業者（概念上の、または潜在的な製品要求をしていた）の労働者になれるか
雇用主（製品市場の売り手）に彼らの需要意向を知らせる？経済的に節約することではない、
お金やその他の流動的な金融資産を保持するなど。
Leijonhufvud（1968）はまた、非自発的失業が発生する可能性はない
雇われた労働者は、彼らが雇用されることになっていたら彼らがより多くの商品やサービスを買うだろうと合図することができます。特定の
たとえ彼らが他の労働者を雇うならば、会社は彼らの利益が上がることを仮定することはできません。
（より高い所得とより高い需要があるため）市場のシグナル伝達プロセスはこのように崩壊します
そして経済は停滞する。追加雇用された労働者が会社の追加生産を買うことが保証された場合にのみ
その場合に限って会社は雇用の費用が
労働者たちは追加の売上で賄われるだろう」と語った。
結論
ケインズの攻撃と古典的雇用理論の彼の最終的な信用の重要な要素の1つは、
私たちが作曲の誤謬と呼んでいるものの彼の識別。この概念については第2章で説明しました。
1930年代以前は、マクロ経済学と呼ばれる別の研究はありませんでした。今日の支配的な理論
マクロ経済学は個人の集合体における運動であると考えられていた
関係。このように、経済は世帯または単一の会社のように、ただそれよりも大きいと見られていました。従って
個人または会社に利益をもたらす可能性のある行動または状況の変化が自動的に主張された
経済全体に利益をもたらすために。
財務省の見解では、賃金の引き下げは、その間に生じた大量失業を解消するでしょう。
1930年代の大恐慌は、彼らの推論が構成上の誤りに基づいていたという事実を象徴していた。
ケインズはいくつかの誤謬の構成を露呈させることによって主流への攻撃を導いた。これらの種類の
論理的エラーが主流のマクロ経済学的思考に浸透している、2つの有名な構成の誤りがあります。
マクロ経済学：（a）倹約のパラドックス。 （b）失業に対する賃金カットの解決策。
この章でのマクロ経済的労働需要の議論についての私達の議論はまたどのように古典的であるかを強調している。
雇用理論はこの問題によって決定された。
ケインズ対クラシックの討論については、第12章 - 第14章である程度詳しく論じています。
アイデアは現在の時代に論争中です。
14 The Macroeconomic Demand for Labour
215
The mainstream response to the persistent unemployment that has beleaguered most economies for the last
three or more decades is to invoke supply side measures: wage cutting, stricter activity tests for welfare entitle-
ments, relentless training programmes. But this policy approach, which reflects an emphasis on the labour mar-
ket, and particularly the wage rate, falls foul of the fallacy of composition problem.
Policymakers consistently mistake a systemic failure for an individual failure. The main reason that the supply
side approach is flawed is that it fails to recognise that unemployment arises when there are not enough jobs
created to match the desire to work of the willing labour supply. That requires a system-wide policy response to
increase effective demand rather than an individual solution focusing on the characteristics of the unemployed.
udde
References
Clower, R. (1965) "The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal," in F.H. Hahn and F.P.R. Brechling (eds),
The Theory of Interest Rates, London: Macmillan.
Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE) (c.2001) The Tale of 100 Dogs and 95 Bones. Available at: http://
e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/education/education_view.cfm?I D=1, accessed 10 July 2018
Keynes, J.M.(1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: Macmillan, 1957 Reprint.
Leijonhufvud, A. (1968) On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes: A Study in Monetary Theory, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Marx, K. (1863) Theories of Surplus Value. Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-
surplus-value/index.htm, accessed
Pigou, A. (1943) "The Classical Stationary State", The Economic Journal, December, LIlII, 343-51.
Weintraub, S. (1956) "A Macroeconomic Approach to the Theory of Wages", The American Economic Review, 45(5),
December, 835-56
May 2017.
Endnote
1. Even in that case, firms might decline to hire the workers. Simply covering the wages paid through sales to the new
workers would not generate profits for the firms.
Visit the companion website at www.macmillanihe.com/mitchell-macro for additional resources
including author videos, an instructor's manual, worked examples, tutorial questions, additional
references, the data sets used in constructing various graphs in the text, and more.
14労働に対するマクロ経済的需要
215
最後の1年間でほとんどの経済を襲ってきた持続的な失業への主流の反応
30年以上が供給側の対策を実施することです：賃金カット、福祉資格のためのより厳しい活動テスト -
精神、執拗なトレーニングプログラム。しかし、この政策アプローチは、労働環境に重点を置いています。
ケット、そして特に賃金率は、構成問題の誤謬に反する。
政策立案者は一貫して個人的な失敗と体系的な失敗を間違えます。その主な理由
副次的なアプローチに欠陥があるのは、十分な仕事がない場合に失業が発生することを認識できないということです。
意欲的な労働供給の仕事への欲求に一致するように作成されました。そのためには、システム全体の政策対応が必要です。
失業者の特性に焦点を当てた個別の解決策ではなく、実効需要を増やす。
うどん
参考文献
Clower、R.（1965）「ケインジアン反革命：理論的評価」、F.H. HahnおよびF.P.R。ブレヒリング（編）、
金利論、ロンドン：Macmillan。
完全雇用と公平の中心（CofFEE）（c.2001）100匹の犬と95匹の骨の物語。 http：//で入手可能
e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/education/education_view.cfm?I D = 1、2018年7月10日にアクセス
ケインズ、J。M.（1936）「雇用、利子、および貨幣の一般理論」、ロンドン：マクミラン、1957年再版。
Leijonhufvud、A。（1968）ケインズ経済学とケインズ経済学：ニューヨークの貨幣理論の研究：
オックスフォード大学出版局。
マルクス、K.（1863）余剰価値の理論。 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ 1863 / theories-から入手できます。
アクセスされた余剰値/ index.htm
Pigou、A。（1943） "The Classical Stationary State"、The Economic Journal、12月、LIII、343-51。
Weintraub、S。（1956）「賃金理論へのマクロ経済学的アプローチ」、アメリカ経済レビュー、45（5）、
835 - 56年12月
2017年5月
文末脚注
その場合でも、企業は労働者の雇用を辞退する可能性があります。販売を通じて支払われた賃金を単に新しいものにまかなう
労働者は企業にとって利益を生みません。
その他の資料については、コンパニオンWebサイト（www.macmillanihe.com/mitchell-macro）を参照してください。
作者のビデオ、講師用マニュアル、うまくいった例、チュートリアルの質問、その他
参考文献、本文中のさまざまなグラフの作成に使用されるデータセットなど。
参考：
続橋論考
4．高橋是清とローズヴェルト 高橋是清は1932年に大蔵大臣に就任する。一方，ローズヴェルトは1933年に大統領に就任している。このように，高橋とローズヴェルトは，ほぼ同じ時期に重要ポストについているが，両氏の目的は同じで大不況で発生した大量失業者の救済である。だが，二人の失業の救済方法は異なる。財政の果たす役割は（1）資源の最適配分効果（2）所得再分配効果（3）経済安定化効果となっているが，既に触れたように，高橋是清は失業の救済方法として（3）の経済安定化効果を選ぶが，ローズヴェルトは（2）の「所得再分配効果」を目指した。ニューディール政策は，大不況後失業して貧困に陥った労働者を公共事業及び社会保障などを通じて人々を救済した。公共事業や社会保障のための資金調達については国債の発行及び累進所得税率の引き上げや大企業への課税が強化された。かくて，ローズヴェルトが導入したニューディール政策によって高額所得者と低額所得者の所得格差が縮まった。事実，図9が示すように，ローズヴェルトが大統領に就任した33年以降，所得上位1％の家計の所得が国民全体の可処分所得に占める割合は下落傾向を示している。このことは，高額所得者と低額所得者の所得格差が縮小していることを意味し，このため，日本とは逆で，大不況によってパレート最適点から左にシフトしてしまった社会的無差別曲線は，ローズヴェルトのニューディール政策によって，図7のI1からI2, I3へとシフトすることになる。これは，言うまでもなく，アメリカの社会厚生（暮らし向き）が上がることを示す。事実，図10が示すように，アメリカにおいて20年代初頭から32年ごろまで自殺率と殺人率ともに上昇傾向にあったが，ニューディール政策以降は下落傾向となっている。したがって，ニューディール政策は人々の暮らし向きを良くするという面で成果をあげたというのが適切な評価と思われる。5．「高橋是清の経済政策」の評価 以上の議論から明らかなように，高橋是清が導入した経済政策（財政・金融政策）はニューディール政策と全く逆で，所得と雇用を押し上げるのに著しい効果をあげたものの，社会厚生すなわち人々の暮らし向きを悪化させた。所得及び雇用の増大効果は「高橋是清の経済政策」の「便益」となる。一方，同氏による財政・金融政策は所得格差を広げ社会厚生を低下させたため，国民の不満が高まり，その不満をそらすべく日本は戦争の道を選び多くの国民の命が失われたのであるが，これは高橋の経済政策によってもたらされた「コスト」となる。この「コスト」が戦前の日本において「便益」を大幅に上回ったというのは明白であろう。高橋是清の経済政策は「戦争」への危険ばかりでなく，今日では国が債務不履行に陥り国家破綻を招くリスクも秘めている 19）。平和で且つ安全に，そして安心して暮らせる持続可能な経済社会を実現するには，「景気の安定」と「所得再分配」を同時に満たす必要があるが，どの国にとっても，これら二つを同時に満たすことは極めて困難であり，今後の経済政策の大きな課題として残る。付論A 合理的バブルの概念はBlanchard and Watson（1982）によって始めて提唱された。一般的に株式市場におけるバブルとはファンダメンタルズから乖離した部分を指すが，彼らはバブルをさらに「合理的バブル」と「非合理的バ
クラウアー（1965），「ケインジアンの反革命」清水啓典訳・花輪俊哉監修『ケインズ経済学の再評価』東洋経済新報社，昭和55年，99–130ページ。
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部分ブロックに関する方針改訂が6月1日に行われました（詳細）。 ... ロバート・ウェイン・ クラウアー（Robert Wayne Clower、1926年2月13日 - 2011年5月2日） ... ケインズ 経済学の研究に関する理論家の代表的な1人。1986年より南カリフォルニア大学教授。
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クラウアー・モデル (Clower model) とは、ジョン・メイナード・ケインズの『雇用・利子および貨幣の一般理論』の体系と新古典派 ...
ケインズ革命：目次 - Cruel.org
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There is a certain sense in which this is not a joke (Robinson, 1966, pp. vi-vii). ... Essentially for Joan Robinson (1973b, pp. ... 5) that “once we admit that an economy exists in time, that history goes oneway, from the irrevocable past into the unknown future, the conception of equilibrium based on the mechanical analogy of a ...
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