https://nam-students.blogspot.com/2019/12/brahmin-left-vs-merchant-right-thomas.html@
参考：
Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies (Russell Sage Foundation Books) Hardcover – April 20, 2007
by
G. Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations, University of Chicago Press, 2015
Racism Xenophobia Distribution
The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens (English Edition)Kindle版
 | 𝐆𝐨𝐚𝐠𝐥𝐞 a.k.a.生須𝒮ℰ𝒳芳英（なます えちえち よしひで） (@ynamasu) |
|
トマス・ピケティの最新の論文のタイトルが凄いです。
「バラモン左翼 対 商人右翼」です。 高学歴エリートは左翼党へ投票し、ビジネスエリートは右翼党へ投票する。 すると、第三の極として大衆に「ポピュリズム」の穴があき、盛り上がるという分析です。バラモン左翼、商人右翼、強烈な言葉です。 pic.twitter.com/uJScFfQSib | |
 | ぺりかんめも (@pelicanmemo) |
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これですね。🙂
Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality & the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017) Thomas Piketty March 2018 piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2… twitter.com/ynamasu/status… | |
https://twitter.com/pelicanmemo/status/1207825173144948737?s=21
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf
vote, so that 26 Generally speaking, the findings reported on Figures 2.4a-2.4b (and in subsequent results on income and wealth deciles) are based upon the assumption of a fixed left vs right voting fraction within each income and wealth bracket. This amounts to neglecting the withinbracket gradient and therefore to underestimate the total steepness of the income and wealth profiles. In addition, regarding wealth, for most years we only observe categorical
variables on asset ownership (for about 5-10 asset categories), from which construct a composite wealth index and decile indicator. We observe explicit wealth brackets in 2007, which allows us to check that both methods deliver consistent results (but the comparison also shows that the wealth index method tends to underestimate somewhat the top gradient as compared to the wealth bracket method). All details and computer codes are available on-line. 27 A number of papers have used wealth variables available in French and other surveys to analyze the positive impact of asset ownership (and particularly of the ownership of “risky” business and financial assets) on right-wing vote. See e.g. Foucault, Nadeau and LewisBeck (2013), Foucault (2017) and Persson and Martinsson (2016). To my knowledge these works do not explicitly compare the magnitude of the income effect vs wealth effect. Regarding the 1978 French post-electoral survey and the introduction of wealth variables (a rightly celebrated innovation), see the collection of essays edited by Capdevielle et al (1981).
ミシェル・フーコーではない
M. Foucault, R. Nadeau, M. Lewis-Beck, “Patrimonial Voting: Refining the Measures”, Electoral Studies, 2017, vol.32, p.557-562
Foucault, Martial, Nadeau, Richard, and Lewis-Beck, Michael. 2013. Patrimonial Voting: Refining the Measures. Electoral Studies 32:557–562.CrossRef | Google Scholar
M. Foucault, La France politique des possédants et des non-possédants , in P. Perrineau et al, La démocratie de l’entre soi, Presses de la FNSP, 2017
La Démocratie de l'entre-soi (ACADEMIQUE) Format Kindle
La Démocratie de l'entre-soi (ACADEMIQUE) Format Kindle
structures. One of the oldest party systems in the world, namely Conservatives vs Whigs in 18th century Britain, was to large extent a conflict of elites (landed elite vs urban-commercial elite). Of course, this was a time of limited suffrage, when only the top 1% could vote, so there was little else that politics could be except a conflict of elite. It would be naïve however to imagine that universal suffrage in itself has permanently brought a different type of equilibrium. Unequal access to political finance, medias and influence can contribute to keep electoral politics under the control of elites. The class-based party system that emerged in the mid-20th century was due to specific historical circumstances, and proved to be fragile as social and economic structures evolved. Without a strong and convincing egalitarianinternationalist platform, it is inherently difficult to unite low-education, low-income voters from all origins within the same party.
D. Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”, 2017, Harvard KSG
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf
J. Roemer, D. Lee, K. Van des Straeten, Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies, Harvard UP, 2007
M. Tavits, N. Letki, “When Left is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in post-Communist Europe”, American Political Science Review, 103(4), 2009, p.555-569
M.A. Valfort, “Has France a Problem with Muslims? Evidence from a Field Labour Market Experiment”, PSE, 2017
G. Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations, University of Chicago Press, 2015
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