W・ブイター氏の経済教室の寄稿原文
W・ブイター氏（元イングランド銀行金融政策委員）の寄稿原文は以下の通り
（注）寄稿は編集しており、邦文は逐語訳ではありません。
The euro will survive, but it won't be pretty -
Willem H. Buiter
The excessive indebtedness of most European governments and the excessive leverage and poor asset quality of many European banks - including significant exposures to the over-indebted governments - have produced a triple crisis for the euro area and the European Union (EU). In the ‘outer periphery' (Greece, Ireland, Portugal), we face a sovereign insolvency crisis. In the ‘inner periphery' (Spain and Italy) we face a sovereign liquidity crisis that could become a self-fulfilling sovereign solvency crisis unless market funding at affordable interest rates is restored for the Spanish and Italian Sovereigns. Finally, we face a bank recapitalisation and bank funding crisis throughout the EU.
Lack of political leadership, growing populism and economic nationalism in Europe threaten to turn this crisis into a catastrophe. Without decisive action and some institutional innovation, the euro area could break up in the midst of a European banking crisis and a European periphery sovereign default crisis that could threaten to spread to the ‘soft core' of the euro area - Belgium and France. This European banking and sovereign default crisis would soon become global, dragging the global financial system into a deeper collapse than that following the demise of Lehman brothers and bring a prolonged global downturn or depression.
To prevent this nightmare scenario from materialising, Europe needs to do three things. First, the obviously insolvent sovereigns need to be restructured sufficiently aggressively to restore the prospect of solvency, either later this year or early in 2012. In the case of Greece, we estimate that this will require a write-down in the value of the public debt by between 65 and 80 percent. Private and official creditors (including the ECB) except possibly the IMF would share in this debt forgiveness. Political and market contagion from the Greek sovereign restructuring to Portugal and Ireland are likely. This is likely to result in sovereign debt restructuring for Portugal and haircuts on the senior unsecured debt of (some of) the Irish banks. Sovereign debt restructuring will deplete the capital of the domestic banks but also that of foreign banks and other Systemically Important Financial Institutions (sSIFIs) that hold the sovereign's debt. Adequate sources of new bank capital must therefore be readily available.
Second, a ‘big bazooka' financial facility must be readied to ensure continued access to funding for the Spanish and Italian sovereign. Together, they owe more than EUR2.5 trillion, which makes them too big to fail and too big to save for any entity except the ECB backed by the EFSF. The EFSF could, beyond the commitments it has already made, focus on new issuance of likely solvent but illiquid sovereigns and offer a first loss guarantee for ECB purchases of Spanish and Italian sovereign debt.
Finally, recapitalise the EU banks to the point that they can withstand multiple sovereign debt restructurings, by adding EUR300bn to EUR350bn tangible common equity. Little if any of this will come from the markets, although some sovereign wealth funds may be interested in acquiring cheaply an equity stake in a leading European bank. Most of the capital will therefore come from the national fiscal authorities, possibly funded with a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It would be useful to create a European version of the TARP, a jointly-funded vehicle with, say, EUR150 bn worth of resources, that can take equity stakes in banks without having to go through the sovereign. Some of the required capital may also come from the mandatory conversion into equity of unsecured bank debt, both subordinate and senior. The outcome of this will be a more resilient but to a large extent state-owned European banking sector.
If we assume, conservatively, that at least EUR50bn of the EFSF's resources be set aside for recapitalising banks in EA member states whose sovereigns may not be able to raise funds for the recapitalisation of domestic banks, around EUR250bn is left in the ECBs kitty to provide such guarantees. If we assume that the guarantees cover a first loss of 20% on new EA sovereign issuance, perhaps EUR1-1.25trn of issuance could benefit from such guarantees. This compares to gross financing requirements for the Italian and Spanish sovereigns (bond and bill redemptions plus budget deficits) of just under EUR900bn until Q2 2013, the original target date for the birth of the successor of the EFSF, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Secondary market prices of Italian and Spanish sovereign debt would then be left to be determined by the market.
The ECB could also cap interest rates on the outstanding Spanish and Italian sovereign debt by threatening to purchase up to EUR2.5 trillion of such debt. We have estimated the non-inflationary loss absorption capacity of the ECB to be most likely at least EUR3 trillion, so the ECB could take on the lender of last resort function for Spain and Italy without compromising its price stability objective. In any case, even modest-sized EFSF guarantees for new issuance of the Italian and Spanish sovereign may not be enough to lure private investors back to fund these sovereigns on a sustained basis, so the ECB can never be far from the solution.
In our view, the credibility of the Italian authorities has taken such a blow during the past year that an external commitment device such as a Troika programme, or some equivalent externally verified and enforced programme that includes strict conditionality for fiscal austerity and structural reform, would be required. Spain's failure to control the deficits of the lower-tier authorities and the steady drip of revelations of ever greater capital needs by its banking sector have also undermined its capacity for credible commitment to future enhanced austerity and structural reforms to the point that an external crutch, such as a Troika programme or something equivalent is likely to be necessary for it to be the beneficiary of a sovereign debt (new issues) insurance programme at affordable rates.
It is essential that no country, including Greece, exit from the euro area. Sovereign debt restructuring should take place within the euro area. This means that the Greek sovereign and the Greek banks should, provided they comply with the new conditionality, enjoy continued access to official financing following restructuring.
Exit from the euro area by even one country would destroy the credibility of both the exiting and remaining members. The markets would focus on the next country at risk of an exit. This would suffer a deposit run and a refusal by the markets, that will fear an exit followed by a conversion of all contracts and instruments into the new currency, to fund its banks and other private entities. The banking system and sovereigns in the entire periphery would be at risk of default and collapse.
I expect that all three essential steps will be taken and that the euro area and the EU will survive. There will, however, be an extended period of financial turmoil and fear and uncertainty among enterprises and households. The next two years, will, even in this relatively favourable scenario, be years of very low growth or recession. After that, Europe should begin to reap the rewards for deleveraging and structural reform in individual member states and institutional and regulatory reform in the eurozone as a whole.
1 Comments:
ウィレム・ブイターの
「アイスランドの銀行危機と最適通貨圏の最後の貸し手理論」
２００８年１０月の論文ですが、下記からDLできるようになってますね。
(99+) (PDF) The Icelandic banking crisis and what to do about it: The lender of last resort theory of optimal currency areas | Willem H Buiter - Academia.edu https://www.academia.edu/8092545/The_Icelandic_banking_crisis_and_what_to_do_about_it_The_lender_of_last_resort_theory_of_optimal_currency_areas?email_work_card=title
コメントを投稿
<< Home