「市場共同体」

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（リンク::::::、ウェーバー）

THE MARKET: ITS IMPERSONALITY AND ETHIC（Frament）　２−６　

　Notes 

Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology

University of California Press, 1978 
http://books.google.co.jp/books?id=pSdaNuIaUUEC

（pp.635-640） 

http://www.amazon.co.jp/Economy-Society-Outline-Interpretive-Sociology/dp/0520035003/ 

＊
折原浩によれば「市場共同体」の内容は『理解社会学のカテゴリー』５、６章、『法社会学』（邦訳101.190頁）に関連する。
この章の内容は有斐閣新書『ウェーバー　支配の社会学』（４９ー５３頁）に詳しい。

この時点までに、我々は合理化しているグループの形成を議論してきた
一部だけで、しかし、残りのための彼らの社会的なアクションは最も多様を持っていた
構造 - より非晶質又はより合理的に編成し、より連続以上の断続的な、より開かれた以上閉鎖。とは対照的に
すべてまたはそれらが原型またはすべての合理的な社会貢献活動（根拠として、略
Geselschaftshandeln）、市場での交換を通じて協議会（Vergesdlschaftung）。


CHAPTER V I I
ＴＨＥ ＭＡＲＫＥＴ： ＩＴＳ
ＩＭＰＥＲＳＯＮＡＬＩＴＹ ＡＮＤ
Ｅ Ｔ Ｈ Ｉ Ｃ  (Fragment)*1

Up to this point we have discussed group formations that rationalized
their social action only in part, but for the rest had the most diverse
structures -- more amorphous or more rationally organized，more con-
tinuous or more intermittent， more open or more closed. In contrast to
all or them stands， as the archetype or all rational social action (rationales
Geselschaftshandeln),  consociation(Vergesdlschaftung) through ex-
change in the market.
　　A market mav be said to exist wherever there is comPelition， even
if ollly ゛“il3te°I， for oPPort･“ilies oF exchange among a Phjr31ily of
PotentiaI Parties. Their Physical assemblage in one Place， as in the 】ocal
"1°｢ket s(1°ie･ the fair (the “long distance market")，or the exchange
(the merchants' market)，on】y constitutes the most consistent kind of
"13｢ket For"1“lion. lt is， however，only lhis Physi。l assemblage which
allowsdle Full emergcnceof the markct's most distinctivc featurc， viz.，
dickeri“g･ Since lhc discussion or dle markct Phenonlenaconstitutes
essentia】ly the c｡ntent of economics (Sozil＆｡s｡,jlc)，it will not be
Preselted here.From a sociologi。I Point of view， dle market rePresents
a eoexistence and sequence of ralional consociations， each of which is
sPeci6ca】ly cPhemeral insofar as it ceases to exist wilh lhe aet or exchang-
i｢lg the goods， unless a norm has been Promulgated which imPoses uPon
the t。nsferors of the exchangeable goods the guaranty of t}leir lawful
3cguisilion as wariarlly of lilleorof quiet enjoFlent.TIle comPleted
barter constitutesa consociationonly with the immediate Partner. The

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　E6351

６３６
１１１Ｅ ＩＭＡＲＫＥＴ： １１Ｓ ＩＳＩＰＥＲＳＯＮＡＬｒｒＹ ＡＮＤ ＥＴＨＩＣ ［Ｃ１１．Ｖ１１
PreParatory dickering， however， is a】ways a social actjon (Ge｡14,j,udlaμs-
1,。＆1,1)insofar as the Pole“tial Frtners areguided in their ofers by
tlle Polenljal action of an indeterminately large grouP of rea】or im-
3gi°ry cor"Pctilors rather than by their own actions alone. Themore
this is true， the more does the market constitute social action. Further-
more， any act of exchange involving the use of money (sa】e)is a social
3ction si°Ply because the money used derives its value from ils relation
to the Potcntial aetion of others. hs accePtabi】ily rests exclusively on the
exPeclation that it will c｡ntinue to be desirable and 。n be Further used
3s3｢ile311s of Paymenl･ GrouP fomlation (1/。μmEilscl,411,。g)through
the use of money is theexact ct)unterParttoany consociation lhrough
ation°】ly agreed or imPosednorlns.
　　Moncy creatcs a grouP by virtue of material interest re】ations be-
l｀゛eerl actlj31 and Pole°tiaI ParticjPants in the market and its P3yIIlents.
AHhe rully develoPed st3ge， the s4)-alled money eco“omy， the resulling
situatjon looks as if it had beencreated bya setof norms established
for the very PurPose of bringing it into being. T}le exPlanation lies i･
this: Within lhe market community everyactof exchange， esPedany
rnonetary exchange， is nol directed， in isolation， by dle action of the
individuaI Partner lolhe Particular transacljon， butthenlorerationally
it is considered， the more it is directed by the actions oF aU Parties Po-
tentially inlcrcsted in thc exchange. The markct community as such is
dle “lost imPersonal relationshiP of Practical life into whic}l hurnans
c3n enter wilh one another. Tlis is not due to that Potentiality of
st“lggle among the interested Parties which is inherent in lhe market
relatjonshiP.Any human relationshiP， even the most inlimate， andeven
though it be marked by thc most unq°li6ed Pe5o131 de｀,otjon，is in
so"le ser｀se ゛lalive and may i°゛olve a strugg】e with lhe P3n°e｢，For in-
stancc， ovcr the salvation oF his soul. The reason For lhe imPersona】ity
of lhe market is ils matter･of,Factness，its orientation lo lhe c｡mmodity
and onlv to that. XVhere the markel is al】owed to follow its own auton｡-
mous tendencies， its PartjciPants do not look toward the Persons of each
other but onlytoward the commodily; there are noob】igations of
brotherliness or reverence， andnoneof those sPontaneous hurnanrela，
　　　・　　　　　　・?　　　　〃　　　W　　??　　?・.　W
tions that are sustained by
the free develoPment of l
unions. They all wou】d just obstruct
market re】alionshiP， and its sPeci6c
interests serve， in dleir tum， to weaken lhe sentiments on which these
obstnjctions rest. Market behavior is innuenced by rational， PurPoserul
Pursuit oF interests. T11eP3rtner to a transaction is exPected to behave
2ccording to rational legality and， quite Particularly， to resPeet the
formal invio】ability oF a P“)"lise o゛ce gi゛11. These 3re the qua】ities
which form the contenl of market elhics. ln this latter rilsPect the
"larkct incu】eatcs，indeed，Particulady rjgor°｀15 coilcePljo“s. violatjons
Personal
the bare




　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A Fragme711　　　　　　　　　　6 3 7
of agieemelts， e゛e｢l though they may be concluded by mere signs， cn･
tirely unrecorded， and devoid of evidence， are almost unh。rd of jn the
allals of the stock exchalge. Such absolute dePersomhatjon is con･
lrary to a】hhe elementary forms of hunlanrelationshiP･ Sombart has
Pointed out this contrast rePeatedly and briHiantlyj
　　The “free" markct， thatis，the market which is not bound by ethical
norms，with its exPloilation of constenations of interests andrnonoP｡ly
Positions and its dickering， is an abomination to every system of fra-
temal ethics. ln sharPcontrast loaU other gio゛Ps ゛hich always Pre゛
suPPose so"lerneasureof Personal fratemization or even blood kinshiP，
the market is Fundmen?ly alicn to any tyPc of fratemal dationshiP.
　　At 6rst， free exchange doesnoloccurbut wii lhe wor】d oulside
of thc neighborhood or the Personal association.The market is a rela･
tionshiP which transcends the boundaries of nejghborhood， kinshiP
grouP， or tribe. 0riginally，it is indeed dle only Peaceful relationshiP of
such kind.At6rst，fenow membcrs did not tradc with one another with
the intenlion oF obtaining Prolil. There was， indeed，no need for such
transactions in an age oF seIFsuicient agrarian units. 0ne of the most
characteristic forms of Primitive trade, the“silent¨trade[cf.c}1.VIH:ii;21，
dramatically rePresent5 thcconlrastbctwecn the market c｡mmunily and
the Fraternal community. 111e silent trade is a form oF exchange which
avoids an face-to-facecontactand in which the suPPly takes the form
of a dePosit of the commodityat a customary P】ace; the counterx)ffer
takes the same form， and dickering is effected through the increase in
the number of objects being ofFered from bolh 5ides， until one Party
eitller wilhdnnvsdissatis6ed or， saljs6?，takes the goods leFl by the
otherP3｢ty 3nd deParts.
　　lt is normany assumed by both Partners to anexchange that each
will be interested in the Future continuation of the exchange relation-
shiP，be it widl this Partieular Partner orwith some other， and t}lat he
｀､･ill adhere to his Promises for this reason and avoid at least striking
infringcmcntsoft}le rules of good faith and fair dea】ing.lt is only dlis
gssu"IPtion whjch guaranteesie】aw-abidingness of lhe exchange Part°
ners.lnsoFar as that intcrcst exisls， “honcsty i5 the bcst Policy."This
ProPosition， however， is by no means universally aPPlicable， and its
emPirical validity is irregular; naturally， il is highest in lhe casc of
rational enterPrises with a stable clientele. For，on the basis of such a
slable mlationshiP， which gener3tes dle Possibility oF mutual Personal
3PPr3isal with reg3?to "13｢ket ethies， trilding may free itse】f most
successFully fr｡m illimited dickering 3"d rem°， in the inlerest of the
P3rliesdo a re111tive 】imitation of auct､jation in Prices and exP】oitation
ofnlornen【ary imeresl coi｀stellations.The consequences， lhough they
are imPortant for Price formation， are not relevant here in detailynle

６３８
７１１Ｅ ＳＩＡＲＫＥＴ： ＩＴＳ １１ＭＰＥＲＳＯＮＡＬＩＴＹ ＡＮＤ Ｅ７１｛ＩＣ　［Ｃｂ．Ｖ１１
fixed Price， wilhout Preference for any Partieular buyer， and strict busi-
･ess hon。ty are highly Peculiar Fealures of lhe regulated local neigh'
borho()d markets of the medieval occident， in contast to lhc Ncar and
Far East、 Theyare，rTIOreover，acQndition as weH as a Produclohhat
Particular slage of capitalistie economy which is known as Early CaPilal-
ism.Theyare°bsent｀vhere this stage no longerexisls. NOrarethey
Pr3cticed by thoseslatus3nd other grouPs which arenotelg3ged in
e゛ch311ge excePt occ゛lsio°Ily and P3ssi゛ely rather than regularly and
activelyynle maxim ofcayilal e??IFtQr oblains， as exPerience shows，
『゛oslly in transactions involving feudahtrata or， as every cavalry oicer
knows，in horse trading °long co°゜des. The sPecific ethics of the
“13rket Place is alien to lhem. 0nce and for alhhev concei､･e of com-
“lerce･ 3s does any njral community oF neighbors， as an activily i°
｀゛hich the sole question is: who wjn cheat whom.
　　T11c Freedom oF the market is tyPicaUy limited by sacred taboos or
through monoPolisticconsociationsof status grouPs which render cx･
changc withoutsidcrs imPossible. Directed against lhese limitations we
6“d the continuous onslaught of the market community， whose very
exlstence constltules a tenlPt2tlon to share ln the oPPorturlltles for gam.
Thc P“)cess of aPProPriation in a monoPolistic grouP i71ay advance to
the Point at which it becomes closed toward outsiders， i.e.，lhe land， o｢
thc right to sharc in the commons， may have become vested de6nitively
3nd heredilarily. As lhe money economy exPands and， withit，both the
gro｀゛illg difrerentiation of needs 。Pable of being gtis6ed by indirect
barter，and the indePendence from landownershiP，such a situatjon of
･(ed， heredita7 3PP“)Pri3tion nor11｀allycreales asleadily increasing
illteresl of individual Parties in dlc Possibi】ily of using their vcsted
P“)Perty rights for exchange with the highest bid＆r，even though }le
bcanoutsjder.This develoPment js quite analogous to lhal which caus6
the co｀heiis of an induslrial enterPrise in the long run lo establish a
coiP(〕゜tion so as to be able to selhheirshares morc free】y. ln tum， an
e°crging e°Pitalistjc economy， thc strt)ngei it beco“les， the greater win
be its efrorts to obtain lheΠleansoF Prl)duelion and labor services in the
"゛｢kcl｀゛ilhom lj“litiltio“s by sacied oi st3tlls bonds， and to emanciPate
the oPPort11?ties lo sell its Products from lhe restrictions imPos4!d by
salesinonoPolies of sutus grouPs. CaPilalistic interesls thus favor
　　　　　　　　　　　〃?　〃　　?　〃　　?　　　　＝
the
tbe
continuous extension of the Free market， but only uP to the Point at
which some of lhemsucceed， through the Purchase of Privileges from
lhe Polilical authority or simPly thlough the PoxveroF caPitaj， in obtain-
ing for themselves a nlonoP｡】y for the sa】e of their Products orthe
3cqllisitjo" of their means of Production， and in lhus dosing the market
on lhejr own P3rt.
　　The brakuP OF thenlonoP･lies of status grouPs is tbus t}le tyPical

A Fragmau
６３９
immediale sequence to tlle fun aPPa)Prialjon of alhhe material means
of Production. lt occurs wherc thosc having a stake in the caPitalistic
syste° 2゛ i11 3 Positioil to illauelce･ for lheiro｀゛11 advalt3ge， those
co“lmurlities by｀vhich theoMznershiP of goods aild the “lode of their
use are regulated; or wherc， within a monoPolistic stalus F)uP， lhe
uPPer hand is gained by those who are inlerested il the use oF their
vested ProPerty jnterests in the market. Another conseguence is that the
scoPe of those rights which are guaranteed as acquired or ac(luirable by
the coercive aPParatus oF the ProPerty｀regulating eommunity bect)"les
limited to rights in material goods and to c･ntractual daims， induding
daims lo contactml labor. An other aPProPriations， esPeciaUy those of
custornersor tbose ofnlonoPo】ies bystatusgr｀)゛Ps･ 8ie destioycd. This
state of afFairs， which we caU frec comPetition， lasts unti】it is rePlaced
by new， this lime c3Pi?istic，inonoPolies which are ac9｀jired in the
°aiket thr､)ugh dle Poゝyerof ProPcrty. Thesc c3Pitalistic monoPolies
difier fr｡mnlonoPolies of status grouPs｀by their Purely economic and
　　　〃〃　　　　　　　　　　〃　〃　　　〃　　・〃　■　　・
rational character.Byrestricting either the scoPe of Possible sales or the
Permissible terms， dlenlonoPolies of status grouPs e゛c】゛ded fi゛)m their
6eld of action the mechanism oF the market with its dickering and r3tio・31
calculation.ThoserTIonoPolies，on the other hand， which are based solely
uPon the Poゝverof Pr｡Perty，rest，on lhecontrary， ljPo“ 3・ eltirely ra-
tionany calculaled mastery of market cl〕nditions which may， however，
rem2in fomaUy as freeas ever.The sacri!d， status， and merely traditional
bonds，which have graduany come to be eliminaled， constituted restric-
tjons on the formation of raliona】markel Prices; the Purely economicany
condidoned monoPolies are， on lhe other hand， tbeir ultimate conse-
(1｀je"ceynle bene6ciaryoFanlonoPoly by 3 st3t｀ls gi゛)｀jPrestricts，and
maintains his Pos゛eragainst， the market， while the rational,economic
rnonoPolist rules dlrough the market. XVe shan designate those interest
grQuPs which are enabled by formal market freedomtoachieve Power， as
market-inlerest grouPs.
　　A P3rticular market may be subject to a body oF noms autonomously
3greed uPon by dle ParticiPants or imPosed
oF difFerent grouPs， esPecjally Politieal or
by°nyoneof a great ・
ieligious org8nizations，
norrns rnay involve limitations of market freedom， restrictions of dicker･
ing oroF comPetition， or lhey may estab】isll guaranties For the ob5erv･
anccoF °3iket leg31ity， esPecj311y the modes or means of Payment or，
in Periods of inter】cxza】insecurity， thenornls nlay be aimed at guarantee，
ing the market Peace･ Since the market was originany a consociation oF
Persons who are not members oF dle same grouP and who are， therefore，
“ene"lies," lhe guaranly of Pcacc， like that of restriclions oF Permissib】e
modes of warfare， was ordinarily lefl to divine Powers.4 very often
the Peaceof t}le market was Placed under the Protection of a temPle;
r

６４０
１１１Ｅ ＳＩＡＲＫＥＴ： ＩＴｓ ｌｓｌＰＥＲＳＯＮＡＬＩＴＹ ＡＮＤＥｎｎＣ［Ｃｌｌ．Ｖ１１
later on il lended to be made into a source oF revcnuc for the chief or
Prilce. However， while exchange is the sPeci6cally Peacdul form oF
acquilingeconornic Po゛c｢，it c3n， obviously， bc associated with thc
use of force. The seafarer or Antiquity and lhe Middle Agesg゛asPleased
to take without Pay whatevcr hc could ac(111ire by force and hadrecoursc
　　　　????　　　?　?　?　　　?　　?　?　　　　　　?
to PaceF111 diekering only where he was confronted with a Po∬'ere(l゛al
to his own or where he regarded it as shrewd to do so for the sake of
future exchange oPPortunities which might be endangered othenvise.
But the intensive exPansion of exchange relations has always gone to-
geiei widl a Process of relative Paci6catjon. AI】of the “Pub】ic Peace"
amlngenlentsof the Middle AgesゝvereΠleanl to servethe interesls of
e゛chalgej The aPPr｡Priation oF goods through free， Purc】y economi-
cally ratjonal exehange， as OPPcnheimer has said timc and again， is the
colcePtlJal oPPosile of aPProPrialion of goo(js by coe゛cion oF aly kind，
but esPeciaUy Physjeal coercion， the rcgulated excrcise of which is the
｀゛iy co“stittlti゛e ele"lent of lhe Politj。l community.
ＮＯＴＥＳ
T11e tille is by lhe Prl5entedi,or; all notes are by Rheinstein. （R）
?　?　　　　　--･　　　　　　　?　?・
｜
　　　ｚ． ＤＩＥ ＪｕＤＥＮ ｕＮＤ ＤＡｓ ＳＶＩＲＴｓｃＨＡＦＴｓＬＥＢＥＮ （１９１１， ＥＰｓｌｅｉｎ ｔｒ． １９１３，１９５１，
ｓ．ｔ．ＴＨＥ ＪＥｗｓ Ａｓｘ）Ｍｏ。Ｅ,､Ｎ ＣＡ・ＩＴＡｕｓｓ）;ＤＥａ Ｂ・ｕｎＧＥｏｘｓ（１９・３）;Ｈλｌｉｘ）ＬＥｎ
UND HELDEN（1915）;DnMODERNIKAPrrALls&lus，vol.H【，Part l，
also DEuTscllER SozlALlsMus （1934）（Geiser lr･ s.1･ A Nlw SoclAL
　　　　　　??　?　　　　?　　--????　　　--??
P. 6; see
PHILOSO･
゛H7， 1937).Re。lsion apinst the s。cllled '‘de-humanization" of rclalionshiPs
hasconstituled an imPorlantelement in the Germanneo-rornanticism of such
grouPs andΠ10vernents asthe circle amund lhe Poet Stefan George， lhe yguth
mQgmcnG lhc Christian S。ciali5ls etc.Thr。ugh thc lendency lo ascribe this caP'
ilalistic sPirit to lhc Jcws and lo hold t}lem resPonsible ror its risc and sPrcad，
thcsc zntimcnls becamc high】y inRuentiahn the growth oF orpnized anti-Semi→
iismand，especially，National,Scxzialism.
iismand,esPeciaII ， National-S(xzialism.
　　　3. Such as £monoPol of guild members to sen certain goods wilhin lhe
cily･ or thernonoPo】y of the lrd or arnanor to ‘nd the grain of aII Peasants of
the distict， orlhenlonoP｡ly of lhe mcmbers or tC bar lo give lega】advice，amo→
noP｡ly which was abolished in mst (。ntinenlal counlries in lhe nineteenlb cen･
tury･
　　　4， 0n markel Peacc， cf.S.RllTsclIE1，MAllxT u,io STADT(1897);H.
PmENNE，vlLLEs，MARCHisET slARCHANDs Au s{○¥ENλcE(1898).
　　　5. 0n such medieval Peace amlngements(LudME＆n)，whichs゛cfeaimed
　
at the eliminatjon of feuds￣
？d Fiy?'e ？｢s？d?｀ich o？jlyed e?he？lsnon･
aggles5ion Pacts concluded， orten￣with ecclesiastical ormyal co6Peration， between
harons，citjes and olhef Polenlales，0r were soughl to be imPosed on his unnlly
subjects by the king， sec Quidde， 11ij･oire＆la Fix μMj9･･e en A1191agne s
919ft14e(19z9)，Z8 RICU11L DES COURS DEL'ACADi14【E DE DROrr fNTERNA･
TIONAL 449･