Journal of Economic Literature
記事·論文名 Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism
著者名 Jack Hirshleifer
巻号、ページ: 1977, vol. 15, issue 2, (500-502)
Hirshleifer on Becker
Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word
Lear: Dost thou call me fool, boy?
Fool: All thy other titles thou has given away; that thou wast born with.
[King Lear, I, iv.]
Lear's story illustrates a limitation of Becker's theory of altruism [1, 1976]. In Becker's
model, both the paternal altruist (Big Daddy)and the selfish offspring (Rotten Kid) can affect
the joint production opportúnities determinng the level of family income Sh* But, after the
completion of all such interactions, Big Daddy will be making unilateral altruistic transfers
h, to Rotten Kid. Thus, however selfish Rotten Kid really is, it is in his interest (assuming a
non-corner solution) to help Big Daddy attain a solution maximizing family income. This is
true, however, only if Big Daddy has the last word - i.e., controls the last action taken in temporal sequence.
Suppose the situation dictates instead that Big Daddy must irrevocably comimit himself to
his altruistic transfers while Rotten Kid still retains free choice of action. As Lear discovered,
disaster is likely to 'foľlow. Upon being unleashed from parental control, Rotten Kid will
behave with ruthless selfishness toward Big Daddy. (And multiple Rotten Kids, like Regan
and Goneril, will be ruthless toward one another as well.) If the parent is not in a position
to have the last word, Shakespeare tells us, he had better not be so altruistic to begin with.
Kid's
consumption
135° transfer line
Joint production-
income
opportunities
Daddy's
consumption
Figure 1.
Under what circumstances can Big Daddy have the last word, so that Becker's analysis is
applicable? Because of the inevitable fact of generational succession, a Rotten Kid is all too
likely to be in a position to embitter the final years of a helpless parent. Still, a number of
instruments of parental control exist. While Big Daddy is still in full strength, he may (by post-
hypnotic suggestion, by cultural indoctrination, or even by direct physical means) be able
to constrain Rotten Kid's ultimate capacity to harm him. Under a legal system permitting
testamentary disposition, Big Daddy can retain the last word even beyond the death barrier.
Yet, we often see attempts at parental control failing, for a variety of personal or situational
reasons. (A brief review of the possíbilities and limitations of parental domination in the
biological realm appears in Robert L. Trivers and Hope Hare [2, 1976, fn. 13].)
Figure 1 illustrates the force and range of applicability of Becker's argument. In the sim
plifying special case pictured, a singlé Rotten Kid chooses the initial level and distribution of
family income somewhere on the border PP of the joint productive opportunity region
(shaded). Big Daddy may also make inputs into the determination of the shape of these
opportunities, but this is not essential. What is essential is that once Rotten Kid has made his decision,
Big Daddy has the last word--taking the form of 1:1 transfers from himself to Rotten
Kid along a 135° line from the "productive in come" position along PP chosen by Rotten Kid.
If Big Daddy has preferenoes as represented by indifference curve U, and Rotten Kid knows
this, the latter will choose the joint production optimum (maximizing the level of family income Sh). Big Daddy then transfers income
along the line Sh* S* so as to attain his altruistic consumption-distribution optimum at point A.
Here even Rotten Kid has acted "unselfishly," in choosing point J over the (short-sightedly)
best position he could have attained at point R. (Kid's indifference curves are of course
horizontal lines, like the dotted line through R.) If Big Daddy were somewhat less generous,
as illustrated by indifference curve U', he would only want to transfer from J to his
indifference-curve tangency at point B. But B is inferior, from Rotten Kid's point of view, to his
selfish solution R. Knowing his parent's preferences, Rotten Kid would then choose R. This
illustrates Becker's contention that a greater degree of altruism on the part of Big Daddy
may make him even selfishly better off in comparison with a less altruistic parent. Big Daddy's
own-consumption at A is greater than at the solution R, which would be arrived at if he
were less “generous.”
A few brief comments to bring out other interesting aspects of this interaction:
(1) Even if Rotten Kid were to choose the selfish joint-income position R, Big Daddy's
indifference curves might impel him to make parental transfers to his hard-hearted offspring
This consideration makes it more likely that Rotten Kid would selfishly choose R (the
spoiled-child, martyr-parent syndrome), since Kid will be comparing a final position some-
where northwest of R with his "unselfish" outcome at a point like A or B.
(2) It might be that beyond a certain point Rotten Kid's consumption, while still a good for
Big Daddy, becomes an inferior good for him. Then Rotten Kid may be motivated to choose
a joint-income position somewhere between R and J in the diagram. Rotten Kid will never
(if he can help it) allow Big Daddy to enter a region where Rotten-Kid's consumption
becomes an inferior good.
(3) Explicit contractual exchange between the two parties may be useful in some cases.
Consider one of the situations described above, where a less generous parent would move only
from J to position B with the result that Rotten Kid actually determines the effective joint in
come position at R. Notice that point A is surely in the region of mutual advantage in
comparison with R, even if not a tangency optimum for Big Daddy. The two parties should be able to
agree to come to a position like A, rather than ending up at R.
Finally, the altruist's move need not necessarily lie along a 135° line representing 1:1
transfers of income. The same logic would apply even if transfers were not always on a 1:1
basis (there might be transfer taxes or subsidies or ranges of increasing or decreasing returns
in the transfer process). None of this makes any qualitative change in the nature of the conclu
sions, always provided, however, that Big Daddy retains the last word.
JACK HIRSHLEIFER
University of California, Los Angeles
REFERENCES
1. BECKER, GARY S. “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology,"
J. Econ. Lit., Sept. 1976, 14(3), pp.817-26
2. TRIVERS, ROBERT L. AND HARE, Hope.“Haplodiploidy and the Evolution of the Social Insects," Science, 23 Jan. 1976, 191, pp.249-63
KING LEAR
Dost thou call me fool, boy?
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リア王
おまえはわしを阿呆呼ばわりするのか。
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Fool
All thy other titles thou hast given away; that thou wast born with. （1:4.165）
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道化
だって他の称号はみんな譲ってしまっただろう。残ったのは生まれつきの阿呆だけ。
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無礼講が許されている道化は、王権も領地も全部譲ってしかも父親思いのコーディリアを追放してしまったリア王を、歯に衣をきせず、徹底的に非難する。おまえはゼロだと。
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