Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession
日本語紹介
Table 1: Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession
Dean Baker, US
Wynne Godley, US
Fred Harrison, UK
Michael Hudson, US
Eric Janszen, US
Stephen Keen, Australia
Jakob Brøchner Madsen &
Jens Kjaer Sørensen, Denmark
Kurt Richebächer, US
Nouriel Roubini, US
Peter Schiff , US
Robert Shiller , US
Table and Figures Table 1: Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession Analyst Capacity Forecast Dean Baker, US Wynne Godley, US Fred Harrison, UK Michael Hudson, US Eric Janszen, US Stephen Keen, Australia Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen, Denmark Kurt Richebächer, US Nouriel Roubini, US Peter Schiff , US Robert Shiller , US co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research Distinguished Scholar, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Economic commentator professor, University of Missouri investor and iTulip commentator associate professor, University of Western Sydney professor & graduate student, Copenhagen University private consultant and investment newsletter writer professor, New York University stock broker, investment adviser and commentator professor, Yale University
“ …plunging housing investment will likely push the economy into recession.” (2006)
“The small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels are rising resulting form the house price decline, will immediately lead to a …sustained growth recession … before 2010”. (2006). “Unemployment [will] start to rise significantly and does not come down again.” (2007)
Godley, W and G Zezza (2006) Debt and Lending:A Cri de Coeur. Levy Institute at Bard College Policy Notes 2006/4
Godley, W, D Papadimitriou G Hannsgen and G Zezza (2007) Is There a Way Out of the Woods? The Levy Economics Institute Strategic Analysis, November 2007. At http://www.levy.org/
“The next property market tipping point is due at end of 2007 or early 2008 …The only way prices can be brought back to affordable levels is a slump or recession” (2005).
Michael Hudson, US
“Debt deflation will shrink the “real” economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” (2006)
Hdson (2006a) Saving, Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation. In: L. Randall Wray and Matthew Forstater, eds., Money, Financial Instability and Stabilization Policy Edward Elgar, 2006:104-24. Graph also reproduced at http://www.americasbubbleeconomy.com/index.php?s=itulip .
“The US will enter a recession within years” (2006). “US stock markets are likely to begin in 2008 to experience a “Debt Deflation Bear Market” (2007)
“Long before we manage to reverse the current rise in debt, the economy will be in a recession. On current data, we may already be in one.” (2006)
Keen, S. and B. Chapman (2006) Hic Rhodus, Hic Salta! Profit in a dynamic model of the Monetary Circuit, Storia del Pensiero Economico 2: 139-156
同著者別論
次なる金融危機 単行本(ソフトカバー) – 2018/5/26
Jakob Brøchner Madsen &
Jens Kjaer Sørensen, Denmark
“We are seeing large bubbles and if they bust, there is no backup. The outlook is very bad” (2005)” The bursting of this housing bubble will have a severe impact on the world economy and may even result in a recession” (2006).
“The new housing bubble – together with the bond and stock bubbles – will invariably implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the U.S. economy into a protracted, deep recession” (2001).
“A recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable for the U.S. economy… All remaining questions pertain solely to speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn.” (2006)☆☆
“Real home prices are likely to fall at least 30% over the next 3 years“(2005). “By itself this house price slump is enough to trigger a US recession.” (2006)
“[t]he United States economy is like the Titanic ...I see a real financial crisis coming for the United States.” (2006). “There will be an economic collapse” (2007).
early 2007 book Crash Proof: How to Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse.
Robert Shiller , US
“[F]urther rises in the [stock and housing] markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines… A long-run consequence could be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. (2005)
第2版序文より
The issues that are treated in this book are serious, and of continuing relevance today. People in much of the world are still overconfident that the stock market, and in many places the housing market, will do extremely well, and this overconfidence can lead to instability. Significant further rises in these markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines. The bad outcome could be that eventual declines would result in a substantial increase in the rate of personal bankruptcies, which could lead to a secondary string of bankruptcies of financial institutions as well. Another long-run consequence could be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. This extreme outcome—like the situation in Japan since 1990 writ large—is not inevitable, but it is a much more serious risk than is widely acknowledged. Lest raising these possibilities seem alarmist, one should note that we are already living with some
Irrational Exuberance by Robert J. Shiller Princeton University Press, Second Edition, 2005 http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/
ITバブルの崩壊やサブプライム危機へ警鐘を鳴らしたことで知られる☆。
☆
シラー教授、アベノミクスを語るノーベル経済学賞学者の視点
Note: for sources and more detail, please refer to the Appendix.
Hudson (2006b) The Road to Serfdom: An Illustrated Guide to the Coming Real Estate Collapse, Harper’s Magazine, April 2006
☆☆
Kurt Richebächer (1918-2007) wrote one of the longest-standing investment newsletters, “The Richebächer Letter,” which at various times also circulated as “Currencies & Credit Markets.” Richebächer was chief economist for Dresdner Bank from 1964 and moved into private consultancy in 1977. He warned against the bubble in technology stocks in the late ’90s. After its collapse, he warned against the bubble in housing, writing in September 2001: “the new housing boom is another rapidly inflating asset bubble financed by the same loose money practices that fuelled the stock market bubble.” He went on to predict “that the housing bubble – together with the bond and stock bubbles – will invariably implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the U.S. economy into a protracted, deep recession.” (Bonner 2007). Writing in 2006, Richebächer held that “the recovery of the U.S. economy since November 2001 has been dominated by an unprecedented consumer borrowing-and-spendingbinge. …”wealth creation” though soaring asset prices has been driven by ultra-cheap and loose money and credit, and not by saving and investment…” Richebächer (2006a:4). Just before the turning of the US housing market in summer 2006, Richebächer (2006a:4) in July 2006 commented that “[t]he one thing that still separates the U.S. economy from economic and financial disaster is rising house prices that apparently justify ever more credit and debt”… “Given this precarious income situation on the one hand and the debt explosion on the other, it will be clear that in the foreseeable future there will be heavy selling of houses, with prices crashing for lack of buyers” (Richebächer, 2006a:11). As this prospect began to materialize in the next month, Richebächer wrote in his August 2006 newsletter that “a recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable for the U.S. economy. … This will not be a garden-variety recession, in which monetary easing unleashes pent-up demand, as it used to do in past business cycles”. He again emphasized its cause: “the great trouble for the future is that the credit bubble has its other side in exponential debt growth” … “The U.S. liquidity deluge of the last few years has had one single source: borrowing against rising assets backed by the Fed’s monetary looseness… all hinging on further rises in asset prices. But they are going to plunge” (Richebächer, 2006b:1,5,9,11-12). And in September 2006 he wrote hat “housing bubbles, when bursting, generally do considerable damage to the economy. Today, they are bound to do far more damage….” (Richebächer, 2006c:4). The question was not if, but “how fast the U.S. economy and its asset markets will turn down. … “There is no question that the U.S. housing bubble is finished. All remaining questions pertain solely to speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn” (Richebächer, 2006c:9).
…
Nouriel Roubini is Professor of Economics and International Business at the Stern School of Business, New York University, Research Associate at the NBER and Research Fellow with the CEPR. He is a former advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department and former member White House Council of Economic Advisers. He runs the Roubini Global Economics Monitor and a Global Economics Blog (http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini , from which all quotes below are taken). He predicted in summer 2005 that real home prices were likely to fall at least 30% over the next 3 years, and published warnings about the recessionary implications from the very beginning of the house price decline. On August 23, 2006, he wrote that “[b]y itself this [house price] slump is enough to trigger a US recession”. On August 30, he wrote that “[t]he recent increased financial problems of … sub-prime lending institutions may thus be the proverbial canary in the mine – or tip of the iceberg – and signal the more severe financial distress that many housing lenders will face when the current housing slump turns into a broader and uglier housing bust that will be associated with a broader economic recession. You can then have millions of households with falling wealth, reduced real incomes and lost jobs…” In a Nov 17, 2006 blog he analysed that “the housing recession is now becoming a construction recession; and the construction recession is now turning into a clear auto and manufacturing recession; and the manufacturing recession will soon turn into a retail recession as squeezed households – facing falling home prices and rising mortgage servicing costs – sharply contract their rate of consumption.” He correctly predicted that quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve would lead to a short lived stock rally at the end of 2006, turning into a share price plunge once a coming recession was obvious towards mid 2007. Through 2006 and 2007, Roubini continued warning of further house price falls (where others saw it bottoming out), and of its systemic implications leading to recession in 2007.
Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance
“A succinct, lucid and compelling account of the causes and consequences of the great meltdown of 2008”—Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times
“A rigorous yet highly readable look at why booms and busts occur and how to keep them from wreaking havoc on the real economy”—Bloomberg
“A rigorous yet highly readable look at why booms and busts occur and how to keep them from wreaking havoc on the real economy.—Bloomberg
“An impressive, timely argument on behalf of transparency and stability for a financial system conspicuously lacking both.”—Kirkus Reviews
https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/B004Y4WMHW/
ルビーニは以下にも寄稿
https://www.amazon.co.jp/What-Have-We-Learned-Macroeconomic-ebook/dp/B00KANKAUW/
Kindle版
George A. Akerlof (編集, 寄稿), Olivier Blanchard (編集, 寄稿), David Romer (編集, 寄稿), Joseph E. Stiglitz (編集, 寄稿), Giovanni Dell'Ariccia (寄稿), Paolo Mauro (寄稿), Janet Yellen(寄稿), Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (寄稿), Mervyn King (寄稿), Mike Woodford (寄稿), Andy Haldane (寄稿), Claudio Borio (寄稿), Stanley Fischer (寄稿), Choongsoo Kim (寄稿), Sheila Bair (寄稿), Jeremy Stein (寄稿), Jean Tirole (寄稿), John Stuart Vickers(寄稿), Adair Turner (寄稿), Janice Eberly (寄稿), Anders Borg(寄稿), Roberto Perotti (寄稿), Nouriel Roubini (寄稿), Agustín Carstens (寄稿), Jay C. Shambaugh (寄稿), Martin Wolf (寄稿), Gang Yi (寄稿), Duvvuri Subbarao (寄稿), José De Gregorio (寄稿), Marcio Holland (寄稿), Hélène Rey (寄稿)
Stephen Keen is Associate Professor of Economics & Finance at the University of Western Sydney and a fellow of the Centre for Policy Development. A specialist in financial instability, – he published an academic paper in 1995 titled Finance and Economic Breakdown – Keen (2008) wrote that “[i]n December 2005, almost two years before the crisis hit, I realized that a serious financial crisis was approaching. I was so worried about its probable severity–and the lack of awareness about it amongst policy makers–that I took the risk (for an academic) of going very public about my views. I began commenting on economic policy in the media, started the DebtWatch Report, registered a webpage with the apt name of www.debtdeflation.com, and established the blog Steve Keen’s Oz Debtwatch.” He first publicly predicted Australia’s financial troubles in December 2005 in an interview on Perth radio and ABC Radio. In December 2006, Keen (2006) wrote that the debt-to-GDP ratio in Australia (then 147 per cent) “will exceed 160 per cent of GDP by the end of 2007. We simply can’t keep borrowing at that rate. We have to not merely stop the rise in debt, but reverse it. Unfortunately, long before we manage to do so, the economy will be in a recession. The reasons are simple: paying down excessive debt causes borrowers to stop spending… So when will this recession begin? On current data, the domestic economy may already be in one – though the China boom has more than compensated for the domestic downturn. What can be done to avoid it? Unfortunately, almost nothing.” In September 2007 he published, with the Centre for Policy Development, the report “Deeper in Debt”, writing that “our current problems [will] lead, I expect, to severe economic dislocation” (Keen 2007: 45). In January 2009 the IMF revised its 1.8 % forecast for Australian GDP growth in 2009 down by an unprecedented 2 %, to – 0.2 % (Stutchbury 2009). The Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2009 revised its 2009 forecast from 0.5 % to -1.0 % (Kwok 2009).
Wynne Godley is a Distinguished Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York and a Visiting Research Associate with the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (2002-2005). From 2000 he has consistently argued that a US housing market slowdown was unavoidable in the medium term, and that its implication would be recession in the US. Godley warned that ‘Goldilocks is doomed’, as he put it in a 2000 article with Wray. ‘Goldilocks’ was the simile after the children’s tale, employed in the years after the dotcom crash for the US economy, which was said to be neither too ‘cold’ (low unemployment) nor too ‘hot’ (low inflation). Godley and Wray (2000) argued that this stability was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ debt growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Based on an accounting framework of the US economy developed by Godley (on which more below), they predicted that that as soon as debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years -, growth would falter. When house prices had started to fall, Godley and Zezza (2006) published Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur. They demonstrated again the US economy’s dependence on debt growth and argued that only the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels were rising, resulting form the house price decline, would immediately lead to a “sustained growth recession … somewhere before 2010” (Godley and Zezza, 2006:3). In January 2007, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produced its annual report, which, as Godley and others noted in an April 2007 analysis, had predictions on GDP and inflation “indicating a Goldilocks world in the medium term” which they deemed ”wildly implausible” (p.1) as it required continued growth in household indebtedness while real estate collateral values were I na steep and continued fall. In contrast to CBO projections of GDP growth averaging 2.85 percent between 2007 and 2010, Godley in April 2007 predicted output growth “slowing down almost to zero sometime between now and 2008 and then recovering toward 3 percent or thereabouts in 2009–10”; but warned that “unemployment [will] start to rise significantly and does not come down again.” (Godley et al 2007: 3). Again, in November 2007 Godley and others forecast “a significant drop in borrowing and private expenditure in the coming quarters, with severe consequences for growth and unemployment”. These forecasts describe the actual developments from spring 2007 until the time of this writing in spring 2009. If anything, they were sanguine: US growth not only ‘slowed to zero’ but actually turned negative in 2008, and the recovery ‘toward 3 percent or thereabouts in 2009–10’ is now widely forecast, but yet to start.
地域通貨花子1
@TiikituukaHana
twitter.com/tiikituukahana…
《…2008年11月、ロンドン大学で開催された経済学者の集まりに出席したエリザベス英女王は、君主にふさわしい率直さで、「なぜあなた方の誰もこの危機に気付かなかったのですか」と尋ねた。出席した経済学者の誰一人、女王が納得できる説明を…与えることができなかった。》
2022/09/09 3:08
https://twitter.com/tiikituukahana/status/1567937857427501056?s=21