水曜日, 4月 10, 2019

Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession

Anticipations  of  the  Housing  Crisis  and  Recession 


日本語紹介


Table  1:  Anticipations  of  the  Housing  Crisis  and  Recession 
Dean  Baker,  US
Wynne  Godley,  US 
Fred  Harrison,  UK 
Michael  Hudson,  US 
Eric  Janszen,  US   
Stephen  Keen,  Australia 
Jakob  Brøchner  Madsen & 
Jens  Kjaer  Sørensen, Denmark 
Kurt  Richebächer,  US 
Nouriel  Roubini,  US   
Peter  Schiff  ,  US 
Robert  Shiller  ,  US 




Table  and  Figures Table  1:  Anticipations  of  the  Housing  Crisis  and  Recession Analyst Capacity Forecast Dean  Baker,  US Wynne  Godley,  US Fred  Harrison,  UK Michael  Hudson,  US Eric  Janszen,  US   Stephen  Keen,  Australia Jakob  Brøchner  Madsen & Jens  Kjaer  Sørensen, Denmark Kurt  Richebächer,  US Nouriel  Roubini,  US   Peter  Schiff  ,  US Robert  Shiller  ,  US co-director,  Center  for Economic  and  Policy Research Distinguished  Scholar, Levy  Economics Institute  of  Bard College Economic commentator professor,  University of  Missouri investor  and  iTulip commentator associate  professor, University  of  Western Sydney professor   & graduate  student,   Copenhagen University private  consultant  and investment  newsletter writer professor,    New  York University stock  broker, investment  adviser and  commentator professor,  Yale University 


Dean  Baker,  US
“  …plunging  housing  investment  will  likely  push  the  economy  into recession.”  (2006)


Wynne  Godley,  US 
 “The  small  slowdown  in  the  rate  at  which  US  household  debt  levels  are rising  resulting  form  the  house  price  decline,  will  immediately  lead  to a  …sustained  growth  recession  …    before  2010”.  (2006).  “Unemployment [will]  start  to  rise  significantly  and  does  not  come  down  again.”  (2007)
Godley,  W  and  G  Zezza  (2006)  Debt  and  Lending:A  Cri  de  Coeur.  Levy  Institute  at Bard  College  Policy  Notes  2006/4 
Godley,  W,  D  Papadimitriou  G  Hannsgen  and  G  Zezza  (2007)  Is  There  a  Way  Out  of the  Woods?  The  Levy  Economics  Institute  Strategic  Analysis,  November  2007.  At http://www.levy.org/ 

Fred  Harrison,  UK 
 “The  next  property  market  tipping  point  is  due  at  end  of  2007  or  early 2008  …The  only  way  prices  can  be  brought  back  to  affordable  levels  is  a slump  or  recession”  (2005).


Michael  Hudson,  US 
 “Debt  deflation  will  shrink  the  “real”  economy,  drive  down  real  wages,  and push  our  debt-ridden  economy  into  Japan-style  stagnation  or  worse.” (2006)  
Hdson  (2006a)  Saving,  Asset-Price  Inflation,  and  Debt-Induced  Deflation.  In:  L. Randall  Wray  and  Matthew  Forstater,  eds.,  Money,  Financial  Instability  and Stabilization  Policy Edward  Elgar,  2006:104-24.  Graph  also  reproduced  at http://www.americasbubbleeconomy.com/index.php?s=itulip . 

Eric  Janszen,  US   
 “The  US  will  enter  a  recession  within  years”  (2006).  “US  stock  markets  are likely  to  begin  in  2008  to  experience  a  “Debt  Deflation  Bear  Market” (2007)


Stephen  Keen,  Australia 
 “Long  before  we  manage  to  reverse  the  current  rise  in  debt,  the  economy will  be  in  a  recession.  On  current  data,  we  may  already  be  in  one.”  (2006)
Keen,  S.  and  B.  Chapman  (2006)  Hic  Rhodus,  Hic  Salta!  Profit  in  a  dynamic  model of  the  Monetary  Circuit,  Storia  del  Pensiero  Economico  2:  139-156 
同著者別論

次なる金融危機 単行本（ソフトカバー） – 2018/5/26


Jakob  Brøchner  Madsen & 
Jens  Kjaer  Sørensen, Denmark 
 “We  are  seeing  large  bubbles  and  if  they  bust,  there  is  no  backup.  The outlook  is  very  bad”  (2005)”  The  bursting  of  this  housing  bubble  will  have a  severe  impact  on  the  world  economy  and  may  even  result  in  a  recession” (2006). 

Kurt  Richebächer,  US  
“The  new  housing  bubble  –  together  with  the  bond  and  stock  bubbles  –  will invariably  implode  in  the  foreseeable  future,  plunging  the  U.S.  economy into  a  protracted,  deep  recession”  (2001).
  “A  recession  and  bear  market  in asset  prices  are  inevitable  for  the  U.S.  economy…  All  remaining  questions pertain  solely  to  speed,  depth  and  duration  of  the  economy’s  downturn.”   (2006)☆☆


Nouriel  Roubini,  US   
 “Real  home  prices  are  likely  to  fall  at  least  30%  over  the  next  3 years“(2005).  “By  itself  this  house  price  slump  is  enough  to  trigger  a  US recession.”  (2006)

Peter  Schiff  ,  US 
 “[t]he  United  States  economy  is  like  the  Titanic  ...I  see  a  real  financial crisis  coming  for  the  United  States.”  (2006).  “There  will  be  an  economic collapse”  (2007). 
early  2007  book  Crash  Proof:  How  to Profit  From  the  Coming  Economic  Collapse. 

Robert  Shiller  ,  US
“[F]urther  rises  in  the  [stock  and  housing]  markets  could  lead,  eventually, to  even  more  significant  declines…  A  long-run  consequence  could  be  a decline  in  consumer  and  business  confidence,  and  another,  possibly worldwide,  recession.  (2005) 

第2版序文より
The issues that are treated in this book are serious, and of continuing relevance today. People in much of the world are still overconfident that the stock market, and in many places the housing market, will do extremely well, and this overconfidence can lead to instability. Significant further rises in these markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines. The bad outcome could be that eventual declines would result in a substantial increase in the rate of personal bankruptcies, which could lead to a secondary string of bankruptcies of financial institutions as well. Another long-run consequence could be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. This extreme outcome—like the situation in Japan since 1990 writ large—is not inevitable, but it is a much more serious risk than is widely acknowledged. Lest raising these possibilities seem alarmist, one should note that we are already living with some

Irrational Exuberance by Robert J. Shiller Princeton University Press, Second Edition, 2005 http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/ 
ロバート・シラー（Robert James Shiller、1946年3月29日 - ）は、デトロイト出身のアメリカ合衆国の経済学者。イェール大学教授。専攻は金融経済学、行動経済学。著書「根拠なき熱狂」 (Irrational Exuberance') で知られる。2013年にノーベル経済学賞を受賞。

ITバブルの崩壊やサブプライム危機へ警鐘を鳴らしたことで知られる☆。


☆
シラー教授､アベノミクスを語るノーベル経済学賞学者の視点



Note:  for  sources  and  more  detail,  please  refer  to  the  Appendix. 


Hudson  (2006b)  The  Road  to  Serfdom:  An  Illustrated  Guide  to  the  Coming  Real Estate  Collapse,  Harper’s  Magazine,  April  2006 


☆☆
Kurt  Richebächer  (1918-2007)  wrote  one  of  the  longest-standing  investment  newsletters,  “The Richebächer  Letter,”  which  at  various  times  also  circulated  as  “Currencies  &  Credit  Markets.” Richebächer  was  chief  economist  for  Dresdner  Bank  from  1964  and  moved  into  private  consultancy in  1977.  He  warned  against  the  bubble  in  technology  stocks  in  the  late  ’90s.  After  its  collapse,  he warned  against  the  bubble  in  housing,  writing  in  September  2001:  “the  new  housing  boom  is another  rapidly  inflating  asset  bubble  financed  by  the  same  loose  money  practices  that  fuelled  the stock  market  bubble.”  He  went  on  to  predict  “that  the  housing  bubble  –  together  with  the  bond  and stock  bubbles  –  will  invariably  implode  in  the  foreseeable  future,  plunging  the  U.S.  economy  into  a protracted,  deep  recession.”  (Bonner  2007). Writing  in  2006,  Richebächer  held  that  “the  recovery  of  the  U.S.  economy  since  November 2001  has  been  dominated  by  an  unprecedented  consumer  borrowing-and-spendingbinge.  …”wealth  creation”  though  soaring  asset  prices  has  been  driven  by  ultra-cheap  and  loose money  and  credit,  and  not  by  saving  and  investment…”  Richebächer  (2006a:4).  Just  before  the turning  of  the  US  housing  market  in  summer  2006,  Richebächer  (2006a:4)  in  July  2006  commented that  “[t]he  one  thing  that  still  separates  the  U.S.  economy  from  economic  and  financial  disaster  is rising  house  prices  that  apparently  justify  ever  more  credit  and  debt”…  “Given  this  precarious income  situation  on  the  one  hand  and  the  debt  explosion  on  the  other,  it  will  be  clear  that  in  the foreseeable  future  there  will  be  heavy  selling  of  houses,  with  prices  crashing  for  lack  of  buyers” (Richebächer,  2006a:11).  As  this  prospect  began  to  materialize  in  the  next  month,  Richebächer wrote  in  his  August  2006  newsletter  that  “a  recession  and  bear  market  in  asset  prices  are  inevitable for  the  U.S.  economy.  …  This  will  not  be  a  garden-variety  recession,  in  which  monetary  easing unleashes  pent-up  demand,  as  it  used  to  do  in  past  business  cycles”.  He  again  emphasized  its  cause: “the  great  trouble  for  the  future  is  that  the  credit  bubble  has  its  other  side  in  exponential  debt growth”  …  “The  U.S.  liquidity  deluge  of  the  last  few  years  has  had  one  single  source:  borrowing against  rising  assets  backed  by  the  Fed’s  monetary  looseness…  all  hinging  on  further  rises  in  asset prices.  But  they  are  going  to  plunge”  (Richebächer,  2006b:1,5,9,11-12).  And  in  September  2006  he wrote  hat  “housing  bubbles,  when  bursting,  generally  do  considerable  damage  to  the  economy. Today,  they  are  bound  to  do  far  more  damage….”  (Richebächer,  2006c:4).  The  question  was  not  if, but  “how  fast  the  U.S.  economy  and  its  asset  markets  will  turn  down.  …  “There  is  no  question  that the  U.S.  housing  bubble  is  finished.  All  remaining  questions  pertain  solely  to  speed,  depth  and duration  of  the  economy’s  downturn”  (Richebächer,  2006c:9). 

…
Nouriel  Roubini  is  Professor  of  Economics  and  International  Business  at  the  Stern  School  of Business,  New  York  University,  Research  Associate  at  the  NBER  and  Research  Fellow  with  the CEPR.  He  is  a  former  advisor  to  the  U.S.  Treasury  Department  and  former  member  White  House Council  of  Economic  Advisers.  He  runs  the  Roubini  Global  Economics  Monitor  and  a  Global Economics  Blog  (http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini ,  from  which  all  quotes  below  are  taken). He  predicted  in  summer  2005  that  real  home  prices  were  likely  to  fall  at  least  30%  over  the  next  3 years,  and  published  warnings  about  the  recessionary  implications  from  the  very  beginning  of  the house  price  decline.  On  August  23,  2006,  he  wrote  that  “[b]y  itself  this  [house  price]  slump  is enough  to  trigger  a  US  recession”.  On  August  30,  he  wrote  that  “[t]he  recent  increased  financial problems  of  …  sub-prime  lending  institutions  may  thus  be  the  proverbial  canary  in  the  mine  –  or  tip of  the  iceberg  –  and  signal  the  more  severe  financial  distress  that  many  housing  lenders  will  face when  the  current  housing  slump  turns  into  a  broader  and  uglier  housing  bust  that  will  be  associated with  a  broader  economic  recession.  You  can  then  have  millions  of  households  with  falling  wealth, reduced  real  incomes  and  lost  jobs…”  In  a  Nov  17,  2006  blog  he  analysed  that  “the  housing recession  is  now  becoming  a  construction  recession;  and  the  construction  recession  is  now  turning into  a  clear  auto  and  manufacturing  recession;  and  the  manufacturing  recession  will  soon  turn  into  a retail  recession  as  squeezed  households  –  facing  falling  home  prices  and  rising  mortgage  servicing costs  –  sharply  contract  their  rate  of  consumption.”    He  correctly  predicted  that  quantitative  easing by  the  Federal  Reserve  would  lead  to  a  short  lived  stock  rally  at  the  end  of  2006,  turning  into  a share  price  plunge  once  a  coming  recession  was  obvious  towards  mid  2007.  Through  2006  and 2007,  Roubini  continued  warning  of  further  house  price  falls  (where  others  saw  it  bottoming  out), and  of  its  systemic  implications  leading  to  recession  in  2007.   

Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance

“A succinct, lucid and compelling account of the causes and consequences of the great meltdown of 2008”—Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times

“A rigorous yet highly readable look at why booms and busts occur and how to keep them from wreaking havoc on the real economy”—Bloomberg

“A rigorous yet highly readable look at why booms and busts occur and how to keep them from wreaking havoc on the real economy.—Bloomberg

“An impressive, timely argument on behalf of transparency and stability for a financial system conspicuously lacking both.”—Kirkus Reviews

https://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/B004Y4WMHW/


ルビーニは以下にも寄稿

https://www.amazon.co.jp/What-Have-We-Learned-Macroeconomic-ebook/dp/B00KANKAUW/

What Have We Learned?: Macroeconomic Policy after the Crisis (The MIT Press) (English Edition) Kindle版

George A. Akerlof (編集, 寄稿), Olivier Blanchard (編集, 寄稿), David Romer (編集, 寄稿), Joseph E. Stiglitz (編集, 寄稿), Giovanni Dell'Ariccia (寄稿), Paolo Mauro (寄稿), Janet Yellen(寄稿), Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (寄稿), Mervyn King (寄稿), Mike Woodford (寄稿), Andy Haldane (寄稿), Claudio Borio (寄稿), Stanley Fischer (寄稿), Choongsoo Kim (寄稿), Sheila Bair (寄稿), Jeremy Stein (寄稿), Jean Tirole (寄稿), John Stuart Vickers(寄稿), Adair Turner (寄稿), Janice Eberly (寄稿), Anders Borg(寄稿), Roberto Perotti (寄稿), Nouriel Roubini (寄稿), Agustín Carstens (寄稿), Jay C. Shambaugh (寄稿), Martin Wolf (寄稿), Gang Yi (寄稿), Duvvuri Subbarao (寄稿), José De Gregorio (寄稿), Marcio Holland (寄稿), Hélène Rey (寄稿)

Stephen  Keen  is  Associate  Professor  of  Economics  &  Finance  at  the  University  of  Western  Sydney and  a  fellow  of  the  Centre  for  Policy  Development.  A  specialist  in  financial  instability,  –  he published  an  academic  paper  in  1995  titled  Finance  and  Economic  Breakdown  –  Keen  (2008)  wrote that  “[i]n  December  2005,  almost  two  years  before  the  crisis  hit,  I  realized  that  a  serious  financial crisis  was  approaching.  I  was  so  worried  about  its  probable  severity–and  the  lack  of  awareness about  it  amongst  policy  makers–that  I  took  the  risk  (for  an  academic)  of  going  very  public  about  my views.  I  began  commenting  on  economic  policy  in  the  media,  started  the  DebtWatch  Report, registered  a  webpage  with  the  apt  name  of  www.debtdeflation.com,  and  established  the  blog  Steve Keen’s  Oz  Debtwatch.” He  first  publicly  predicted  Australia’s  financial  troubles  in  December  2005  in  an  interview on  Perth  radio  and  ABC  Radio.  In  December  2006,  Keen  (2006)  wrote  that  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  in Australia  (then  147  per  cent)  “will  exceed  160  per  cent  of  GDP  by  the  end  of  2007.  We  simply  can’t keep  borrowing  at  that  rate.  We  have  to  not  merely  stop  the  rise  in  debt,  but  reverse  it. Unfortunately,  long  before  we  manage  to  do  so,  the  economy  will  be  in  a  recession.  The  reasons  are simple:  paying  down  excessive  debt  causes  borrowers  to  stop  spending…  So  when  will  this recession  begin?  On  current  data,  the  domestic  economy  may  already  be  in  one  –  though  the  China boom  has  more  than  compensated  for  the  domestic  downturn.  What  can  be  done  to  avoid  it? Unfortunately,  almost  nothing.”  In  September  2007  he  published,  with  the  Centre  for  Policy Development,  the  report  “Deeper  in  Debt”,  writing  that  “our  current  problems  [will]  lead,  I  expect, to  severe  economic  dislocation”  (Keen  2007:  45).  In  January  2009  the  IMF  revised  its  1.8  % forecast  for  Australian  GDP  growth  in  2009  down  by  an  unprecedented  2  %,  to    –  0.2  % (Stutchbury 2009). The Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2009 revised its 2009 forecast from 0.5 % to -1.0 % (Kwok 2009). 

Wynne Godley is a Distinguished Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York and a Visiting Research Associate with the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (2002-2005). From 2000 he has consistently argued that a US housing market slowdown was unavoidable in the medium term, and that its implication would be recession in the US. Godley warned that ‘Goldilocks is doomed’, as he put it in a 2000 article with Wray. ‘Goldilocks’ was the simile after the children’s tale, employed in the years after the dotcom crash for the US economy, which was said to be neither too ‘cold’ (low unemployment) nor too ‘hot’ (low inflation). Godley and Wray (2000) argued that this stability was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ debt growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Based on an accounting framework of the US economy developed by Godley (on which more below), they predicted that that as soon as debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years -, growth would falter. When house prices had started to fall, Godley and Zezza (2006) published Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur. They demonstrated again the US economy’s dependence on debt growth and argued that only the small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels were rising, resulting form the house price  decline,  would  immediately  lead  to  a  “sustained  growth  recession  …  somewhere  before  2010” (Godley  and  Zezza,  2006:3).  In  January  2007,  the  US  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO) produced  its  annual  report,  which,  as  Godley  and  others  noted  in  an  April  2007  analysis,  had predictions  on  GDP  and  inflation  “indicating  a  Goldilocks  world  in  the  medium  term”  which  they deemed  ”wildly  implausible”  (p.1)  as  it  required  continued  growth  in  household  indebtedness  while real  estate  collateral  values  were  I  na  steep  and  continued  fall.  In  contrast  to  CBO  projections  of GDP growth  averaging  2.85  percent  between  2007  and  2010,  Godley  in  April  2007  predicted  output growth  “slowing  down  almost  to  zero  sometime  between  now  and  2008  and  then  recovering  toward 3  percent  or  thereabouts  in  2009–10”;  but  warned  that  “unemployment  [will]  start  to  rise significantly  and  does  not  come  down  again.”  (Godley  et  al  2007:  3).  Again,  in  November  2007 Godley  and  others  forecast  “a  significant  drop  in  borrowing  and  private  expenditure  in  the  coming quarters,  with  severe  consequences  for  growth  and  unemployment”.  These  forecasts  describe  the actual  developments  from  spring  2007  until  the  time  of  this  writing  in  spring  2009.  If  anything,  they were  sanguine:  US  growth  not  only  ‘slowed  to  zero’  but  actually  turned  negative  in  2008,  and  the recovery  ‘toward  3  percent  or  thereabouts  in  2009–10’  is  now  widely  forecast,  but  yet  to  start. 

posted by yoji at 4:13 午後

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地域通貨花子１
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twitter.com/tiikituukahana…
《…2008年11月、ロンドン大学で開催された経済学者の集まりに出席したエリザベス英女王は、君主にふさわしい率直さで、「なぜあなた方の誰もこの危機に気付かなかったのですか」と尋ねた。出席した経済学者の誰一人、女王が納得できる説明を…与えることができなかった。》

2022/09/09 3:08


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