Minsky, H. P. (1977b) The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes and an Alternative to ‘Standard’ Theory. Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, 16, 5–16.
Minsky argued therefore that both the cyclical tendencies of the economy and private debt had to play a central role in macroeconomic theory:
The natural starting place for analyzing the relation between debt and income is to take an economy with a cyclical past that is now doing well. The inherited debt reflects the history of the economy, which includes a period in the not too distant past in which the economy did not do well. Acceptable liability structures are based upon some margin of safety so that expected cash flows, even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover contractual debt payments. As the period over which the economy does well lengthens, two things become evident in board rooms. Existing debts are easily validated and units that were heavily in debt prospered; it paid to lever. (Minsky, 1977b, p. 10)
p.11(15頁)
A period of tranquil growth thus leads to rising expectations, and a tendency to increase leverage: as Minsky put it in his most famous sentence, ‘Stability –or tranquility –in a world with a cyclical past and capitalist financial institutions is destabilizing’ (1978, p. 10).
"The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions", 1933, Econometrica.
6 A Cynic’s Conclusion
Market-driven mechanisms alone are unlikely to reduce the debt to GDP ratio, for the reason that Irving Fisher identified during the Great Depression: ‘Fisher’s Paradox’ that, in a deleveraging and deflationary environment, ‘The more the debtors pay, the more they owe’ (Fisher, 1933, p. 344, emphasis added). Just as net debt creation creates money and adds to demand, net debt repayment destroys money and subtracts from demand. Especially in a low-inflation environment, this reduces economic activity: nominal GDP falls, and net capital gains on asset sales become negative. The result is that the debt to GDP ratio falls only slightly, if at all, for a large reduction in nominal debt, because nominal GDP falls at the same time.
32. And, vice versa, deflation caused by the debt reacts on the debt. Each dollar of debt still unpaid becomes a bigger dollar, and if the over-indebtedness with which we started was great enough, the liqui- dation of debts cannot keep up with the fall of prices which it causes. In that case, the liquidation defeats itself. While it diminishes the number of dollars owed, it may not do so as fas,, as it increases the value of each dollar owed. Then, the very effort of intdividuals to lessen their burden of debts increases it, because of the mass effect of the stampede to liquidate in swelling each dollar owed. Then we have the great para- dox which, I submit, is the chief secret of most, if not all, great de- pressions: The more the debtors pay, the more they owe. The more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip. It is not tending to right itself, but is capsizing.
★ Yields three truisms that cannot be reformed away:
•“The employment rate will rise if economic growth exceeds the sum of population & labor productivity growth” • “Wages share of output will rise if wage rises exceeds growth in labor productivity” • “Debt ratio will rise if rate of growth of debt exceeds rate of growth of GDP”…
★Mathematically, with the simplest possible assumptions, it looks like this…
λ(ラムダ)_The employment rate 雇用率
ω(オメガ)_Weighting factor on impact of change in the employment rate on wage setting 賃金率
Godley, W. (2001) The Developing Recession in the United States. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 54, 417–25.
Godley, W. & Izurieta, A. (2002) The Case for a Severe Recession. Challenge, 45, 27–51.
Godley, W. & Izurieta, A. (2004) The US Economy: Weaknesses of the ‘Strong’ Recovery. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 57, 131–9.
Godley, W., Izurieta, A., Gray, H. P. & Dilyard, J. R. (2005) Strategic Prospects and Policies for the US Economy. In: Gray, H. P. & Dilyard, J. R. (eds), Globalization and Economic and Financial Instability, Cheltenham: Elgar.
Godley, W. & McCarthy, G. (1998) Fiscal Policy Will Matter. Challenge, 41, 38–54.
Godley, W. & Wray, L. R. (2000) Is Goldilocks Doomed? Journal of Economic Issues, 34, 201–6.
The employment rate (the percentage of the population that has a job) will rise if the rate of economic growth (in per cent per year) exceeds the sum of population growth and labour productivity growth.
The percentage share of wages in GDP will rise if wage demands exceed the growth in labour productivity.
The debt to GDP ratio will rise if private debt grows faster than GDP.
・産出は、設置された資本財の乗数となる。
・雇用は産出の乗数になる。
・賃金の変化率は、雇用率の線形関数になる。
・投資は、利潤率の線形関数になる。
・利潤を超える投資には、金融による負債が当てられる。*
・人口も労働生産性も一定の割合で伸びる。
(40~1頁)
Output is a multiple of the installed capital stock.
Employment is a multiple of output.
The rate of change of the wage is a linear function of the employment rate.
Investment is a linear function of the rate of profit.
Debt finances investment in excess of profits.*
Population and labour productivity grow at constant rates.
…Another factor that Minsky did not consider, but which is a key feature of a cyclical economy (Goodwin, 1967; Blatt 1983, pp. 204–16), is that the boom will alter the distribution of income.…
^
Blatt, J. M. (1983) Dynamic Economic Systems: A Post-Keynesian Approach, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
7頁DSGE
Smets, F. & Wouters, R. (2007) Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach. American Economic Review, 97, 586–606.
whilst it is found that money enters into the economic scheme in an essential and peculiar manner, technical monetary detail falls into the background. A monetary economy, we shall find, is essentially one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the quantity of employment and not merely its direction. But our method of analyzing the economic behavior of the present under the influence of changing ideas about the future is one which depends on the interaction of supply and demand, and is in this way linked up with our fundamental theory of value. We are thus led to a more general theory, which includes the classical theory with which we are familiar, as a special case. (Keynes 1936, p. xxii) お金が本質的かつ独特の方法で経済計画に入ることがわかっている一方で、技術的な金銭的詳細は背景に分類されます。 金融経済は、本質的には、将来についての見方の変化が、単にその方向性ではなく雇用の量に影響を及ぼし得るものであると私たちは思います。 しかし、将来についての考え方の変化の影響下で現在の経済的行動を分析する私たちの方法は、需要と供給の相互作用に依存するものであり、このように私たちの基本的な価値理論とリンクしています。 私たちはこのようにして、私たちが慣れ親しんでいる古典的な理論を含む、より一般的な理論に特別なケースとして導かれます。 (ケインズ1936年、p。xxii)
Dynamic Monetary Input-Output Model .... As a representative of the PostKeynesian and complexity theory rump, and one ..... Blatt 1983, pp. ...... Blatt, J. M. (1983). ... economic systems: a post-Keynesian approach. Armonk, N.Y, M.E.. Sharpe.
参照:
ミンスキー,金融不安で見直される経済学者 CAN “IT” HAPPEN AGAIN? +テイラールール
・The employment rate (the percentage of the population that has a job) will rise if the rate of economic growth (in per cent per year) exceeds the sum of population growth and labour productivity growth.
・The percentage share of wages in GDP will rise if wage demands exceed the growth in labour productivity.
・The debt to GDP ratio will rise if private debt grows faster than GDP.
より多くの貸付と預金がつくられることはない」(McLeay et al., 2014, p. 1,強調は原典)
イングランド銀行の事実に基づく記述~~銀行が貸し付けるとき、同時に借り手の口座に対応す
る預金が創出され、新しいマネーがつくられる~~は、重要な推論を導く。つまり、マネーは借り
られて存在するようになり~~商品なり、サービスなり、資産なりに~~支出され、既存のマネー
の総額によって融資された額の上に加えられ、総需要を構成する。このように経済の総需要は、既
存のマネーの合計と貸付の総和なのだ。
これが図14の背後にある論理に他ならない。総支出を正確に計測するには、既存のマネーの合計
を貸付に加えねばならない。貸付に関するデータは存在するが、既存のマネーの合計に関するデー
タは存在しない。記録されているのはGDP~~商品とサービスを売って得た所得と総支出~~で
あって、一部は既存のマネーによって、また一部は貸付によって融資されたものだ。だが、現在で
は貸付のほとんどは資産購入のための(GDPのなかに記録されない)融資だから、GDPと貸付の
合計が、経済における総支出をほぼ示す。
このことが、民間負債のレベルとその変化率が問題になるのを説明してくれる。アメリカの慈善
家リチャード・ヴェイグが、重要な経験的規則性を発見した。それによると、過去一五〇年間のい
ずれの経済危機でも、つぎのようなことを示していた。GDPに占める民間負債の率が150%以上、
そしてその五年間の伸び率が17%という組み合わせだ(Vague, 2014)。この経験的規則性は、
負債の伸び率の低下の影響が、そのレベルと変化率に依存するためだ。
McLeay, M., Radia, A. & Thomas, R. (2014) Money Creation in the Modern Economy. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q1, 14–27.
Vague, R. (2014) The Next Economic Disaster: Why It’s Coming and How to Avoid It, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
貨幣に循環というイメージがなくなるのは危険だ
それは複数通貨の認識より重要だ
ミンスキーは逆の立場から両方を見ていた
キーン邦訳では12頁
That question was first posed decades earlier by the then unknown but now famous maverick American economist Hyman Minsky. Writing two decades before Lucas, Minsky remarked that ‘The most significant economic event of the era since World War II is something that has not happened: there has not been a deep and long-lasting depression’ (1982, p. ix). 1 In contrast, before the Second World War, ‘serious recessions happened regularly . . . to go more than thirty-five years without a severe and protracted depression is a striking success’. To Minsky, this meant that the most important questions in economics were:
Can ‘It’ –a Great Depression –happen again? And if ‘It’ can happen, why didn’t ‘It’ occur in the years since World War II? These are questions that naturally follow from both the historical record and the comparative success of the past thirty-five years. (1982, p. xii)
It goes without saying that I’m a Cassandra amongst the Pollyannas crowing about Australia’s current economic performance data. Low inflation, low unemployment, and no sign of a wages breakout, are the usually-quoted sweet economic indicators (admittedly with some strange bedfellows, including a relatively slow rate of economic growth for these conditions, and a huge balance of trade deficit despite the best terms of trade in history).
So how do I justify the stance of a Cassandra? Because things can’t continue as normal, when normal involves an unsustainable trend in debt. At some point, there has to be a break–though timing when that break will occur is next to impossible, especially so when it depends in part on individual decisions to borrow.
However, it is possible to quantify the minimum impact that the end of the unsustainable might have on the economy: what would happen to aggregate spending if private debt grew no faster than GDP?
Aggregate spending–on both commodities and assets–is the sum of incomes plus the increase in debt. Using GDP as the measure of income, this was $1,001 billion in the last calendar year. Over the same period, private debt increased by $202 billion. Aggregate spending was thus approximately $1,200 billion.Private debt grew by 14.9 per cent in the last year, versus a 7.4 per cent growth in nominal GDP.
If both private debt and nominal GDP were to grow at the same rate as GDP last year, then GDP next year would be $1,075 billion, while debt would rise by $115 billion.Aggregate spending would thus be $1,190 billion–or $10 billion less than spending this calendar year.
In one sense, we are now so much in debt that we can’t afford not to continue borrowing. And yet the more we do borrow, the more severe the shock will be to aggregate demand when the correction finally occurs.
This situation has come about because of the exponential growth in debt relative to GDP. Back in 1963, when debt was just 25 per cent of GDP, a fall in the rate of growth of debt had only a minor impact on demand. Now, with debt equivalent to 153 per cent, that small effect has become a very big one.
So my Cassandric pessimism is not entirely based simply on disposition. At some point, the debt to GDP ratio must stabilise–and on past trends, it won’t stop simply at stabilising. When that inevitable reversal of the unsustainable occurs, we will have a recession.
Just the Facts, Ma’am…
To be continued after I finish this morning’s lecture… In the meantime, for most of the charts that will appear in this report, please go to the Charts page of this blog.
—. “The Lily and the Pond.” 2006. Interview reported by the Evans Foundations. Available at https://evatt.org.au/news/445.htm Accessed November 24, 2010.
Unfortunately, long before we manage to do so, the economy will be in a recession. The reasons are simple: paying down excessive debt causes borrowers to stop spending - whether that means households that cancel order for the latest LCD TV, or firms that put off that planned expansion of capacity. Income plummets, but debt continues to rise, simply because of the effect of compound interest. The debt to GDP ratio starts to fall only when a substantial slab of income is devoted to paying debt, but that in turn means a serious recession.
Minsky, H. P. (1977b) The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes and an Alternative to ‘Standard’ Theory. Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business, 16, 5–16.
Debunking Economics was far from the first book to argue that neoclassical economics was fundamentally unsound. If cogent criticism alone could have brought this pseudo-science down, it would have fallen as long ago as 1898, when Thorstein Veblen penned ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’ (Veblen 1898). Yet in 1999, when I began writing Debunking Economics, neoclassical economics was more dominant than it had ever been.
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