Duncan K. Foley ダンカン・K.フォーリー
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Working Paper No. 647 Money - Levy Economics Institute of Bard ...(Adobe PDF) -htmlで見る
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_647.pdf
(2) Money is always debt; it cannot be a commodity from the first proposition because, if it ...... lower in the pyramid use the IOUs issued by entities higher in the pyramid to make .... Foley, Duncan. 1989.
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_647.pdf
Money by L. Randall Wray
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
December 2010
Foley, Duncan. 1989. “Money in Economic Activity.”
in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: Money. New York and London: W.W. Norton.
https://www.amazon.co.jp/Money-New-Palgrave-John-Eatwell/dp/0393027260
★
Duncan K. Foley
Born | June 15, 1942 (age 77)
Columbus, Ohio, USA
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Nationality | American |
Institution | New School of Social Research and Santa Fe Institute |
Field | Economics |
School or tradition | Classical economics, Marxian economics, Keynesian economics, Neo-Ricardian economics, Neoclassical economics, Alternatives to capitalism |
Alma mater | Yale University (Ph.D., Economics, 1966; National Science Foundation Grant Fellowship) Swarthmore College (B.A. Mathematics, 1964; Phi Beta Kappa) |
Doctoral advisor | Herbert Scarf James Tobin |
Doctoral students | Mark Gertler |
Influences | Karl Marx, Michel Aglietta, Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Ladislaus Bortkiewicz, Nikolai Bukharin, Samuel Bowles, Maurice Dobb, William Baumol, Luigi Pasinetti, Erik Lindahl |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc |
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Duncan_Foley
(PDF) Advanced Microeconomics II Spring 2016 Lecture 1
サミュエルソンの奇妙な手落ち
Samuelson’s initiative to re-found economics as a mathematical science was an astounding success in terms of academic politics, but in retrospect looks increasingly flawed as a research program. Samuelson’s vision saw economics as a constrained optimization problem, and his genius was to adapt a subset of the powerful arsenal of tools developed by mathematical physicists to attack constrained optimization to an economic context. He did this in a much more subtle and critical manner than many other wouldbe translators of physical methods into economics, who too often wind up merely re-labeling physical models with economic categories through defective analogies. Nonetheless, there are puzzling lacunae in Samuelson’s crossdisciplinary lexicon. For example, the optimizing methods he imported into economics were mostly developed as a branch of physical thermodynamics, which neoclassical economics has a family connection to (Smith and Foley, 2008). But Samuelson’s translation omits the specifically statistical character of physical thermodynamic reasoning, an omission which is all the more surprising because statistical fluctuations and regularities appear in very important ways in economic data, including wealth and income distributions, firm and city size distributions, and asset price movements.
(拙訳)
経済学を数理科学として再構築しようとしたサミュエルソンの試みは、学界における政略としては驚くべき成功を収めたが、研究の進め方としては今から見るとますます欠陥が目立つようになっている。サミュエルソンの見方では経済学は制約付き最適化問題であり、彼の天才は、数理物理学において開発された強力なツールの一部を、経済学の文脈における制約付き最適化問題を解くのに適用することに発揮された。物理学的手法を経済学に応用しようとした他の数多くの人々は、欠陥のある類推を用いて物理学モデルのラベルを経済学カテゴリに貼り換えただけに終わることが多かったが、サミュエルソンはそうした人々よりも遥かに繊細かつ決定的な手法でその適用をやってのけた。しかしながら、サミュエルソンの学際的翻訳語集には奇妙な穴があった。例えば、彼が経済学に移植した最適化手法は、主に物理学の熱力学の一分野として開発されたものであり、新古典派経済学で既に馴染みがあるものだった(Smith and Foley, 2008*1)。しかしサミュエルソンは、経済学への翻案に当たって、物理の熱力学の手法のうち統計的側面だけをスパッと切り落としてしまった。経済データにおける統計的な変動や規則性が、富や所得の分布や企業や都市の規模の分布や資産価格の変動といった非常に顕著な形で現れることを考えると、この省略は一層奇妙に思える。
Samuelson’s import of the optimizing mathematics of thermodynamics as the foundations of a mathematical economics without including statistical theories of fluctuations contributed to an economic vision of market interactions smoothly implementing social goals. As I have argued in Foley (2010) the suppression of the irreversible aspects of market interactions in finding Pareto allocations also systematically suppresses the study of redistributions of economic surpluses inherent in decentralized market interactions. Looked at in this way, the market appears to be a “neutral” mechanism for achieving economic efficiency through the universal discipline of the price system. The econometric catastrophe of “Keynesian” macro-models of the 1970s was intimately connected to the pressures on economists to find a “neutral” presentation of the conflict over distribution that underlay the inflationary stagnation of the period. The sudden triumph of rational expectations theories rested in an important way on their presentation of macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy as “neutral”, that is, by implication, without impact on distribution. From this point of view it is easier to see why the balance of power in disposing of theoretical speculation shifted from econometricians to the theorists themselves. Even relatively crude examination of macroeconomic data reveals the central importance of distribution (between wage and non-wage incomes, for example) in the dynamics of business cycle fluctuations. To those who share the tendency of neo-liberal economic policies to accept and encourage increasing inequality in the distributions of wealth and income, research on the actual dynamics of wage setting and its relation to unemployment is as irrelevant as it is unwelcome.
(拙訳)
サミュエルソンが、変動の統計理論抜きで熱力学の最適化の数学を数理経済学の基礎に用いたことは、市場の働きがスムーズに社会的目標を達成するのだ、という経済学の見方の形成に寄与した。Foley (2010)*2で論じたように、市場がパレート配分を見つける際の不可逆過程を無視したことは、非中央集権的な市場の働きに伴う経済余剰の再分配の研究を組織的に無視することにつながった。そうすれば、市場は、普遍的な価格システムの法則によって経済的効率性を達成する「中立的」機構のように見える。1970年代の「ケインジアン」計量経済マクロモデルが崩壊したことは、当時のインフレを伴う経済停滞を彩った分配を巡る闘争について、経済学者が「中立的な」提案をするように強く求められたことと密接に関連している。合理的期待理論が突然の勝利を収めたことは、彼らがマクロ経済政策、とりわけ金融政策を「中立的」なものとして提示したことが大きく貢献している。ここで「中立的」とは、分配に影響しないことを意味していた。そう考えると、なぜ理論的推論の重心が計量経済学者から理論家自身に移ったのかが理解できる。マクロ経済データをざっくり見ただけでも、景気循環変動の動学において、分配(賃金収入と非賃金収入の間の分配など)が中心的とも言うべき重要な役割を果たしていることは明らかである。富と所得の分配の不平等の増大を受容し推進するというネオリベラル的な経済政策の指向を共有する者にとっては、実際の賃金設定ならびにその失業との関係についての動学に関する研究は、歓迎せざるものであるのと同時に無関係なものでもあった。
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《…もしその国が貨幣の流通速度を高めることができれ
貨幣に関するスミスの見解は, ケインズの見解とも異なる。ケインズは,
参考:
disentangle the extent that Virginia’s paper money functioned as a commodity or real-asset medium of exchange ((APV - RD) / MEV) versus as a fiat currency (TP / MEV).
Fortunately, Virginia’s treasury notes were structured as zero-coupon bonds, except for the 1755-6 emissions that were structured as interest-bearing bonds.5 The notes had legally defined end maturity dates when they were paid off at face value in specie equivalents by Virginia’s government, and they could be redeemed at face value for tax payment obligations any time after initial emission. Given expected redemption time-paths and end maturity dates, payoff values, and an appropriate risk-free time-discount rate, the APV of these notes as risk-free non-money tradable bonds can be calculated independent of their MEV.
5Benjamin Franklin (Labaree 1967, v. 11, pp. 13-15), Adam Smith (1937, pp. 310-12), and James Madison (Hutchinson and Rachal 1962, v. 1, pp. 305-06) described colonial bills of credit as zero-coupon bonds.
https://www.nber.org/papers/w21881.pdf
smith
2:0:2
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/220/0141-02_Bk.pdf
Colonial Virginia's Paper Money Regime, 1755-1774: Value Decomposition and Performance
Farley Grubb
Issued in January 2016, Revised in March 2016
NBER Program(s):Program on the Development of the American Economy
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ADAM’S FALLACY A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC THEOLOGY
Duncan K. F
2006
アダム・スミスの誤謬
http://digamo.free.fr/duncan06.pdf
p.41
Smith was aware of certain pathologies that unregulated banking systems could encourage. These are all, in one way or another, connected with an unstable multiplication of credit. In Smith’s time a great deal of trade was nanced with bills of exchange, a receipt for goods in transit signed by the shipper, which other merchants and banks would accept as collateral for cash loans. In boom periods, some traders would issue bills beyond their actual inventories of goods in transit, which would allow an unstable growth of loans and credit in the economy as a whole. Such pyramids of credit are vulnerable to sudden crises, in which the failure of some of the issuers of bills to pay triggers off a chain reaction of other traders’ failures. The credit system collapses temporarily, ruining many merchants and often interrupting trade and production, thus creating unemployment.
Smith argues that this kind of overtrading in bills of exchange can be avoided if banks strictly follow a policy of lending only on the basis of “real bills,” that is, bills of exchange that are backed by actual goods sold and in transit to their purchasers. This “real bills” doctrine has played a key role in banking policy debates ever since.
スミスは、規制されていない銀行システムが助長する可能性がある特定の病態を認識していました。これらはすべて、何らかの形で、信用の不安定な増加に関連しています。スミスの時代には、交換手形、運送業者が署名した輸送中の商品の領収書、そして他の商人や銀行が現金ローンの担保として受け入れることで、大量の取引が行われました。好況期には、一部のトレーダーは、輸送中の商品の実際の在庫を超えて請求書を発行します。これにより、経済全体でのローンと信用の不安定な成長が可能になります。このような信用のピラミッドは、突然の危機に対して脆弱です。この危機では、法案の発行者の一部が支払いを怠ると、他のトレーダーの失敗の連鎖反応が引き起こされます。信用システムは一時的に崩壊し、多くの商人を台無しにし、しばしば貿易と生産を中断し、失業を生み出します。
スミス氏は、銀行が「実際の請求書」、つまり実際の商品の販売と輸送中に裏付けられた為替手形のみに基づいて貸出の方針を厳密に守れば、この種の為替手形の過剰取引を回避できると主張します購入者。この「実質法案」の原則は、それ以来、銀行政策の議論において重要な役割を果たしてきました。
スミス下4:7:3
ミッチェル
Foley は p.250でPyramid という単語を使っているだけだった
『Money』1989年
Duncan編