tobin 1963
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COMMERCIAL BANKS AS CREATORS OF 'MONEY' - ECONPAPERS
By James Tobin; Commercial Banks as Creators of 'Money' ... Date: 1963. Note: CFP 205. References: Add references ...
Commercial Banks as Creators of 'Money'
No 159, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Date: 1963
Note: CFP 205.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40) Track citations by RSS feed
Note: CFP 205.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Dean Carson, ed., Banking and Monetary Studies, for the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Treasury, Richard D. Irwin, 1963, pp. 408-419
MMTerのミッチェルもTobinのfountain pen moneyに言及／“Teaching macroeconomics students the facts” W Mitchell 2010 http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=9574 #経論 #経論MMT
Anyway, I also mentioned to the person that I had just that morning been reading a rarely cited 1963 paper Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” – by Nobel Prize winning economist (the late) James Tobin. I had read it a long-time ago while I was doing my PhD and was alerted to it again by one of the regular billy blog readers (thanks Jeff).
The article considers the money multiplier by juxtaposing the “Old View” and the “New View” of banking. I went back into my database to see the notes I took when I read the article originally (in 1983!). It is quite amazing that articles like this get lost in the mainstream literature. Despite obvious flaws they categorically demonstrate that the material that is presented in macroeconomics textbooks and which students subsequently take away from their studies as “truth” is typically misleading and often totally wrong.
Tobin begins:
Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank and credit deposits. Before the admiring eyes of freshmen he puts to rout the practical banker who is so sure he “lends only the money depositors entrust to him.” … [in fact] … depositors entrust to bankers whatever amounts the bankers lend … [for] … the banking system as a whole …. a long line of financial heretics have been right in speaking of “fountain pen money” – money created by the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower’s checking account.
James Tobin (March 5, 1918 – March 11, 2002)
トービンのq(1963,1968)、トービン税(1974,1978)で知られる。
CONLIS FOUMDATION POR КESEARCH II всомIсS
АT YALE UNIVERSITY
Вох 2125, Yale Station
Кew Haven, Сonnecticut
СOMLIS FOUDАTION DISCUSSTON PAP3R KO. 159
Кote: Cowles Foundation Discusslon Раpеrs are prelininary нaterials
сАrculated to stimulate discussion and criticаl coment.
Requests for aingle copies of a
Coxles Foundation witaia the linits of the suрply. References
in publicatons to Discussion Papers (other than нere acknowll-
edgent by а writer that he has accева to such unpubllshed
вaterial) skould be cleared with the author to protect the
tentative character of these papers.
Рерer will be filled by the
СоммRсLAL BANKS AS CRЕАТОRS OF "MОNEY"
Jвmes Tobia
July 24, 1963
Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money"
James Tobin
I.
THE OLD VIEW
Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics
teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank credit and bank
deposits
Before the admiring eyes of freshmen he puts to rout the
practical banker who is so sure that he "lends only the money depositors
entrust to him.'
The banker is shown to have a worm's eye's view, and his
error stands as an introductory object lesson in the fallacy of composition.
From the 0lympian vantage of the teacher and the textbook it appears that
the banker's dictum must be reversed: depositors entrust to bankers what-
ever amounts the bankers lend.
To be sure, this is not true of a
single
bank one bank's loan may wind up as another bank's depoait. But it is,
the arithmetic of successive rounds of deposit creation makes clear, true
Whatever their other errors
of the banking system as a whole.
a long line
of financial heretics have been right in speaking of "fountain pen money,
money created by the stroke of the bank president's pen when he approves a
loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower's checking account.
In this time-honored exposition two characteristics of commercial
banksboth of which are alleged to differentiate them sharply from other
financial intermediaries--are intertwined.
One is that their liabilities,
well at least their demand deposit liabilities--serve as widely acceptable
2
means of payment. Thus they count, along with coin and currency in public
"money.
The other is that the preferences of the public
circulation,
normally play no role in determining the total volume of deposits or the
total quantity of money. For it is the beginning of wisdom in monetary
economics to observe that money is like the "hot potato" of a children's
game one individual may pass it to another, but the group as a whole cannot
If the economy and the supply of money are out of adjustment,
get rid of it.
This is as true, evidently of
it is the economy that must do the adjusting.
money created by bankers' fountain pens as of money created by public print-
On the other hand, financial intermediaries other than banks
ing presses.
do not create money, and the scale of their assets is limited by their
liabilities, i.e., by the savings the public entrusts to them. They cannot
11
count on receiving "deposits" to match every extension of their lending.
The commercial banks and only the conmercial banks, in other words,
And because they possess this key to unlimited
possess the widow's cruse.
Once this is
expansion, they have to be restrained by reserve requirements.
done, determination of the aggregate volume of bank deposits is just a
matter of accounting and arithmetic: simply divide the available supply of
bank reserves by the required reserve ratio.
The foregoing is admittedly a caricature, but I believe it is not a
great exaggeration of the impressions conveyed by economics teaching con-
cerning the roles of commercial banks and other financial institutions in
the monetary system.
In conveying this melange of propositions, economics
has replaced the naive fallacy of composition of the banker with other half-
3
truths perhaps equally misleading. These have their root in the mystique of
"money"--the tradition of distinguishing sharply between those assets which
are and those which are not "money,
" and accordingly between those institu-
tions which emit "money" and those whose liabilities are not "money.
The
persistent strength of this tradition is remarkable given the uncertainty
and controversy over where to draw the dividing line between money and other
Time was when only currency was regarded
assets
as money, and the use of
bank deposits
was regarded as a way of economizing currency and increasing
the velocity of money.
Today scholars and statisticians wonder and argue
whether to count commercial bank time and savings deposits in the money
supplya And if so, why not similar accounts in other institutions? Never-
theless, once the arbitrary line is drawn, assets on the money side of the
line are assumed to possess to the full properties which assets on the other
side completely lack
For example, an eminent monetary economist, more
candid than many of his colleagues, admits that we don't really know what
money is, but proceeds to argue that, whatever it is, its supply should grow
regularly at a rate of the order of 3 to 4 per cent per year.
*E. S. Shaw, "Money Supply and Stable Economic Growth," in United
States Monetary Policy, American Assembly, New York, 1958, pp. 49-71.
II
THE "NEW VIEW"
A more recent development in monetary economics tends to blur the
sharp traditional distinctions between money and other assets and between
commercial banks and other financial intermediaries; to focus on demands
for and supplies of the whole spectrum of assets rather than on the quantity
and velocity of "money"; and to regard the structure of interest rates,
asset yields, and credit availabilities rather than the quantity of money as
the linkage between monetary and financial institutions and policies on the
one hand and the real economy on the other.*
In this essay I propose to look
*For a review of this development and for references to its pro-
see Harry Johnson's survey article, "Monetary Theory and Policy,'
I will confine myself
20
tagonists,
American Economic Review, LII, June 1962, pp. 335-384.
to mentioning the importance, in originating and contributing to the "new
view," of John Gurley and E. S. Shaw (yes, the very same Shaw cited in the
previous footnote, but presumably in a different incarnation). Their view-
point is summarized in Money in a
Institution, 1960.
Theory of Finance, Washington, Brookings
briefly at
'new view" for the theory of deposit
implications of this
creation, of which I have above described or caricatured the traditional
version
One of the incidental advantages of this theoretical development
is to effect something of a reconciliation between the economics teacher and
the practical banker.
According to the
'new view," the essential function of financial inter-
mediaries, including commercial banks, is to satisfy simultaneously the port-
folio preferences of two types of individuals or firms.**
On one side are
**This paragraph and the three following are adapted with minor
changes from the author's paper with William Brainard, "Financial Intermedi-
aries and the Effectiveneas of Monetary Controls," American Economic Review
LII, May 1963, pp. 384-386.
borrowers, who wish to expand their holdings of real assets--inventories,
residential real estate, productive plant and equipment, etc.--beyond the
5
limits of their own net worth.
On the other side are lenders, who wish to
hold part or all of their net worth in assets of stable money value with
negligible risk of default.
The assets of financial intermediaries are
obligations of the borrowers--promissory notes, bonds, mortgages.
The
liabilities of financial intermediaries are the assets of the lenders--bank
deposits, insurance policies, pension rights.
Financial intermediaries typically assume liabilities of smaller de-
fault risk and greater predictability of value than their assets.
The
principal kinds of institutions take on liabilities of greater liquidity
too; thus bank depositors can require payment
on demand, while bank loans
become due only on specified dates.
The reasons that the intermediation of
financial institutions can accomplish these transformations between the
nature of the obligation of the borrower and the ature of the asset of the
ultimate lender are these:
(1) administrative economy and expertise in
negotiating, accounting, appraising, and collecting; (2) reduction of risk
per dollar of lending by the pooling of independent risks, with respect both
to loan default and to deposit withdrawal; (3) governmental guarantees of
the liabilities of the institutions and other provisions (bank examination,
investment regulations, supervision of insurance companies, last-resort
lending) designed to assure the solvency and liquidity of the inst:itutions.
For these reasons, intermediation permits borrowers who wish to ex-
pand their investments in real assets to be accommodated at lower rates and
easier terms than if they had to borrow directly from the lenders.
If the
creditors of financial intermediaries had to hold instead the kinds of
6
obligations that private borrowers are capable of providing, they would cer-
tainly insist on higher rates and stricter terms.
Therefore, any autonomous
increase--for example, improvements in the efficiency of financial institu-
tions or the creation of new types of intermediaries--in the amount of
financial intermediation in the economy can be expected to be, ceteris
paribus
This is true whether the growth occurs
an expansionary influence.
in intermediaries with monetary liabilities--i.e., commercial banks--or in
other intermediaries.
Financial institutions fall fairly easily into distinct categories,
'intermediary" offering
each industry or
a differentiated product to its
customers, both lenders and borrowers.
From the point of view of lenders,
the obligations of the various intermediaries are more or less close, but not
perfect, substitutes.
For example, savings deposits share most of the
attributes of demand deposits; but they
are not means of payment, and the
institution has the right, seldom exercised, to require notice of withdrawal.
Similarly there is differentiation in the kinds of credit offered borrowers.
Each intermediary has its specialty--e.g., the commercial loan for banks, the
But the borrowers'
real estage mortgage for the savings-and-loan association.
market is not completely compartmentalized. The same credit instruments are
handled by more than one intermediary, and many borrowers have flexibility
Thus there is some substitutability, in the
in the type of debt they incur.
demand for credit by borrowers, between the assets of the various inter-
mediaries.*
*These features of the market structure of intermediaries, and their
implications for the supposed uniqueness of banks, have been emphasized by
on the deposit
side is analyzed by David and Charlotte Alhadeff, "The Struggle for Commer-
cial Bank Savings," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXII, February 1958, 1-22.
An example of substitutability
Gurley and Shaw, loc. cit.
The special attention given commercial banks in economic analysis is
usually justified by the observation that, alone among intermediaries, banks
create" means of payment. This rationale is on its face far from convincing.
The meansof-payment characteristic of demand deposits is indeed a feature
differentiating bank liabilities from those of other intermediaries.
Insurance against death is equally a feature differentiating 1ife insurance
policies from the obligations of other intermediaries, including banks.
It
is not obvious that one kind of differentiation should be singled out for
Like other different:ia, the means-of-payment
special analytical treatment.
attribute has its price. Savings deposits, for example,
are perfect sub-
stitutes for demand deposits in every respect except as a medium of exchange
This advantage of checking accounts does not give banks absolute immunity
from the competition of savings banks; it is a limited advantage that can be,
at least in some part for many depositors,
overcome by differences in yield
It follows that the community's demand for bank deposits is not indefinite,
even though demand deposits do serve as means of payment.
III
THE WIDOW'S CRUSE
Neither individually nor collectively do commercial banks possess a
"widows cruse.
Quite apart from legal reserve requirements, commercial
banks are limited in scale by the same kinds of economic processes that de-
termine the aggregate size of other intermediaries.
One often cited difference between commercial banks and other inter-
mediaries must be quickly dismissed as superficial and irrelevant. This is
the fact that a bank can make a loan by "writing up" its deposit liabilities,
while a
savings and loan association, for example, cannot satisfy a mortgage
borrower by crediting him with a share account.
The association must transfer
means of payment to the borrower; its total liabilities do not rise along with
its assets.
True enough, but neither do the bank's for more than a
fleeting
moment
Borrowers do not incur debt in order to hold idle deposits, any more
than savings and loan shares.
The borrower pays out the money, and there is
of course no guarantee that any of it stays in the lending bank
Whether or
not it stays in the banking system as a whole is another question, about to
be discussed.
But the answer clearly does not depend
on the way the loan was
It depends
initially made.
on whether somewhere in the chain of transactions
initiated by the borrower's outlays are found depositors who wish to hold new
deposits equal in amount to the new loan.
Similarly, the outcome for the
savings and loan industry depends
on whether in the chain of transactions
initiated by the mortgage are found individuals who wish to acquire addition-
al savings and loan shares.
expand its assets either (a) by purchasing,
The banking system can
or
(b by lending to finance new private
lending against, existing assets; or
investment in inventories or capital goods,
buying government securities
or
(a)
financing new public deficits.
In case
no increase in private wealth
occurs in conjunction with the banks' expansion.
There is no new private
(b)
In case
saving and investment.
private saving occurs, matching
new
dollar for dollar the private investments or government deficits financed by
the banking system.
In neither case will there automatically be an increase
in savers demand for bank deposits equal to the expansion in bank assets.
9
In the second case, it is true, there is an increase in private wealth.
But even if we assume a closed economy in order to abstract from leakages of
capital abroad, the community will not ordinarily wish to put 100 per cent of
its new saving into bank deposits
Bank deposits are, after all, only about
15 per cent of total private wealth in the United States; other things equal,
savers cannot be expected greatly to exceed this proportion in allocating
new
saving
So, if all new saving is to take the form of bank deposits, other
things cannot stay equal
Specifically, the yields and other advantages of
the competing assets into which new saving would otherwise flow will have to
fall enough so that savers prefer bank deposits.
This is a fortiori true in case
a) where there is no new saving and
the generation of bank liabilities to match the assuned expansion of bank
assets entails a reshuffling of existing portfolios in favor of bank deposits.
In effect the banking system has to induce the public to swap loans and
securities for bank deposits. This can happen only if the price is right.
Clearly, then, there is at any moment a natural economic limit to the
scale of the cormmercial banking industry. Given the wealth and the asset
preferences of the community, the demand for bank deposits can increase only
if the yields of other assets fall
The fall in these yields is bound to
restrict the profitable lending and investment opportunities available to
the banks themselves.
Eventually the marginal returns on lending and invest-
ing, account taken of the risks and administrative costs involved, will not
exceed the marginal cost to the banks of attracting and holding additional
deposits. At this point the widow's cruse has run dry.
10
IV
BANKS AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES COMPARED
In this respect the cormercial banking industry is not qualitatively
different from any other financial intermediary system.
The same process
limits the collective expansion of savings and loan associations,
or savings
banks,
or life insurance companies. At some point the returns from addition-
al loans or
security holdings are not worth the cost of obtaining the funds
from the public
There are of course some differences.
First, it may well be true
that commercial banks benefit from a larger share of additions to private
savings than other intermediaries. Second, according to modern American
commercial banks are subject to ceilings on the rates pay-
legal practice,
able to their depositors--zero in the case of demand deposits.
Unlike com-
commercial banks cannot seek funds by raising
peting financial industries,
They can and do offer other inducements to depositors, but these
rates
substitutes for interest are
imperfect and uneven in their incidence.
In
these circumstances the major readjustment of the interest rate structure
necessary to increase the relative demand for bank deposits is a decline
in other rates.
Note that either of these differences has to do with the
"money."
quality of bank deposits as
In a world without reserve requirements the preferences of depositors,
as well as those of borrowers, would be very relevant in determining the
The volume of assets and liabilities of every
volume of bank deposits.
competi
intermediary, both nonbanks and banks, would be determined in a
tive equilibrium, where the rate of interest charged borrowers by each kind
of institution just balances at the margin the rate of interest paid its
creditors.
11
Suppose that such an
equilibrium is disturbed by a shift in
savers' preferences.
At prevailing rates they decide to hold more savings
accounts and other nonbank liabilities and less demand deposits
They
transfer demand deposits to the credit of nonbank financial institutions,
providing these intermediaries with the means to seek additional earning
assets
These institutions, finding themselves able to attract more funds
from the public even with some reduction in the rates they pay, offer
better terms to borrowers and bid up the prices of existing earning assets.
Consequently commercial banks release some earning assets--they no longer
yield enough to pay the going rate on the banks' deposit liabilities.
Bank deposits decline with bank assets.
In effect, the nonbank inter-
mediaries favored by the shift in public preferences simply swap the
deposits transferred to them for a corresponding quantity of bank assets.
V.
FOUNTAIN PENS AND PRINTING PRESSES
Evidently the fountain pens of comercial bankers are essentially
different from the printing presses of governments.
Confusion results from
concluding that because bank deposits are like currency in one respect--
both serve as media of exchange--they are like currency in every respect.
Unlike governments, bankers cannot create means of payment to finance
Bank-created "money" is a
their own purchases of goods and services.
liability, which must be matched on the other side of the balance sheet.
And banks,
, as businesses, must earn money from their middlemen's role.
Once created, printing press money cannot be extinguished, except by reversal of the budget policies which led to its birth.The community
12
cannot get rid of its currency supply; the economy must adjust until it is
The "hot potato" analogy truly applies.
willingly absorbed.
For bank-
created money, however, there is an economic mechanism of extinction as
If bank deрosits are
well as creation, contraction as well as expansion.
excessive relative to public preferences, they will tend to decline; other-
wise banks will lose money.
The burden of adaptation is not placed entirely
on the rest of theе еconomy.
THE ROLE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
VI.
Without reserve requirements, expansion of credit and deposits by the
commercial banking system would be limited by the availability of assets at
yields sufficient to compensate banks for the costs of attracting and hold-
ing the corresponding deposits. In a regime of reserve requirements, the
limit which they impose normally cuts the expansion short of this competi-
tive equilibrium.
When reserve requirements and deposit interest rate
ceilings are effective, the marginal yield of bank loans and investments
exceeds the marginal cost of deposits to the banking system.
In these cir-
cumstances additional reserves make it possible and profitable for banks to
acquire additional earning assets.
The expansion process lowers interest
rates generally--enough to induce the public to hold additional deposits but
ordinarily not enough to wipe out the banks' margin between the value and
cost of additional deposits.
It is the existence of this margin--not the monetary nature of bank
liabilities--which makes it possible for the economics teacher to say that
additional loans permitted by new reserves will generate their own deposits.
…
13 -
The same proposition would be true of any other system of financial institu-
tions subject to similar reserve constraints and similar interest rate
ceilings
In this sense it is more accurate to attribute the special place of
banks among intermediaries to the legal restrictions to which banks alone are
subjected than to attribute these restrictions to the special character of
bank liabilities.
But the textbook description of multiple expansion of credit and
given reserve base is misleading
even for a regime of reserve
deposits on a
There is more to the determination of the volume of bank
requirements.
deposits than the arithmetic of reserve supplies and reserve ratios
The
redundant reserves of the thirties are a dramatic reminder that economic
opportunities sometimes prevail over reserve calculations. But the sig-
nificance of that experience is not correctly appreciated if it is regarded
as an aberration from a normal state of affairs in which banks are
simply
fully "loaned up" and total deposits
are tightly linked to the volume of
phenomenon which is
The thirties exemplify in extreme form a
reserves.
always in some degree present:
The use to which commercial banks put the
reserves made available to the system is an economic variable depending
on
lending opportunities and interest rates.
An individual bank is not constrained by any fixed quantum of reserves.
It can obtain additional reserves to meet requirements by borrowing from the
Federal Reserve, by buying "Federal Funds" from other banks, by selling or
1#
running off" short term securities
In short, reserves are available at
price
This cost the bank
the discount window and in the money market, at a
14
must compare with available yields on loans and investments.
If those yields
are low relative to the cost of reserves, the bank will seek to avoid borrow-
ing reserves and perhaps hold excess reserves instead.
If those yields are
high relative to the cost of borrowing reserves, the bank will shun excess
reserves and borrOw reserves occasionally or even
regularly. For the banking
C
system as a whole the Federal Reserve's quantitative controls determine the
supply of unborrowed reserves.
But the extent to which this supply is left
unused,
or supplemented by borrowing at the discount window, depends on the
economic circumstances confronting the banks
-on available lending opportuni-
ties and on the whole structure of interest rates from the Fed's discount
rate through the rates on mortgages and long term securities.
The range of variation in net free reserves in recent years has been
from -5 per cent to +5 per cent of required reserves.
This indicates a much
looser linkage between reserves and deposits than is suggested by the text-
book exposition of multiple expansion for a system which is always precisely
and fully "loaned up.
(It does not mean, however, that actual monetary
authorities have any less control than textbook monetary authorities.
Indeed the net free reserve position is one of their more useful instruments
and barometers
Anyway they are after bigger game than the quantity of
o
"money"
Two consequences of this analysis deserve special notice because of
their relation to the issues raised earlier in this paper. First,
an in-
crease--of, say, a billion dollars--in the supply of unborrowed reserves will,
in general, result in less than a billion dollar increase in required
15
Net free reserves will rise (algebraically) by some fraction of
reserves
the billion dollars-a very large fraction in periods like the thirties,
much smaller one in tight money periods like those of the fifties.
Loans and
deposits will expand by less than their textbook multiples. The reason is
simple. The open market operations which bring about the increased supply of
reserves tend to lower interest rates.
So do the орerations of the commer-
cial banks in trying to invest their new reserves.
The result is to
diminish the incentives of banks to keep fully loaned up or to borrow re-
serves, and to make banks content to hold on the average higher excess
reserves.
Second, depositor preferences do matter, even in a
regime of frac-
tional reserve banking.
Suppose, for example, that the public decides to
switch new or old savings from other assets and institutions into commercial
banks
This switch makes earning assets available to banks at attractive
yields--assets that otherwise would have been lodged either directly with
the public or with the competing financial institutions previously favored
with the public's savings.
These improved opportunities for profitable lend-
ing and investing will make the banks content to hold smaller net free re-
Both their deposits and their assets will rise as a result of this
serves.
shift in public preferences, even
though the base of unborrowed reserves re-
mains unchanged.
Something of this kind has occurred in recent years when
commercial banks have been permitted to raise the interest rates they offer
for time and savings deposits.
16
IIA
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The implications of the "new view" may be summarized as follows
The distinction between commercial banks and other financial inter-
mediaries has been too sharply drawn.
The differences are of degree, not of
kind
In particular, the differences which do exist have little intrinsically
2.
to do with the monetary nature of bank liabilities.
The differences are more importantly related to the special reserve re-
quirements and interest rate ceilings to which banks are subject. Any other
financial industry subject to the same kind of regulations would behave in
much the same way»
4. Commercial banks do not possess, either individually or collectively, a
widow's cruse which guarantees that any expansion of assets will generate a
corresponding expansion off deposit liabilities. Certainly this happy state
of affairs would not exist in an unregulated competitive financial world.
Marshall's scissors of supply and demand apply to the "output" of the bank-
ing industry,
no less than to other financial and nonfinancial industries.
Reserve requirements and interest ceilings give the widow's cruse myth
5.
somewhat greater plausibility. But even in these circumstances, the scale
of bank deposits and assets is affected by depositor preferences and by the
lending and investing opportunities available to banks.
I draw no policy morals from these observations.
That is quite
another story, to which analysis of the type presented here is only the
preface
The reader will misunderstand my purpose if he jumps to attribute
- 17
to me the conclusion that existing differences in the regulatory trestment of
banks and competing intermediaries should be diminished, either by relaxing
constraints on the one or by tightening controls on the other.
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貨幣的均衡分析と内生的貨幣供給
（Adobe PDF）
だの均等関係にかんするヴィクセル流のメカニズムは,現在でもトービン・モデルやブルンナー. =メルツァー・ ..... は,あたかも「ホットポテト」のごとく,財・サービス市場にスピル・オーバーしていくが,信. 用貨幣の場合には ...
https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10291/1918/1/shogakuronso_75_2-3-4_141.pdf
How to Play Hot Potato
以下は違う
https://matome.naver.jp/odai/2142689435535317601
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https://econ101.jp/%E3%83%9B%E3%83%83%E3%83%88%E3%83%9D%E3%83%86%E3%83%88%E5%8A%
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