Stiglitz doesn’t get Modern Monetary Theory.
Joseph Stiglitz wrote an uninspiring guide to reducing the deficit at the end of last year. Here is guide to the main ideas in the paper. He gives seven main ideas, starting on page 1. Brainwave No 1. The first idea is to go for “Public investments that increase tax revenues by more than enough to pay back the principle plus interest reduce long-run deficits.” One flaw in that idea is that worthwhile public investments (and private investments) should be being made ANYWAY – regardless of whether we are in a recession or not. The second problem is that if the investment “increases tax revenues by more than enough to pay back the principle plus interest…” then the investment will withdraw cash from the private sector. In a balance sheet recession that’s plain daft. Or in MMT parlance, the last thing that needs to be done in a recession is to reduce private sector net financial assets. Thirdly, public sector investments often require specialised labour, e.g. highway or bridge construction. A dramatic increase in public sector investment in a recession could be plain impossible or difficult for lack of the relevant skilled labour. But even if it is possible, to dramatically expand one sector of the economy, only to contract it again come the recovery simply distorts the labour market: hardly desirable. The distortion has to be unwound come the recovery. Stiglitz then enlarges on this public sector investment idea under item A in his page 2. Here he claims that public sector investments during a recession a good idea because interest rates are currently low. Well hang on. WHY are interest rates low? It’s because the government / central bank machine has DELIBERATELY lowered them! And those low interest rates have been lowered by printing money and buying government debt. So Stiglitz is saying government should borrow the stuff (i.e. money) which government itself has produced. Well now, why go to all the trouble of dishing out money to the private sector only to borrow it back again???? It would be much simpler just to print money and spend it (in a recession), which is what MMT advocates!!! His next reason under item A for public investment is that given high unemployment, the multiplier from such investment will be high. True. But the same goes for any sort of spending, so this is not specifically a point in favour of investment! MMT beats Stiglitz yet again: MMTers tend to favour payroll tax reductions in a recession. Having expanded the economy via such payroll tax reductions, a portion of the expanded economy will doubtless end up in the form of extra public sector investment. But that’s by the by. Brainwave No 2. Stiglitz’s second brainwave is that “It is better to tax bad things (like pollution) than good things (like work).” Revelation of the century! There was me wondering why we tax alcohol. Now I know. Brainwave No 3. His 3rd idea is that “Economic sustainability requires environmental sustainability. The polluter pay principle—making polluters pay for the costs they impose on others—is good both for efficiency and for equity.” Quite right, but what’s that got to do with deficits or recessions? Absolutely nothing. Again, the above principle applies recession or no recession. Brainwave No 4. This is that “Eliminating corporate welfare is good both for efficiency and for equity.” True, but for the umpteenth time, this has nothing specifically to do with recessions or deficits. Brainwave No 5 This is “Given the increases in inequality and poverty and given the inequitable nature of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, the incidence of any tax increases should be progressive, and there should be no increases in the tax burden on the poorest Americans.” At last: an idea with a small amount of logic! The inequality point is irrelevant in that optimising the level of inequality is a valid aim recession or no recession. But the idea does have a small amount of logic in that the poor have a higher propensity to spend income increases than the rich. Thus transfers of money from rich to poor would be stimulatory. But as far as I can see Stiglitz has not grasped the latter “stimulatory” point: at least I can’t find it in his paper. Getting technical. But even the above stimulatory effect of transferring money from rich to poor is a feeble saving grace for this paper. Reason is that it is a classic example of the “bang per buck” argument – the idea that there is some merit in getting as much employment as possible from each dollar spent. The latter apparent merit is not actually a merit at all because the process of government creating dollars and spending them is virtually costless in real terms. The only important question is: what are the REAL effects of the different options available? The number of dollars that need to be created and spent to effect each option is irrelevant. As Abba Lerner put it (p.39) "government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and repayments of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall all undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions….” (the italicisation of the word “results” is in the original). Stiglitz’s paper thus consists of a series of random ideas, most of which are no good. But when it comes to the one idea that is half valid, the author does not seem to realise why it is half valid. I’ve had enough. I’m can’t be bothered reading beyond Brainwave No 5. .
Joseph Stiglitz wrote an uninspiring guide to reducing the deficit at the end of last year. Here is guide to the main ideas in the paper.He gives seven main ideas, starting on page 1.
Brainwave No 1.
The first idea is to go for “Public investments that increase tax revenues by more than enough to pay back the principle plus interest reduce long-run deficits.”
One flaw in that idea is that worthwhile public investments (and private investments) should be being made ANYWAY – regardless of whether we are in a recession or not.
The second problem is that if the investment “increases tax revenues by more than enough to pay back the principle plus interest…” then the investment will withdraw cash from the private sector. In a balance sheet recession that’s plain daft. Or in MMT parlance, the last thing that needs to be done in a recession is to reduce private sector net financial assets.
Thirdly, public sector investments often require specialised labour, e.g. highway or bridge construction. A dramatic increase in public sector investment in a recession could be plain impossible or difficult for lack of the relevant skilled labour. But even if it is possible, to dramatically expand one sector of the economy, only to contract it again come the recovery simply distorts the labour market: hardly desirable. The distortion has to be unwound come the recovery.
Stiglitz then enlarges on this public sector investment idea under item A in his page 2. Here he claims that public sector investments during a recession a good idea because interest rates are currently low.
Well hang on. WHY are interest rates low? It’s because the government / central bank machine has DELIBERATELY lowered them! And those low interest rates have been lowered by printing money and buying government debt.
So Stiglitz is saying government should borrow the stuff (i.e. money) which government itself has produced. Well now, why go to all the trouble of dishing out money to the private sector only to borrow it back again????
It would be much simpler just to print money and spend it (in a recession), which is what MMT advocates!!!
His next reason under item A for public investment is that given high unemployment, the multiplier from such investment will be high. True. But the same goes for any sort of spending, so this is not specifically a point in favour of investment!
MMT beats Stiglitz yet again: MMTers tend to favour payroll tax reductions in a recession. Having expanded the economy via such payroll tax reductions, a portion of the expanded economy will doubtless end up in the form of extra public sector investment. But that’s by the by.
Brainwave No 2.
Stiglitz’s second brainwave is that “It is better to tax bad things (like pollution) than good things (like work).” Revelation of the century! There was me wondering why we tax alcohol. Now I know.
Brainwave No 3.
His 3rd idea is that “Economic sustainability requires environmental sustainability. The polluter pay principle—making polluters pay for the costs they impose on others—is good both for efficiency and for equity.”
Quite right, but what’s that got to do with deficits or recessions? Absolutely nothing. Again, the above principle applies recession or no recession.
Brainwave No 4.
This is that “Eliminating corporate welfare is good both for efficiency and for equity.” True, but for the umpteenth time, this has nothing specifically to do with recessions or deficits.
Brainwave No 5
This is “Given the increases in inequality and poverty and given the inequitable nature of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, the incidence of any tax increases should be progressive, and there should be no increases in the tax burden on the poorest Americans.”
At last: an idea with a small amount of logic! The inequality point is irrelevant in that optimising the level of inequality is a valid aim recession or no recession. But the idea does have a small amount of logic in that the poor have a higher propensity to spend income increases than the rich. Thus transfers of money from rich to poor would be stimulatory. But as far as I can see Stiglitz has not grasped the latter “stimulatory” point: at least I can’t find it in his paper.
Getting technical.
But even the above stimulatory effect of transferring money from rich to poor is a feeble saving grace for this paper. Reason is that it is a classic example of the “bang per buck” argument – the idea that there is some merit in getting as much employment as possible from each dollar spent.
The latter apparent merit is not actually a merit at all because the process of government creating dollars and spending them is virtually costless in real terms. The only important question is: what are the REAL effects of the different options available? The number of dollars that need to be created and spent to effect each option is irrelevant.
As Abba Lerner put it (p.39) "government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and repayments of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall all undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions….” (the italicisation of the word “results” is in the original).
Stiglitz’s paper thus consists of a series of random ideas, most of which are no good. But when it comes to the one idea that is half valid, the author does not seem to realise why it is half valid.
I’ve had enough. I’m can’t be bothered reading beyond Brainwave No 5.
「中央銀行についての大嘘」by Joseph E. Stiglitz
以下の文は、Joseph E. Stiglitz,”Big Lies about Central Banking“の翻訳になります。2003年の記事ですが内容はタイムリーなものです。誤字・誤訳の指摘はコメント欄にお願いします。
もっぱら物価安定に焦点を当てた独立性ある中央銀行というものが「経済改革」のマントラの中心になっている。他の多くの格言と同じように、それは何回も繰り替えされることによって、信じられていくようになる。だが、それが中央銀行家からのものであれ、ずぶとい断言が研究や分析の代用品になるわけではない。
研究では、中央銀行はインフレに焦点を当てたほうが、インフレをコントロールするのに上手く行くことを示している。だが、インフレをコントロールすることだけが全てではない。それは失業率を低め、より早く、より安定した成長を達成するための一つの手段に過ぎない。
それらこそ重要な真の変数であり、もっぱら物価の安定に焦点を置いた独立した中央銀行家がこれらの本質的な点に関して上手くやれるとする証拠はほとんどない。2001年に私とノーベル賞を共同受賞したジョージ・アカロフと彼の同僚はゼロ以上になる最適なインフレ率が存在すると力強く論じている。だから、無慈悲に物価の安定を追及してしまうことは実際には経済成長や幸福にとって害になる。最近の研究では、物価の安定に目標を置くことで、インフレと失業のトレードオフが小さくなるという主張ですら疑問が呈されている。
インフレに焦点を合わせることは、長いインフレの歴史を持つ国々では意味があるかもしれないが、日本などそれ以外の国では意味がない。アメリカの中央銀行である連邦準備銀行は物価の安定だけを保証するのではなく、経済成長と完全雇用を促進する責務も負っている。アメリカでは、ヨーロッパ中央銀行(ECB)のような狭い責務を採用しないことに広範なコンセンサスがある。今日、ヨーロッパの成長が低迷しているのは、ECBが景気回復を促進することもなく、インフレという一つの責務に焦点を当てるよう制限されているからだ。
その制度的仕組みから利益を受ける専門家や金融市場関係者などは、独立した中央銀行の美徳と金融政策を政治的駆け引きの枠外に置かれた技術的な事柄として扱う必要性を、多くの国々に納得させるのに目覚しい役割を果たしてきた。これは中央銀行家のやることが、例えば支払い決算のソフトウェアを選ぶようなものだけであるのならそうかもしれない。
だが、中央銀行は、経済成長や失業率を含む社会の全ての面に影響を与える決定をしている。そこにはトレードオフがあるのだから、その決断を下すのは政治的なプロセスの一部としてのみ可能なことだ。
長期的にはトレードオフなどないという人もいる。だが、ケインズも言ったように、長期的には我々はみな死んでいる。たとえ、インフレに火をつけることなく臨界点以下に失業を下げることが不可能だとしても、その臨界点がどこかについては不確実性がある。それゆえに、リスクは避けられない:金融政策をあまりにも緩和してしまうことには、インフレの危険性がある。それをあまりにも引き締めてしまうと、無益な失業を生み出す可能性がある。どちらであれ、それにより苦しむ人々がいる。
1990年代、アメリカの経済成長が急上昇している間、クリントン政権は、社会的利益―福祉の役割の低下や暴力事件の減少といった――を直接的な経済的利益に加えた場合、失業率を押し下げる危険を冒す価値があると考えた。それとは対照的に、IMFは金融政策を引き締めるよう推奨したが、それはIMFが失業のコストを過小に見積もり、付随的な社会的利益を減少させることには見たところまったく評価しない一方で、潜在的なインフレのコストを過大に見積もっていたからだ。
クリントン政権の経済諮問委員会の経済分析は正しかったことが明らかになっている。IMF(そしてFRB)のモデルは間違っていた。アメリカはインフレを引き起こすことなく、失業率の大幅な減少を成し遂げた――最終的には失業率は4%以下に下がった。
だが、それがポイントなのではない。ポイントは、確実なことは誰にも言えないということだ。予測されたリスクは常に避けられない。そのことによる負担を誰が負うかは政策によって異なるものになるので、その決断を下すのを中央銀行の専門的技術者に委ねることはできない――少なくとも、そうすべきではない。民主主義と矛盾しない中央銀行やその他意思決定機関の独立性の度合いについては正当な議論があるものの、そこでなされる決定によって生活に影響を受ける人々の考えがそれを決める過程で取り入れられるべきだ。
一例を挙げれば、中央銀行が過度に引き締め政策をとることで多くが損失を被ってしまう労働者は会議で席を持っていない。だが、金融市場関係者――失業からはほとんど損失を受けないが、インフレの悪影響を受ける――には決まって発言権がある。だが、金融市場関係者が技術的適任性に関して独占権を持っているわけでは全くない。
実際、金融界の多くの人はマクロ経済的システムの入り組んだ作用についてほとんど理解していない――そのことは彼らがマクロ経済を操作しようとした時しばしば間違いを犯すことからも証明されている。例えば、1945年以来、ほとんどのアメリカの景気後退は、FRBがブレーキを踏みすぎたために起こっている。同様に、1970年代後期と1980年代早期にいくつかの中央銀行が熱情を持ってマネタリズムを採用したが、根底にある理論の信用を損ねる統計的証拠が積み上がってしまうことになった。
共通通貨のメリットがなんであれ、ユーロを採用することについて協議したヨーロッパの人々はEUの将来を、その欠点がどんどん明らかになりつつある制度的仕組みと結びつけることがどういうことか考えるべきだった。同様に、発展途上国は中央銀行の独立性のことだけを考えるのではなく、中央銀行の責務や代表性についても考えるべきだ。彼らは経済的効率性についての関心と民主的な説明責任とのバランスをとる必要がある。
多くの新生民主主義国家の市民は困惑している。最初、新たな体制の美徳が賞賛されるが、後になって、彼らが最も気にしているマクロ経済政策の決定に関しては民主主義のプロセスに任せるには重要すぎるのだと言われてしまう。市民たちはポピュリズム(人々の意思という意味だろうか?)の危険性について警告を受けることになる。
安易な答えは存在しない。だが、あまりにも多くの国で、その代替案について民主的な議論すら行われていない。
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