Bernie Sanders' Economic Adviser Stephanie Kelton on His 2020 Run
Stephanie Kelton, a senior economic adviser to Bernie Sanders' presidential campaign, discusses the Democratic presidential candidate's economic vision. She speaks with David Westin on "Bloomberg: Balance of Power." (Source: Bloomberg)
Conflict theory of inflation and inflationary biases A series of articles in the journal Marxism Today in 1974 illustrated the proposition that inflation was the result of a distributional conflict between workers and capital. These articles were written with reference to the early 1970s, when inflation rates rose in many Western economies. One article by Pat Devine stated that the inflation process was a structural construct embedded in the intrinsic capital labour conflict. He argued that the increased bargaining power of workers (that accompanied the long period of full employment in the post-Second World War period) and the declining productivity growth in the early 1970s imparted a structural bias towards inflation which was manifested in the inflation breakout in the mid-1970s that “ended the golden age.” He further claimed that the prolonged growth of money wages was “unprecedented in the history of capitalism” (Devine, 1974: 80). Capitalists increased prices to maintain profitability and thus countered the attempt to raise real wages. Large, oligopolistic firms with price setting power engaged in non-price competition (for example, product quality). These firms, however, were interdependent because their market shares were sensitive to their pricing strategies. When a firm was faced with nominal wage demands, its management knew that its rivals would face similar pressure and that their competitive positions would not depend on the absolute price level while the government continued to ensure that effective demand was sufficient to maintain full employment. On the other hand, a firm could lose market share if it increased prices while other firms maintained lower prices. As a result, firms had little incentive to resist the wage demands of their workers and strong incentives to protect their profits by passing on the demands in the form of higher prices. This structural depiction of inflation as being embedded in the class dynamics of capital and labour, both of which had increased capacity to set prices and defend their real shares of income, implicates Keynesian-style approaches to full employment. There was also an international component to the structural theory. It was argued that the Bretton Woods system (see Chapter 9) imparted deflationary forces on economies that were experiencing strong domestic demand growth. As national income rose and imports increased, central banks were obliged to tighten monetary policy to maintain the agreed exchange rate parity and the constraints on monetary growth acted to choke off incompatible claims on the available income. However, when the Bretton Woods system of convertible currencies and fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1971, the structural biases towards inflation came to the fore with floating exchange rates. Devine (1974: 86) argued that:
《floating exchange rates have been used as an additional weapon available to the state. Given domestic -inflation, floating rates provide a degree of flexibility in dealing with the resultant pressure on the external payments -position. However, if a float is to be effective in stabilising a payments imbalance it is likely to involve lower real incomes at home. If a reduction in real wages (or their rate of growth) is not acquiesced in there will then be -additional pressure for higher money wages and if this cannot be contained the rate of inflation will increase and there will be further depreciation. 》
The structuralist view also noted that the mid-1970s crisis, which marked the end of the Keynesian period, was not only marked by rising inflation but also by an ongoing profit squeeze due to declining productivity growth and increasing external competition for market share. The profit squeeze led to firms reducing their rate of investment (which reduced aggregate demand growth), which combined with harsh contractions in monetary and fiscal policy, created the stagflation that bedevilled the world in the second half of the 1970s. The resolution to the structural bias proposed by economists depended on their ideological persuasion. On the one hand, those who identified themselves as Keynesians proposed incomes policies (which we shall explore in more detail later in this chapter) as a way of mediating the distributional struggle and achieving nominal income claims that were compatible with the available output. On the other hand, the emerging Monetarists considered the problem to be an abuse of market power by the trade unions and this motivated demands for policymakers to legislate to reduce the bargaining power of workers. The rising unemployment was also not opposed by capital because it was seen as a vehicle for undermining the capacity of the trade unions to make wage demands. From the mid-1970s, the combined weight of persistently high unemployment and increased policy attacks on trade unions in many advanced nations reduced the inflation spiral as workers were unable to pursue real wages growth, and productivity growth outstripped real wages growth. As a result, there was a substantial redistribution of income towards profits during this period. The rise of Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the USA exemplified the increasing dominance of the Monetarist view in the 1980s.
(The author is a Lecturer in Economics at Manchester University)
The phenomenon in need of explanation is not
inflation in the abstract but inflation in the world of
state monopoly capitalism in the period since the
second world war. Two questions arise. First,
throughout this period inflation has been chronic
in all the major capitalist countries; why has it
replaced depression as the principal "economic"
problem confronting the capitalist system as a whole?
Second, within this overall framework, why has the
rate of inflation varied, both between countries and
at different times ? This paper is mainly concerned
with the first question, although in the course of
discussing it the major influences believed to be
relevant to the second are isolated.
Section I is concerned with Marx's basic model,
necessary modifications to it and some thoughts on
the "historical and moral" element in the value of
labour power in the post-war context. Section II
looks at the international nature of the capitalist
system, the central role of the state and the relation-
ship between state policies and theories of inflation.
' This paper was presented to a Conference on "Money
and Inflation" organised by the Conference of Socialist
Economists in November 1973. An earlier version was
presented to a Conference on "Intlation" organised by
the Economic Committee of the Communist Party in
February 1973. I have drawn heavily on the work of Bill
Warren and on discussions with Phil Leeson, David
Purdy, Roger Simon and lan Steadman.
PRODUCE
LECTRONIC REPR
University)
Section 1I attempis a summary interpretation of
British inflationary experience in the post-war
period in terms of the approach developed in the
earlier sections.
It is important to relate recent inflationary
experience, and successive developments in Labour
and Tory policy, to a Marxist analysis of post-war
experience as a whole. This is especially so since
inflation has ceased to be primarily an "economic"
problem and has become a major socio-political
problem. If it is not done, the working class will
continually find itself placed on the defensive,
making opportunistic use at any given moment of
contingent, ad hoc, even false "explanations" of
inflation which are unrelated to fundamental
analysis of the distinctive features of modern
capitalism.
I. CAPITALISM, EXPLOITATION AND THE
LABOUR MARKET
Marx's Model: Competitive Capitalism
In Marx's analysis of capitalist production,
exploitation takes the form of the appropriation by
the capitalist of the surplus value produced by the
worker, i.e., the value in excess of the value of the
worker's labour power. The model assumes equili-
brium. In equilibrium, competition between capi-
talists has enforced equal profit rates and the sale of
ミッチェル 2 Henry, J.F. (2012) The Making of Neoclassical Economics, Routledge Revivals, Abingdon:Taylor & Francis.
17 References Devine, P. (1974) “Inflation and Marxist Theory”, Marxism Today, March, 79–92. Hume, D. (1752) “Of Money”, in D. Hume (ed.), Political Discourses, Edinburgh: Fleming.
Modern Monetary Theory–what is new about it?–Part 2 (long) OM Menu - bilbo.economicoutlook.net … While MMT clearly owes a legacy to the past influences (Marx through Lerner and beyond) it has also uniquely brought together the characteristics of the currency with the theoretical challenge to … Devine, P. (1974) 'Inflation and Marxist Theory', Marxism Today, March, 70–92 … 関連記事
雑誌 Marxism today / Communist Party. 1957-1991 London : Communist Party of Great Britain Vol. 1, no.1 (Oct. 1957)-v. 35, no. 12 (Dec. 1991-Jan. 1992). 李健煕記念図書室(政治経済学術院研究図書室) 政経研究-Gブロック (PERIODICALS) で利用可
マイクロ資料 Marxism today [microform]. 1957- London : Communist Party [of Great Britain] Vol. 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1957)- Ceased with issue for Jan. 1992? 李健煕記念図書室(政治経済学術院研究図書室) 政経研究-Gブロック (MF 44(09)) で利用可
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
Although I have seen the "can't push on a string" metaphor attributed to John Maynard Keynes in a number of places, I haven't seen an actual primary source where Keynes used the phrase. (拙訳) 「紐を押すことはできない」という比喩がケインズに帰せられるのを数多く目にしてきたが、ケインズがそのフレーズを用いた実際の一次的なソースを目にしたことはない。
Governor Eccles: Under present circumstances there is very little, if anything, that can be done. Mr. Goldsborough: You mean you cannot push a string. Governor Eccles: That is a good way to put it, one cannot push a string. We are in the depths of a depression and, as I have said several times before this committee, beyond creating an easy money situation through reduction of discount rates and through the creation of excess reserves, there is very little, if anything that the reserve organization can do toward bringing about recovery. I believe that in a condition of great business activity that is developing to a point of credit inflation monetary action can very effectively curb undue expansion. Mr. Brown: That is a case of pulling the string. Governor Eccles: Yes. Through reduction of discount rates, making cheap money and creating excess reserves, there is also a possibility of stopping deflation, particularly if that power is used combined with this broadening of eligibility requirement.
(拙訳)
エクルズ議長((Taylorがリンクした[http //www.federalreservehistory.org/People/DetailView/75:title=こちらのサイト]によると、「Marriner S. Eccles was appointed chairman (called “governor” before 1935) of the Federal Reserve Board on November 15, 1934.」との由。エクルズについてはこちらのエントリも参照。)):現状ではできることは殆どありません。 ゴールズボロー氏 紐は押せないということですね。 エクルズ議長 紐は押せない、というのは良い表現ですね。我々は不況の深みに嵌っており、本委員会の前にも何度か申し上げた通り、公定歩合の引き下げや超過準備の創造によって金融を緩和的な状況にすること以上に、準備銀行が回復をもたらすためにできることは殆どありません。企業活動が非常に活発になり、信用インフレが発生するに至った状況においては、金融政策行動は、行き過ぎた拡大を極めて効果的に抑えることができる、と私は思います。 ブラウン氏(([https //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prentiss_M._Brown:title=Prentiss M. Brown](民主党、ミシガン)。)):それは紐を引くケースですね。 エクルズ議長 そうです。公定歩合の引き下げ、低金利、超過準備の創造によりデフレを止める可能性も存在します。殊に、適格要件*3の拡大とセットでそうした権限が行使された場合には。 このやり取りについて、Taylorは、以下のように補足している。
Later in the hearings, several other speakers refer back to the "push on a string" comment, which clearly had some resonance. (拙訳) この後のヒアリングで、他の幾人かの発言者も、先の「紐を押す」コメントに言及している。この言葉は明らかに幾ばくかの共鳴をもたらしたようである。
These points, where a further increase in effective demand in terms of money is liable to cause a discontinuous rise in the wage-unit, might be deemed, from a certain point of view, to be positions of semi-inflation, having some analogy (though a very imperfect one) to the absolute inflation (cf. Chapter 21 below ) which ensues on an increase in effective demand in circumstances of full employment. They have, moreover, a good deal of historical importance. But they do not readily lend themselves to theoretical generalisations.
• MMT is about replacing an artificial budget constraint with a real resource constraint-i.e. inflation ・ MMTは、人為的な予算制約を実質的な資源制約、すなわちインフレに置き換えることを目的としています。
MMT is about replacing an artificial fake phony imaginary budget constraint with a real resource constraint with an inflation constraint. MMTとは、人工的な偽物の架空の予算制約を、実際の資源制約とインフレ制約に置き換えることです。
MMT is about replacing an artificial fake phony imaginary budget constraint with a real resource constraint with an inflation constraint. MMTとは、人工的な偽物の架空の予算制約を、実際の資源制約とインフレ制約に置き換えることです。
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y8_vo01Of0Q/Xgr9qnLIaFI/AAAAAAABp2s/KAvHxYO3WXE8L2hRb8WfoE93DFmvS8D4QCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6 上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
第二次大戦後のアメリカの物価上昇率は凄まじかった
参照伊東政吉論考
https://www.seijo.ac.jp/pdf/faeco/kenkyu/125/125-itou.pdf
しかし(電化製品の低価格化と共に)実質賃金が上昇したので
そこまで問題にならなかったとされる
金ピカ本におけるレイの発言などはここの数字が頭にあるのだろう
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTAEs3B9JkNWcVChmxARmzczJfHwNBalX0vY21MZQy49ZTB_mba4XlEhsgugnox-Yk9GkziFl0maQbmKMYcWep3WWpvGkWH9Bk5hFSB_aiwNeJe9hCBM-AWo_FsQ5Vrm_goTeW/s1600/IMG_7785.JPG
Lester V. Chandler, Inflation in the United States, 1940-1948, 1951, p. 6
上の本(のp.216)を伊東は参照
さらに中野剛志発言の元ネタは以下だが、
「政府は好きなだけ支出ができる 借金5千兆円でも大丈夫」
<朝日新聞デジタル>
2019年5月7日07時00分
日本の対GDP国債残高を太平洋戦争の戦費(その当時の対GDP比)のように約9倍にすると5千兆円になる。
参考:
結局、借金大国日本は財政破綻を迎えるのか | 小宮一慶の会計でわかる日本経済の論点 | 東洋経済オンライン | 社会をよくする経済ニュース
2015
https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/97230?page=2
《戦争には、多額のお金が必要です。太平洋戦争(日中戦争を含む)に投入された戦費の総額は、当時の金額で1935億円。
日中戦争開戦当時のGDPは約228億円ですから、その8.5倍にも上ります。現在の状況に当てはめると、2015年の名目GDP
の推計値は約500兆円ですから、約4250兆円の国費を使ったことになります。この戦費を税金だけではとても賄いきれませ
んから、国債で調達しました。》
(小宮の数字は2015年度換算)
中野には上の数字が念頭にあったのだろう。