Speaker bios –講師略歴– Galbraith, James K. Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations Professor of Government Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin Professor Galbraith holds degrees from Harvard and Yale (Ph.D. in economics, 1981). He studied as a Marshall Scholar at King's College, Cambridge in 1974-1975, and then served in several positions on the staff of the U.S. Congress, including executive director of the Joint Economic Committee. He directed the LBJ School's Ph.D. Program in Public Policy from 1995 to 1997. He directs the University of Texas Inequality Project, an informal research group based at the LBJ School. Galbraith's new books are Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just Before the Great Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2012) and The End of Normal: The Great Crisis and the Future of Growth (Simon & Schuster, 2014). Previous books include The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, 2008), Created Unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (Free Press, 1998) and Balancing Acts: Technology, Finance and the American Future (Basic Books, 1989). Inequality and Industrial Change: A Global View (Cambridge University Press, 2001), is co-edited with Maureen Berner. He has co-authored two textbooks, The Economic Problem with the late Robert L. Heilbroner and Macroeconomics with William Darity, Jr. He is a managing editor of Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. Galbraith is a member of the Lincean Academy, the oldest honorary scientific society in the world. He is a senior scholar of the Levy Economics Institute and chair of the Board of Economists for Peace and Security, a global professional network. He writes frequently for policy magazines and the general press. ジョン・ケネス・ガルブレイス テキサス大学オースチン校 ロイド・ミラード・ベンツェンJr チェア 産官関係学 教授 リンドン・B・ジョンソン公共政策研究科 政治学 教授 ハーバード大学ならびにイェール大学大学院にて学位を修める（1981年に経済学博士）。 1974～75年の１年間、マーシャル奨学生としてケンブリッジ大学キングス・カレッジに学んだ後、上下両院合同経済委員会などといった米国連邦議会スタッフとして勤務。 95～97年にテキサス大学リンドン・B・ジョンソン（LBJ）公共政策研究科の博士課程を指導、現在は、LBJに本拠を置く「テキサス大学不平等プロジェクト（University of Texas Inequality Project: UTIP）という非公式の研究グループを指揮している。 近著には、『Inequality and Instability』 オックスフォード大学出版 2012年（邦訳：『格差と不安定のグローバル経済学―ガルブレイスの現代資本主義論』、明石書店、2014年10月）、 『The End of Normal』サイモン＆シュスター社 2014年（未邦訳）、などがある。 その他、『The Predator State』（Free Press, 2008）、『Created Unequal』（Free Press, 1998）、『Balancing Acts』（Basic Books, 1989）、そしてモーリン・ベルナーとの共著に『Inequality and Industrial Change』（ケンブリッジ大学出版, 2001）がある。教科書として執筆したものには、故ロバート・L. ハイルブローナーとの共著で『Economic Problem』、ウィリアム・ダリティ・ジュニアとの共著で『Macroeconomics』 （邦訳：『現代マクロ経済学』、阪急コミュニケーションズ 、1998年）がある。 ジャーナル誌『Structural Change and Economic Dynamics』の編集長。 世界で最も古く名誉ある科学アカデミーであるアッカデーミア・デイ・リンチェイ（注：ローマのコルシーニ宮殿にある学会で、かつてガリレオ・ガリレイも会員であった）の会員。世界的な専門家ネットワークであるレヴィ経済研究所・平和と安全保障を考える経済学者の会においては委員長をつとめている。政策関連の専門誌やその他一般的なメディア等においても頻繁に執筆活動を行っている。 8
james our final question for you as we
do with all of our guests our final
question is the question from hell the
question we hate to ask you might hate
to answer
or our audience might hate your response
is
modern monetary theory a trojan horse
for socialism?
oh i kind of hope so yeah
um no i um okay i'll tell you my trojan
horror story that uh.
i had a chance to spend some time in
2010
with a pres last president of the soviet
union mikhail gorbachev and
uh con small conference in italy.
and i i
said
i said mr president when homer returns
uh to tell the story of his our time now.
he will he will say
that the russian mathematicians rode out
of moscow in the early 1990s
presented themselves to the gates of
wall street bearing the gift of
quantitative risk management models.
they
were received with
joy they came inside they set to work
and in
less than 20 years they succeeded in
destroying the whole place.
and so i said so mr president not only
will you be credited with the fall
downfall of soviet communism but also
that of western financial capitalism.
then looked at me and smiled and said
i've been accused of worse.
huh
wow that might be the best
answer to a question from hell we've
ever had james i cannot thank you enough
for being back on our show
i promise we'll have you back on before
2034.
all of your writing has been really
enlightening and i really appreciate you
being on the show.
i'll try to hang around at least till
then.
i will too i think
it's going to be quite a race thank you
so much james okay a pleasure
take care.
The End of Normal: The Great Crisis and the Future of Growth
著者: James K. Galbraith
Epilogue
When Homer Returns
In the summer of 2009, I attended a seminar sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation and held in a small hotel in the hills of Umbria, near the town of Perugia, Italy. I was the only American present. There was one Italian and the rest—about a dozen—were friends and colleagues from the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Moscow School of Economics. When the moment came for my remarks, I addressed President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—the last president of a disappeared country—directly: “Mr. President, when Homer returns to write the history of our epoch, he will say that the Russian mathematicians swept out of Muscovy in 1991 and presented themselves before the gates of Wall Street, bearing the gift of quantitative risk management models. They were received with joy, set to work, and in twenty years had destroyed the place entirely. It was, he will say, the greatest Trojan horse operation since Troy.” Gorbachev responded: “I’ve been accused of worse.”
The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, now two decades back, is a distant event to most Americans. Most decided long ago that it was the inevitable failure of an inferior system, forgetting (if they ever knew) just how much fear that system had instilled in us only a few decades before. Or they remember it as the triumph of Reaganism: the great success of an arms race that somehow broke the Soviet bank. In either case, the moral of the episode is reassuring. To American minds, it demonstrates the superiority of capitalism as we know it. This is a fairy tale for children. In reality, at its peak, the real Soviet Union was a superpower like modern Europe and in some ways like the United States. It had been the world’s “first successful developmental dictatorship”—in the phrase of Adam Tooze, a premier scholar of the Nazi war economy—having built an entire industrial heartland beyond the reach of the German army in 1941. In the 1980s, the USSR was the world’s largest producer of (among other things) steel, nickel, wheat, cotton, and natural gas. It was (and its successor states remain) highly urbanized. It had its own aviation industry, space program, and a vast nuclear industry and arsenal with secret cities to support them, not to mention trains, subways, health care, universities, and high culture. “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons”—a common postcollapse gibe—it was not.
Listen. to worry is human.To worry unnecessarily is neurotic. We have plenty of things to worry about. And the issue that divides professor. Turn andmyself from our opponents isn't really deficits or national debt. The issue that divides us is whether we have the capacity to address the important problems that actually face us whether we have the capacity to stabilize our economy in the face of apandemic and to deal with the public health challenges whether we have the capacity to reduce unemployment whether we can cope with climate change whether we can address inequality and the legacies of racial divide in our countries. These are the issuesthat are in front of us. Our opponents say no we can't do that. There are mysterious reasons of high finance why this is impossible. To quote John Maynard Keynes from another epic abra would rise cadabra would come down.But this is not the way the world actually is. We have seen as I've said many times so far in this debate from this year's experience from the experience of the past four years from the experience of the past 40 years that yes we can address these problems if we havethe will. The organization the capacity and the determination to do them. We can't do it if we say oh now that some mysterious financial reason why we can't.
That's our opponents position that their position is really that they don't want to address these problems. We do. And we say once again if we can actually achieve this we can afford it. Finance is a bookkeeping matterfor our countries. It is a matter that's important but it is not a constraint. And people should stop worrying about things that are not important so that they can focus their will and the attention on things that truly are. Thank you.
In contrast to “deficit hawks” who want spending cuts and revenue increases now in order to temper the deficit, and “deficit doves” who want to hold off on austerity measures until the economy has recovered, Galbraith is a deficit owl. Owls certainly don’t think we need to balance the budget soon. Indeed, they don’t concede we need to balance it at all. Owls see government spending that leads to deficits as integral to economic growth, even in good times.
The term isn’t Galbraith’s. It was coined by Stephanie Kelton, a professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, who with Galbraith is part of a small group of economists who have concluded that everyone — members of Congress, think tank denizens, the entire mainstream of the economics profession — has misunderstood how the government interacts with the economy. If their theory — dubbed “Modern Monetary Theory” or MMT — is right, then everything we thought we knew about the budget, taxes and the Federal Reserve is wrong.
MMT is a relatively new approach that builds on the insights of John Maynard Keynes, Karl Marx, A. Mitchell Innes, Georg F. Knapp, Abba Lerner, Hyman Minsky, Wynne Godley, and many others. It “stands on the shoulders of giants”, so to speak. (Wray,2012)
ポスト・ケインジアンには新古典派生産者理論の欠陥について言うことが山ほどある。特に、ほとんどの企業が限界主義の価格決定理論（marginalist theories of pricing）によって、どうやら完全に当惑してしまっているのだから。そういうことから、ＰＫのアプローチはずっと単純で、実際に観察されるビジネス慣行ともより調和的だ。（以前に書いたように、限界主義的な見方は農業とはより親和的かもしれないけれど、工業とはかけ離れている。）
price anchon19。6 1rnpact on the Phillips CurveWewillnowexaminetheimpactoftheintrOductionOfajGonthetraditionalPh‖lips curve trade´o「Consider Figure 19.3.ln a Ph‖lips curve、vorld,imagine that the unemployment rate vvas at υRA and theinЯa‐tion rate was IA・The fu‖emp10yment unemployment rate is tJRFtlと['WhiCh denotes frictiOnal unemploymentThe governmentis under pressure to reduce the excessive unennploソment・lfit increased aggregate demand′wage´wage and wage´price pressures would d面ve the innation rate up to lB(a movement along the Phillips curvefrom Point A to Point 3)and aChieve fu‖employment.Hovrevet there is no guarantee that the inttatiOn rate would remain stable at lB.Certainl"the NAIR∪modelwould predict that bargaining agents would incorporate the new higherinlation rate into their expectations and
6フィリップス曲線上の1npactウェストノウハミンアミノハイムパクトのためのスリップ曲線トレード曲線図19.3.lnを考慮して、フィリップス曲線、vorldを考えると、失業率vvasは「失」率となります。 総失業率を減らすために政府は圧力をかけられている。総需要の賃金と賃金の圧力の圧力を増加させることができれば、金利上昇はポンド（フィリップスに沿った動き）になる ポイントAからポイント3）への曲線とa a a h ave fuloyの雇用。インタビュー率が1 Bで安定したままであるという保証はない。
the Phillips curve would start moving out.VVhether that happens in reality is nOt re!evant here(we cOnsideredthose issuesin Chapter 18).lf the government initia‖y responded to the excessive unemployment at Point/ヽby intiOduCing aりG it couldabsorb workers in iobs cOmmensurate with the difFerence between υRA and υRFυιし'although in reality as morework became available,workers from outJde the labour force(the hidden unemployed)would also takeりG jobsin preference tO remaining withoutincOme.But、へ/hatever the quantum of workers that would initia‖y be absorbed in thejG pooしthe ecOnomy wouldmovefrom A to A,G ratherthan from A to B.in other words,the introduction of the jG elinlinates the Ph‖‖ps curve.The macroeconomic opportun´ities facing the government are not dictated by a perceived unemployment and inЯatiOn trade´ofF whichmight be unstable(asin a NAIRU world).Ratheらfu‖ennployment and price stab‖ity go hand in hand.Beniamin Graham wrote in the 1930s about the idea of stabilising pttces and standards ofliving by surplusstorage.He documents how a government might deal with surplus production in the economy:″[The]State maydeal with actual or threatened surplusin one offour ways(a)by preVendngit(b)by deStroying it(c)by dump´ing it or(d)by conserving itr′Graham(193フ:18)Jn the COntext ofan excess supply oflabouらgovernments nowtend to choose the dumping strategy via the unemployment bufFer stOck approach(the NAIRU).HoWeveぅit isless wasteful to use the conservation approach,which is renected in the lG framework.ThejG approach is alsobased on the maintenance ofa variable bufer stOck ofjobsin‖ne with Яuctuationsin private demand.Howevetthe weaknesses ofthe ag百cultural scheme do not apply to ajG First,if there is a price guarantee(theりG wage)below the prevailing market price,and a bufFer stock of working hours which is designed to absorb the excesssupply oflabour at the jG wage,then a form offu‖employment can be generated Without tinkering with theprlce structure.Second′the incentives to overproduce in commodity bufFer stock systems do not apply to maintenance ofalabour bufFer stOck because no one is concerned that ennployed、vorkers wou!d have more children than unem´ployed vvorkers.
同総裁は先進各国・地域の中銀がインフレ率を目標付近で維持することの難しさを、低金利による 金融政策への足かせと関連付け、インフレ期待が上向かない場合は「中銀が将来、インフレ目標からさ らに離れたところからスタートすることになって、行動の余地が一段と狭まることを意味する」と付け加えた。 原題：Williams Says Fed Should Act Quickly When Stimulus Need Arises、 New York Fed: Williams’ Speech Not About Potential Policy Action（抜粋）
You know the deficit hawks. Now meet the deficit owls. - The Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/you-know-the-deficit-hawks-now-meet-the-deficit-owls/2011/08/25/gIQAHsoONR_blog.html 2012 You know the deficit hawks. Now meet the deficit owls.
About 11 years ago, James K. “Jamie” Galbraith recalls, hundreds of his fellow economists laughed at him. To his face. In the White House. A discounted poster presenting US dollars bills in circulation is seen in the visitor center of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in Washington on August 09, 2011. (MLADEN ANTONOV/AFP/GETTY IMAGES) What’s more, his father, John Kenneth Galbraith, was the most famous economist of his generation: a Harvard professor, best-selling author and confidante of the Kennedy family. Jamie has embraced a role as protector and promoter of the elder’s legacy. But if Galbraith stood out on the panel, it was because of his offbeat message. Most viewed the budget surplus as opportune: a chance to pay down the national debt, cut taxes, shore up entitlements or pursue new spending programs.
The term isn’t Galbraith’s. It was coined by Stephanie Kelton, a professor at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, who with Galbraith is part of a small group of economists who have concluded that everyone — members of Congress, think tank denizens, the entire mainstream of the economics profession — has misunderstood how the government interacts with the economy. If their theory — dubbed “Modern Monetary Theory” or MMT — is right, then everything we thought we knew about the budget, taxes and the Federal Reserve is wrong.
M はある期間中の任意の時点tにおける流通貨幣（通貨）の総量 V は貨幣の"流通速度"（特定期間内に人々のあいだで受け渡しされる回数：貨幣の回転率のようなもの）売買契約の約定回数 P はある期間中の任意の時点tにおける物価水準（通常は基準年度を1としたデフレータ） Q は"取引量" （特定期間内に人々のあいだで行われる取引量(quantity)の合計）
ジョン・ロック 『利子・貨幣論』 1692年 Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising the Value of Money, by John Locke 1691 http://nam-students.blogspot.jp/2017/03/some-considerations-of-lowering-of.html@
貨幣数量説 - Wikipedia https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/貨幣数量説
1327: What do we do with MMT? / James K. Galbraith ポッドキャストエピソード 1327: What do we do with MMT? / James K. Galbraith This Is Hell! 2021 4月26日 69 分
エピソードの内容 Economist James K. Galbraith on modern monetary theory, public spending and possibility of post-neoliberal policy, and his article "Who's Afraid of MMT?" for Project Syndicate.https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-central-bankers-fear-modern-monetary-theory-by-james-k-galbraith-2020-12
以下も参照
MMT(現代貨幣理論）で解ける財政問題: 目からウロコの解決策 Kindle版
ガルブレイスによる教科書はポストケインジアン入門として必携
ケインズ一般理論におけるニュートンとアインシュタインの含意を真面目に扱っている
通常は自明のものにしてしまうが
ミッチェル2019より先に読むべきだ
＿＿＿＿
Ｉ Ｓ ／ Ｌ Ｍ図表は 、 Ｇ Ｎ Ｐ （国民総生産 ）と利子率が Ｉ Ｓ曲線 （財市場の均衡を示す ）と Ｌ Ｍ曲線 （貨幣市場の均衡を示す ）の交点によって同時に決定されることを教えてくれるが 、ケインジアンとマネタリストの違いは 、 Ｉ Ｓ曲線と Ｌ Ｍ曲線の形状にかかわっているという 。すなわち 、マネタリスト （古典派も同様 ）が 、 Ｌ Ｍ曲線がほとんど垂直であるようなケース （貨幣の流通速度がほとんど限界に達しており 、投機的動機に基づく貨幣需要がほとんど存在しない ）を想定しているのに対して 、ケインズやケインジアンは 、 Ｌ Ｍ曲線がほとんど水平 （いわゆる 「流動性の罠 」の状態 ） 、かつ Ｉ Ｓ曲線がほとんど垂直であるようなケ ースを想定しているというのである 。サムエルソンは 、次のように解説している （ ＊ 2 5 ） 。
「ヒックス＝ハンセン図は 、財政政策と金融政策 、所得決定の理論 、それに貨幣理論の全部を総合することに成功している 。それはさらに 、貨幣の流通速度についての明確な一般理論を提供することにより 、マネタリストとケインジアンのマクロ経済理論を総合するのにも役立っている 。すなわち重要な意味において 、マネタリストの反革命は 、 Ｌ Ｍおよび Ｉ Ｓの形についての論争に帰してしまうのである 。 」
＊ 2 4 … …出典は 、ポ ール ・ Ａ ・サムエルソン 『経済学 （第十一版 ） 』都留重人訳 、上巻 （岩波書店 、一九八一年 ）三七二ペ ージ 。
＊ 2 5 … …前同 。
参考：
Kelton and Krugman on IS-LM and MMT Jo MichellMarch 6, 2019
https://nam-students.blogspot.com/2019/06/kelton-and-krugman-on-is-lm-and-mmt-jo.html
MP曲線の方がポストケインジアン的には重要だ
ガルブレイス
1998年351頁
第7章
利潤の決定要因
[(1933) 1954]
単純化されたモデルにおける利潤の理論
まず最初に,政府支出と課税を無視することができる封鎖経済における利潤
の決定要因について考察しよう。そうすると,粗国民生産物は,(固定資本と
在庫への)粗投資と消費の合計に等しいであろう。事実上税金は支払われてい
ないので,粗国民生産物の価値は労働者と資本家の間で分割されるであろう。
労働者の所得は賃金と俸給から成る。資本家の所得,すなわち粗利潤は,減価
償却費,留保利潤, 配当,非法人企業からの収益の回収,地代および利子を含
んでいる。かくしてわれわれは, 資本家消費と労働者消費を区別して示した次
のような粗国民生産物の貸借対照表を得る。
粗利潤 粗投資
賃金と俸給 資本家消費
労働者消費
粗国民生産物 粗国民生産物
労働者は貯著しないという仮定を追加すれば, 労働者消費は彼らの所得に等し
くなる。このことから直接的に,次式を得る。
粗利潤 = 粗投資+資本家消費
この方程式は何を意味しているのであろうか。それは,ある期間の利潤が資
本家消費と投資を決定するということを意味しているのであろうか,あるいは
その逆のことを意味しているのであろうか。この疑問に対する回答は, これら
の項目のうちどの項目が直接的に資本家の決意によって決定されるのかという
ことに依存している。ところで,資本家はある期間に前期より多く消費したり
投資したりすることを決意することはできるであろうが, より多くの利潤を獲
得しようと決意することができないことは明らかである。したがって,利潤を
決定するのは彼らの消費決意と投資決意であって,その逆ではない。
カレツキ
資本主義経済の動態理論
79~80頁1984