2022/10/20ケルトン、ミルクマン Have the bond vigilantes who attacked the U.K. killed off modern monetary theory? MMT proponent Stephanie Kelton says that's nonsense. - MarketWatch
The experimental task was to toss a tennis ball into a bucket that was placed 3 meters away. Participants were informed that they had 10 chances. A successful shot meant that the tennis ball entered the bucket and stayed there. The task was chosen because it was simple to explain and implement, and no gender differences in ability were expected (as was found in a pilot experiment and reinforced in the results discussed below). Furthermore, we are aware of no other popular task in these societies that is similar to the ball games that we implemented. Indeed, the Khasi are known archers and the Maasai are known lancers, but since our task can only be completed with an underhand toss, the traditional skills do not advantage men over women. In this spirit, our data represent signals of initial competitive inclinations since the task is unfamiliar (Harrison and List (2004), denote such an approach as an artefactual eld experiment).
Participants, who numbered 155 in total, were told that they were matched with a participant from the other group who was performing the same task at the same time in another area. For example, in the Maasai representative session discussed above, a group 1 member on side 3 was anonymously paired with a group 2 member on side 4, and both subjects were informed that their identities would remain anonymous. The only decision participants were asked to make concerned the manner in which they would be paid for their performance. They made this choice before performing the task, but only after they fully understood the instructions and the payment schemes. The two options participants were asked to choose between were (a) X per successful shot, regardless of the performance of the participant from the other group with whom they were randomly matched or (b) 3X per successful shot if they outperformed the other participant. They were told that in case they chose the second option and scored the same as the other participant, they would receive X per successful shot. We set X to equalize payments in terms of the prevailing exchange rates, and therefore, set X equal to 500 Tanzanian shillings in Tanzania and 20 rupees in India.
After choosing the incentive scheme, participants completed the task and were told how the other participant performed. Then they were asked to proceed to another location where they provided personal information in an exit survey (see Appendix B for the experimental survey) and were paid their earnings in cash. As promised, participants were never given the opportunity to learn with whom they were paired.
^John Malcolm Dowling, Yap Chin-Fang "Modern Developments in Behavioral Economics: Social Science Perspectves on Choice and Decision", World Scientific Pub Co Inc., 2007年9月.
ダニエル・カーネマン、ポール・スロヴィック、エイモス・トベルスキー共著、『Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases』、1982年、およびT・ギロヴィッチ、D・グリフィン、ダニエル・カーネマン共編、『Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive jadgment』、2002年参照。
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (1999). Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (2000). Choices, values and frames. New York: Cambridge University Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.). (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive jadgment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Diener, E., Helliwell, J.F., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.). (2010). International differences in well-being. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1971). "Belief in the law of small numbers". Psychological Bulletin 76 (2): 105–110.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1972). "Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness". Cognitive Psychology 3 (3): 430–454.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1973). "On the psychology of prediction". Psychological Review 80 (4): 237–251.
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1973). "Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability". Cognitive Psychology 5 (2): 207–23.
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases". Science 185 (4157): 1124–1131.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1979). "Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk". Econometrica 47 (2): 263–291.
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1981). "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice". Science 211 (4481): 453–458.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1984). "Choices, values and frames". American Psychologist 39 (4): 341–350.
Kahneman, D.; Miller, D.T. (1986). "Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives". Psychological Review 93 (2): 136–153.
Kahneman, D.; Knetsch, J.L.; Thaler, R.H. (1990). "Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem". Journal of Political Economy 98 (6): 1325–1348.
Fredrickson, B. L.; Kahneman, D. (1993). "Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1): 45–55.
Kahneman, D.; Lovallo, D. (1993). "Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive perspective on risk-taking". Management Science 39: 17–31.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1996). "On the reality of cognitive illusions". Psychological Review 103 (3): 582–591.
Schkade, D. A.; Kahneman, D. (1998). "Does living in California make people happy? A focusing illusion in judgments of life satisfaction". Psychological Science 9 (5): 340–346.
Kahneman, D. (2003). "A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality". American Psychologist 58 (9): 697–720.
Kahneman, D.; Krueger, A.; Schkade, D.; Schwarz, N.; Stone, A. (2006). "Would you be happier if you were richer? A focusing illusion". Science 312 (5782): 1908–10.
経済理論の核となる前提とは 、人は自分にとって最適な行動を選択する 、というものだ 。つまり 、私たちは経済学者の言う 「合理的期待 ( r a t i o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s ) 」に基づいて選択をしているというのである 。…
この制約付き最適化 ( c o n s t r a i n e d o p t i m i z a t i o n =限られた予算の下で最良のものを選ぶこと )の前提は 、経済理論のもう 1つの柱である均衡 ( e q u i l i b r i u m )と結びついている 。価格が自由に変動する競争市場では 、供給と需要が一致するように価格が調整される 。これを少し単純化すると 、 「最適化 +均衡 =経済学 」という式で表すことができる 。この組み合わせは強力で 、他の社会科学はとうてい太刀打ちできない 。ところがいくつか問題がある 。経済理論が拠って立つ前提には欠陥があるのだ 。…